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THEORIES OF NATURAL EVIL
IN THE THOUGHT OF
HENRY NELSON WIEMAN, EDWIN LEWIS, AND PAUL TILlich

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
INTRODUCTION	xvi
1. The Problem of the Dissertation	xvi
2. Definitions and Limitations	xvi
i. Natural evil	xvi
ii. The problem of natural evil	xxi
iii. The thinkers considered	xxiii
3. Previous Research in the Field	xxiv
4. The Methodology of the Dissertation	xxvii
I. HENRY NELSON WIEMAN: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF IMMANENT CREATIVITY	1
1. Background and Introduction to the Thought of Henry Nelson Wieman	1
i. The challenge of naturalistic skepticism	1
ii. Theistic naturalism	2
(1) A verifiable and religiously meaningful God-hypothesis	2
(2) Influences and influencers	3
(3) Meeting the problem of evil	5
2. An Empirical Epistemology	7
i. Act, datum, and reason	8
(1) Perceptual events	8
(2) Concepts	9
(3) Implicative use of concepts	9

Chapter		Page
	(4) Descriptive truth-function of concepts	9
	(5) Scientific knowledge	10
ii.	The ontological grounds of truth	10
	(1) Subject-object process of reality	10
	(2) Common knowledge	11
	(3) Private knowledge	11
iii.	The ontological structure of reason	12
	(1) Unity of creative change	12
	(2) Dynamic aspects of mind and reality	13
iv.	Faith and value behind knowledge and truth	13
	(1) Faith as interested act	14
	(2) Ontological stimulus of faith	14
	(3) Quality and value, basic in knowledge and world	14
3.	Religious Knowledge	16
	i. The subject and object in religious knowledge	16
	ii. Knowledge by committed adjustment	17
	iii. Revelation and mysticism in empirical sciences	18
	iv. Limitations of empirical sciences for religious experience	19
	v. Proper use of myth and symbol	20
4.	A Scientific, Pragmatic God-hypothesis	21
	i. God as creative value-process in nature	23
	ii. A limited God and the problem of evil	23
	iii. God as immanent function	24
	(1) Creative interaction and concretion	24
	(2) Concrete value	25

Chapter	Page
(3) Creative value-process	25
(4) The oneness of the work and the worker	26
iv. God as supra-personal	27
v. God above mind	28
vi. The manifold unity of God	29
(1) Divine unity	29
(2) Divine manifoldness in unity	30
(3) The eternal temporality of God	30
vii. The supreme worthfulness of God	31
(1) Created value	32
(2) Creative value	32
(3) Limited power of the creative	32
(4) Ultimate cause and supreme good relative to man	33
(5) Organic work of God—mechanical work of man	33
viii. Overbeliefs of religious value	34
5. Theory of Good and Evil	36
i. Realistic setting for the problem of evil	36
ii. Created and creative good	38
(1) Analysis of the creative event	39
(2) Intrinsic value of creative growth	39
(3) Value and disvalue of created good	40
iii. Absolute good—a finite God	40
(1) Value in subjective and objective interrelation	41
(2) Human relevance of the ultimate good	42
iv. Derivative and independent aspects of the nature of evil	43
(1) Evil form derived from good	43

Chapter	Page
(2) The absolute nature of obstructive evil	44
(3) The independent status of pervasive evil . . .	44
(4) Sin as idolatry of the created	46
(5) Sin as demonic	47
(6) Evil flaws in finite value-perception	47
(7) Original evil--not original sin	48
(8) Freedom to do good only	49
v. Nature versus God	49
(1) Natural evil in protective hierarchies	50
(2) Natural evil by inertias	51
(3) Pain and suffering as positive evidence of conflict	52
(4) Death and the danger of immortality	53
(5) Wrath of God	54
(6) Positive shock of evil	55
6. The Redemption of Man from Evil	55
i. A present, felt power of redemption	55
(1) No redemption in the a-historic	55
(2) No futuristic redemption	56
(3) No redemption by beliefs or ideals	56
ii. God as the present power of integrating love	57
(1) Forgiveness, conversion, redemption by creative interchange	57
(2) Redemptive suffering--love's strange work . . .	58
iii. Redemptive faith and commitment	59
(1) Faith as vision	60
(2) Liberal faith	60

Chapter	Page
(3) Commitment by worshipful adjustment	61
(4) Mystical immediacy and transcendent symbolism	61
(5) Receptive service	63
(6) Committed discernment of values	63
(7) Jesus Christ as revelatory example	64
iv. Pain and disvalue redeemed in suffering and association	65
v. Immortality and eternal life	66
(1) Death as culmination and doorway	67
(2) Cumulative social immortality	67
(3) Redemption of what has been	68
(4) No sure progress or victory of good	68
vi. Indestructible creative good	69
vii. The positive revelation of good in all evil	70
II. EDWIN LEWIS: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF ULTIMATE STRUGGLE	71
1. Background and Development of Lewis' Position	71
i. Liberal influences	72
(1) Problem of evil in men	72
(2) Problem of evil transcending man	73
ii. Orthodox turnings and deepening insights	74
2. A Theology of the Experience of Natural Evil	76
i. The experience of evil	77
(1) Self-transcendence in the experience of evil	77
(2) Transcendent factors	77
ii. Transcendent reality, revelation, and reason	79
(1) Man's rational capacity	79
(2) Transcendent directives in experienced reality	80

Chapter	Page
(3) Man's necessary God-hypothesis	81
(4) Revelation and interpretation	81
3. Ontological Struggle	83
i. Basic elements of struggle	83
(1) Creator, Adversary, and residual constant . .	83
(2) Monistic inadequacy	85
(3) Pluralistic inadequacy	85
ii. The ontological drama of creation	86
iii. Intimations of the outcome	87
(1) Priority of the creative	88
(2) Creative domination of the nexus of struggle .	88
(3) Parasitic dependence of the Adversary	89
(4) Preliminary grounds for optimism	89
iv. The effect on man	90
(1) Man, precious and vulnerable	90
(2) Man's egocentricity and evil	91
(3) Natural evils	92
(4) Avoidable and inevitable evils	93
(5) Similarity and difference in the situations of man and God	94
4. The Drama of Redemption	95
i. The nature and role of Jesus Christ	96
(1) Divine entrance into human struggle	96
(2) Human entrance into Christ	97
ii. The inner meaning of redemption	97
iii. Victory of the immanent God over evil	98
(1) Victorious power of an immanent God	98
(2) God's power available in men	100

Chapter	Page
5. Grounds for Enduring Hope	101
1. God's capacity for consistent concern	101
(1) God's acquaintance with human hope	101
(2) God's time	102
(3) Confidence in a finite God	103
(4) The dependable consistency of divine purpose	105
(5) God's respectful revelation through Christ's victory	106
(6) The enduring finality of Christ's victory	106
ii. The confidence and comfort of eternal life	107
(1) Individual immortality and the conservation of value	107
(2) Qualitative and quantitative eternal life	109
(3) The extended and transcendent harvest	109
III. PAUL TILLICH: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF ABSOLUTE BEING	112
1. Background and Introduction to the Thought of Paul Tillich	112
i. Nature romanticism	112
ii. Correlation of existentialism and essentialism	113
iii. The dialectical structure of being and existence	119
iv. Ontological reason	120
(1) Depth of reason	121
(2) The fallen state of human reason	121
(3) Symbolic meaning	122
v. God as ground of being	123
(1) The power of being and nonbeing	123
(2) The symbol of a personal God	125

Chapter	Page
2. The Concern and Question of Man's Existential Situation	126
i. The correlation of existential question and answer	126
ii. Nonbeing in existence	127
(1) Negative appraisals of existence	128
(2) Demythologizing the symbol of "the Fall"	129
iii. Freedom and destiny	130
iv. The fall as existential self-estrangement	131
(1) Human responsibility in spite of destiny . . .	132
(2) The mutual fall of man and nature	133
(3) The mutual relation of moral and natural evil .	135
v. The pattern and symptoms of estrangement	136
(1) Being and nonbeing in ambiguous existence . . .	137
(2) Demonic bifurcation of dialectical existence .	137
(3) Nonbeing and the categories of reason	138
(4) Nonbeing as destiny and guilt in suffering and death	140
(5) Despair and the concern for salvation	143
3. The Answer of Theology	144
i. The courageous affirmation of being	144
ii. God as transcendent and immanent	145
(1) The near aspect of God	146
(2) The far aspect of God	147
iii. The integrating attributes of God as spirit	147
iv. The redemption of temporal evil through the eternity of God	149
v. Providential courage	150
(1) The key to theodicy	151
(2) The existential answer	152

Chapter	Page
vi. The pervasive range of the demonic	152
vii. The comprehensive grounds for courage and faith . .	154
(1) The "in-spite-of" quality of being and existence	154
(2) The power of self-transcendent realism	155
viii. The soteriological meaning of being-itself as love .	155
(1) The self-limitation of love's power	156
(2) A suffering God	157
(3) Love and justice in redemption	158
4. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ	159
i. The divine working under the conditions of existence	161
ii. The paradoxical nature of the New Being	162
iii. The mutual plight of man and nature	163
(1) Disintegration and sickness	164
(2) Love's healing power	164
iv. The redemption of nature in the New Being	165
(1) Demonic distortion transcended	165
(2) Courage for the tragic scene of nature	166
(3) Suffering borne by courage	166
(4) Acceptance and guiltless suffering	167
v. Realistic redemption	168
(1) Redemption "in spite of" suffering and death .	168
(2) Existential theodicy	170
(3) A comprehensively sacramental world	171

Chapter	Page
IV. CRITICAL COMPARISON FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING	173
1. Philosophical Understanding in Convergent and Divergent Systems	173
i. Dominant convergences	173
ii. Plan of presentation	174
iii. Questions to be answered; problems to be understood	175
2. Knowledge of the World and Ultimate Reality	177
i. The precedence of scientific epistemology in Wieman	178
ii. The precedence of ontology in Tillich	180
iii. Critical comparison of Wieman and Tillich	183
iv. Natural knowledge and revelation of the supernatural in Lewis	189
v. Further critical comparisons	191
(1) The dialectical structure of transcendent reality	191
(2) The revelatory fulfillment of reason	191
(3) The validity of committed knowledge	195
(4) Objective knowledge of God	196
(5) The import of natural experiences of negativity	198
3. The Nature and Work of God and the Ground of Evil	198
i. Tillich's dialectical concept of God	199
ii. Wieman's continuity of creation and God	203
iii. Lewis' God of dualistic struggle	206
iv. Further critical comparisons	209
(1) The problematic nature of God in Wieman and Tillich	209
(2) Critical comparison with Lewis' specifiable, working God	213

Chapter	Page
4. The Nature of Value and the Conception of Evil	216
i. The nature of value in the life of man	216
(1) Value and the creative personality, according to Wieman	217
(2) Value and man's relation to being, according to Tillich	218
(3) Value and the imitation of Christ, according to Lewis	219
(4) Comparative considerations	220
ii. The complexity of evil in human experience	221
(1) Tillich's comprehension of the existential complexity of evil	222
(2) Convergences of natural and moral evil in Wieman's theory	223
(3) Lewis' structure of cosmic struggle to comprehend the felt content of natural evil	224
iii. The ultimate nature and status of value	226
(1) Tillich's ontological basis and nature of value	226
(2) The ultimacy of value in the theory of Lewis	229
(3) The centrality of value in the theory of Wieman	230
iv. The goodness and power of God	231
5. Summary and Conclusions	233
V. CRITICAL COMPARISON FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE	243
1. Standards of Religious Significance	243
2. Explanation for the Kind of Evil Man Experiences	247
3. The Ultimate Status of Humanly Relevant Values	250
i. The questionable transcendence of ontology over axiology in Tillich	251
ii. Axiology transcended in Wieman	252
iii. Human values and the personal aspect of God in Lewis	252

Chapter	Page
4. The Soteriological Nature of God	253
1. Jesus Christ, the revelation of God's sympathetic redemptive power	254
(1) Tillich's victory of courage in the self through Jesus Christ	254
(2) Lewis' objective victory of God revealed in Jesus Christ	255
(3) Wieman's redemptive community founded in Jesus Christ	255
(4) God's immanental concern, suffering, and victory revealed in Jesus Christ	256
ii. The comfort of divine immanence and the liability of the utter transcendence of God	257
5. Man's Approach to God in Worship	260
i. Dimensions of the experience of worship	260
ii. Meaningful symbols for worship	262
6. The Nature of Redemption	263
1. The experience of evil and the redeeming grace of God	264
(1) Redemption as reunion of the estranged according to Tillich	265
(2) Wieman's concept of redemption as commitment to creative power	266
(3) Lewis' concept of redemption as commitment to God, the creative and victorious artisan	267
ii. The consistency of divine purpose throughout redemption	268
(1) Implication of God's consistent purpose as evidenced in natural stabilities	268
(2) The redemptive increase of human knowledge in a world of stable structure	270
(3) The concept of divine wrath and the consistent redemptive purpose of God	271

Chapter	Page
iii. Man's courageous opposition to evil and his redemptive co-operation with God	273
iv. The implications of a suffering God and the continuing cross of redeemed man	274
v. Grounds for the present experience of transcendent courage and confidence in God	276
vi. Futuristic dimensions of redemption	277
7. Immortality and Eternal Life	277
i. Religious man's quest for immortality and eternal life	278
(1) Tillich's rejection of immortality and affirmation of eternal life	279
(2) Wieman's rejection of personal immortality and affirmation of social immortality	280
(3) Lewis' integration of personal existence and value, immortality and eternal life	283
ii. Implications of the concepts of crucifixion and resurrection	284
iii. The nature of life eternal and immortal	285
8. Summary and Conclusions	287
BIBLIOGRAPHY	299
ABSTRACT	311
AUTOBIOGRAPHY	314

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of the Dissertation

This dissertation is a study of theories of natural evil in the thought of three American religious thinkers of the twentieth century. They are Henry Nelson Wieman, Edwin Lewis, and Paul Tillich. Although none of these has written a systematic presentation of his theory of natural evil, each has written much which is relevant to a theory of natural evil. Thus, the problem of this dissertation is to explore critically their larger systems of religious thought for elements capable of contributing to theories of natural evil.

In the case of each thinker, these elements are to be considered within the context of his larger system of thought. Further, they are to be critically compared and evaluated in terms of their rational and religious meaningfulness.

2. Definitions and Limitations

1. Natural evil

Natural evil is to be defined broadly here as events leading to experiences of disvalue for any sentient and, in particular, any rational being, for which no human responsibility can reasonably be found. This definition is purposely broad for the sake of covering the more specific definitions found in the thinkers to be considered.

Manifestations of natural evil include man's very downward bent to physical and mental dissolution, earthquakes, floods, tidal waves, cancer, congenital diseases, and children born idiots, as well as the final reality of death in all living creatures. The list is almost endless.

The problem of natural evil has been called by some thinkers the problem of pain or suffering. From certain points of view, it may be this. But such designations do not readily suggest the mental and spiritual dimensions involved in man's experience of disvalue. They sound more like elements from an exclusive pain-pleasure premise of hedonism. Likewise, they tend to ignore the differentia of human responsibility the absence of which distinguishes natural evil from moral evil, as suggested above.

It is a fact that pain or suffering not only is a great disvalue for hedonists, but may be disvalues even for certain religious idealists. It is often the case that present sufferings may be positively pointed toward, or may positively eventuate in, forthcoming values. Nevertheless, they may still constitute present disvalues to a great many people. Since evil is being considered here within the context of the problem of evil as viewed by religious thinkers, however, the fact becomes more obvious that evil is likely to be defined in other terms besides pain and suffering. If, in the thought of religious men, spiritual communion with God, however conceived, is the good, then separation from God will be evil. If knowledge of God is held to be the good, then ignorance or possibly error will constitute evil. Or, if the creative growth and development of one's capabilities in harmony with the will of God is the good, then

anything which causes a static way of life which obstructs the divine will may be called evil. Of course, it may be said that some form of physical, mental, or spiritual discomfort is the symptom of all such evils. Yet, to call this pain or suffering alone is to focus on the surface of the symptoms without suggesting the deeper meanings involved. In any case, regardless of what things may be called evils, insofar as such evils constitute elements in human experience for which man is not ultimately responsible, they are natural evils.

The term moral evil will be used in this dissertation to describe those experiences of human disvalue, the causes of which are traceable to human responsibility. This is evil brought on by human volition when there is human cognizance of, and a sense of obligation toward, ethical standards which are being broken. Such standards may vary greatly in their form and authority among persons. They may vary all the way from being construed as the will of God to being interpreted as naturalistic (nontheistic) standards of physical or mental health. They may be standards held by the evil-doer himself, who is then in a position to judge his own act as moral evil; or they may be standards held by others who judge his act to be moral evil from their point of view. Again, this definition is kept broad to allow for variations in it to be found among the thinkers to be considered.

To clarify further the above definitions and limitations by way of illustration, it may be said that insofar as man acts in such a way as to cause disvalue to himself or others, but does it out of ignorance or compulsion for which he cannot reasonably be held responsible, then such ignorance or compulsion becomes an element of natural evil. Nevertheless, another person who has in some sense risen above such ignorance

or compulsion may still judge the man's total act as moral evil in which elements of natural evil were partially present. Such an act might then be considered to be more of the nature of "a mistake" than of villainy.¹ Yet, men in this world are held responsible and punished for this kind of "mistake." This is a case, then, in which human volition and conscious obligation to an ethical standard are present, but in which these elements belong severally to a community of persons instead of belonging to the individual alone. The volition may be the individual doer's; the standard may be someone else's. Yet, that someone else will still pronounce the individual's act to be moral evil.

In moral evil as in natural evil there must be a standard of value or well-being against which man judges the disvalues he experiences. But the crucial factor in the distinction between natural and moral evil being made here is human volition.

The term metaphysical evil has also been used by thinkers in this area to designate structures or agencies of ultimate reality which are held responsible for man's experience of disvalue. In a sense, metaphysical evil, insofar as it is experienced by man, is natural evil. However, the term is very useful in the present study to distinguish between natural evil as experienced by man and natural evil as caused by structures and forces of ultimate reality. Natural evil is the term to be used here in the consideration of experiential evil. Metaphysical evil is the term to be used insofar as factors in ontology are conceived to be causes of natural evil.

1. For a discussion of the distinction between such "mistakes" and "villainy" in terms of "material" and "formal sins" see L. Harold DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953), pp. 182-183.

It must be remembered that elements of natural, moral, and metaphysical evil mingle intricately in human experience and in any explanation of it. What man does is always partially determined by what he is--his nature and that of his world insofar as he is not responsible for them--yet, what he is is partially determined by what he does. If man is defined as having the power of free will to make alternative choices while also being determined in part by causal factors (as will be the case with the thinkers considered in this dissertation), then in any act or experience of disvalue some elements of moral evil and some of natural (and metaphysical) evil are likely to be found. It might be said, quite simply, that the line where human responsibility leaves off and causation or determination begins is seldom, if ever, as clear in the analysis of experienced disvalue as it may be in theory. The relations, ratios, and dimensions of evils as interpreted in any given experience will vary from thinker to thinker, as presented in this dissertation.

This persistent concurrence and intermingling of moral and natural (and metaphysical) evil in any specific analysis of human experience may reasonably lead one to cease calling them types of evil and, instead, cause one to refer to them as dimensions, factors, or emphases within the larger experience of evil, however conceived. Thus, with due regard both for basic distinctions already presented and for this larger context of evil, natural evil will not be dealt with here in an exclusive way. Rather, this is to be a study of the problem of evil in the large with its emphasis on the dimension of natural evil.

ii. The problem of natural evil

The problem of natural evil with which theories of natural evil must deal may be stated quite generally as the problem of making sense of man's life and world in which man faces so many evils for which he cannot reasonably consider himself responsible. This "sense" which man would make of his world is the knowledge or faith (in conjunction with some manner of support) that the values or qualities of life which he desires at his best are somehow supported and conserved in this world in which they are so often kept or taken from him. It is the problem of developing a positive attitude of confidence in life's meaningfulness and of "courageous composure" in one's world, in spite of anxiety over the vast variety of seemingly meaningless afflictions which beset man. It is, quite literally, the problem of holding fast to life at its best in the face of life at its worst and death. John Stuart Mill has expressed something of the natural evils man faces while trying to believe that there is a basic and meaningful justice for man in this world.

In sober truth nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's everyday performances. . . . Nature impales men . . . and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this, nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice.¹

In this dissertation the problem of evil is considered primarily from the angle of vision of religious men. It is set in the thought systems of religious thinkers. Here the problem takes on another di-

1. John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1874), p. 29.

mension. The problem of evil for Christian theists has usually been the problem of reconciling the facts of evil in the world with belief in a God who is held to be both all-good and all-powerful. It has also been the problem of finding and adjusting to God's plan and power for the salvation and redemption of man in his evil predicament.

In this, it must be remembered that the problem of evil belongs to everyone, not just to theists. As Brightman has put it, "It is evasive to say that the problem is artificially created by the belief in a good God. The problem is given in the conflicts of experience."¹ For every feeling man there is the problem of persistent disvalue; for every thinking man, the problem of inescapable dysteleological elements in the frame of life. For religious man who believes in a good and powerful God, the crucial nature of the problem of evil has been well expressed by Ralph Tyler Flewelling who called it "the rock on which theism is supposed to wreck itself."²

It must also be remembered that the problem of natural evil is not only a problem of speculative philosophy which seeks to comprehend the patterns of reality which will account for the contrarities of life (health-sickness, knowledge-ignorance, life-death, etc.). It is also a problem of "soteriology." This word is used here rather than theology to suggest the fact that men, whether theistic believers or not, do seek more than an understanding of reality to meet evil. They seek a saving or soteriological structure and power by which they may overcome, or re-

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1. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," The Development of American Philosophy, ed. W. G. Muellder and L. Sears (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), p. 520.
 2. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1915), p. 188.

deem, or be protected from, evil. The theist turns to his God for such salvation.

This is not to say that the philosophical and soteriological-theological ventures of man are mutually exclusive. Man's quest for understanding of the ultimate structure of the world is prompted by a desire to discover resources available in heaven or earth to aid him in overcoming life's negativities and limitations. Likewise, such resources, be they theistic faith, or grace, or naturalistic energies of the universe, can only be found, communicated, and employed if they are rendered somehow intelligible by man's philosophical effort.

Thus, theories of natural evil (conceptions of the problem and its answer) as presented in the thought of the three American religious thinkers of this dissertation will be considered, in part, as man's venture to understand and also as his venture to find redemption. This is the twofold way in which the thinkers considered have addressed themselves to the problem, as will be seen.

iii. The thinkers considered

The three American religious thinkers whose theories are presented here have all dealt with the problem of natural evil indirectly, yet meaningfully. That is, although none of them has written any systematic presentation on the theme of natural evil, each has presented in his larger system highly meaningful insights for the comprehension and redemption of natural evil.

A further distinction concerning these men seems in order here. They have been referred to as "religious thinkers" in this dissertation for the sake of broadly and comprehensively designating their approaches

which span the disciplines both of philosophy of religion and of theology. However, some differentiation may be made here. Henry Nelson Wieman has been more of a philosopher of religion than a theologian, placing his emphasis on objective analysis of the human religious constitution and experience. Yet, he has, at times, entered the "theological arena" insofar as he has spoken from the position of commitment to the Christian soteriological structure and tradition. Edwin Lewis is quite clearly a theologian, speaking from the tradition of, and making defense for, Christian belief as interpreted by him. Nevertheless, he is given to extensive philosophical analysis of his terms and structures. Paul Tillich operates in both the disciplines of philosophy of religion and of theology. His central method of correlation is the key to his approach, that of correlating philosophical questions with theological answers. Some may hold that this gives theology decided pre-eminence. Yet, in this study, the twofold nature of his approach is accepted as such.

Thus, the combination of positions to be considered in this dissertation presents some balance between philosophical and theological approaches to the problem. This is to have its effect on methodology as will be shown below.

3. Previous Research in the Field

Prior to this dissertation, to the best knowledge of the author, no comparative study has been made of theories of natural evil in the thought of Henry Nelson Wieman, Edwin Lewis, and Paul Tillich taken together. However, a few previous works in the field have some noteworthy relation to the present study.

A dissertation was written by Alexander Nicholas Tsambasis at Northwestern University in 1957 on the topic, "Evil and the 'Abysmal Nature' of God in the Thought of Brightman, Berdyaev, and Tillich." In this very insightful study Tsambasis placed heavy emphasis on the German (pre-American) writings of Tillich. His study was focused on the implications of the abysmal nature of God in Tillich's thought for the explanation of man's experience of natural evil. This is an emphasis much more limited in scope than the emphasis of this present dissertation in which implications for a theory of natural evil from Tillich's system as a whole are being sought. Again, Tsambasis placed his emphasis more on the philosophical than on the religious value of Tillich's thought. Tillich's explanation for the presence of evil in the world is considered with very little reference to Tillich's theory of man's redemption from evil. In this present dissertation, the religious value of Tillich's systematic insights and the nature of Tillich's theory of redemption are major concerns. One other difference between the study by Tsambasis and the present dissertation lies in the fact that Tsambasis' critique of Tillich was made by way of comparison with Brightman and Berdyaev rather than with Wieman and Lewis. Tsambasis also made a study of major criticisms of Tillich by others besides the men mentioned in his title.

It is interesting to note that the conclusions of the dissertation by Tsambasis (which was not available to this writer until this present dissertation had been nearly completed) are in many ways quite different from those of this present study. This fact is mentioned to suggest where another point of view on Tillich's theory of evil is available.

A dissertation by Chesly Taylor Howell written at the University of Chicago in 1937 is entitled, "A Critique of Theories of Good and Evil in Contemporary Thought." This study of theories of good and evil by no less than twenty-three modern American thinkers, each one presented rather briefly, provides excellent background material for a more extensive study of individual, modern American theorists on the problem of natural evil. The only thinker of this present dissertation considered by Howell is Henry Nelson Wieman. Howell's treatment of Wieman is very brief and, by reason of date, does not include a number of significant books by Wieman written since that dissertation.

Martin Luther King wrote a dissertation entitled, "A Comparison of the Conceptions of God in the Thinking of Paul Tillich and Henry Nelson Wieman" at Boston University in 1955. Although not directed toward the problem of natural evil, in King's study many insights are to be found into the general nature of the thought of Tillich and Wieman.

Finally, a work which offers something of a pattern for the study of theories of natural evil in the thought of three American religious thinkers is Personalism and the Problem of Evil by Floyd Hiatt Ross. This is a published doctoral dissertation written at Yale University in 1935 (published by the Yale University Press in 1940). Theories of natural evil by Borden Parker Bowne, Albert Cornelius Knudson, and Edgar Sheffield Brightman are considered. The capacity of personalism to explain meaningfully the ultimate reason for phenomena of natural evil and to offer religiously meaningful concepts of the redemption of evil by a personal God is clearly presented.

4. The Methodology of the Dissertation

The methodology of this dissertation is to be as follows. A brief study will be made of the background and orientation of the system of thought of each of the three thinkers considered. Following this, the larger system of thought by each man will be explored for elements relevant to a theory of natural evil and its redemption. Such elements will be presented, as far as possible, within the context of the system from which they come to reveal how they arise in the system. Thus, elements for a theory of natural evil by each thinker will be considered in their relation to other relevant factors of his system of thought (i.e. his theory of knowledge, his theory of values, his conceptions of God and creation, and his theory of man's religious consciousness). Various premises and presuppositions found in the respective systems will be considered to note the implications they hold separately and ensemble for the problem of evil, with emphasis on natural evil.

The question of how a systematic philosophy of religion or theology generates a theory for the comprehension and redemption of natural evil, and the emphasis to be properly given this factor in the formulation of a larger system will be dealt with. This will be, in effect, a consideration of the effects of a system on the problem of natural evil and the effects of the problem on the system.

In the interest of allowing each system more or less to "speak for itself," and in the interest of presenting each system in the terms of its author as much as possible, the order in which the above elements appear may differ somewhat in the different presentations, in fairness to

the original order of each thinker's thought.

Finally, following the fundamental work of this dissertation, which is to discover the nature of each thinker's theory of natural evil, a critical comparison of the systems presented will be made. Extensive attention will be given to elements of convergence and divergence among the systems presented. It is fairer to say that elements of systems will be comparatively evaluated than that total systems will be set one against the other. This comparison of elements will not act as a preparation for the comparative evaluation of the total systems. This is because the problem of natural evil is, itself, only an element in any system of religious thought. It is also because the unmeasurable nuances of comparative value in the many elements of the systems compared do not lend themselves to the ready addition and subtraction necessary for any final choice of a superior system as a whole.

This comparative criticism and evaluation will be made from two points of view--philosophical understanding and religious significance. These viewpoints are somewhat correlated with the approaches of philosophy and theology used by Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich. They are also correlated with the factors of philosophical question and religious need earlier noted as being inherent in the very nature of the problem of natural evil itself.

From the former viewpoint of philosophical understanding, theories will be examined for their rational consistency and coherence in their comprehension of man's experience of evil and redemption from it. From the viewpoint of religious significance, theories will be considered for their capacities to understand and answer meaningfully religious man's quest for divine comfort and the redemption of his evil plight.

CHAPTER I

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF IMMANENT CREATIVITY

1. Background and Introduction to the Thought of Henry Nelson Wieman

1. The challenge of naturalistic skepticism

Henry Nelson Wieman began writing in the 1920's for an audience of religious skeptics in America. These skeptics made up a large portion of the thoughtful world of the time. Their fulcrum for religious doubt was the resplendent scientific naturalism of the day, with its rarefied epistemology, tangible or this-worldly ontology, and confident ideal of evolutionary progress. The influence of supernaturalistic theologians like Karl Barth seemed only to drive naturalists farther into nature. Naturalists abhorred beliefs in a God transcendent and condemnatory over finite creation, a God totally inaccessible to human reason.

In the ranks of American religious thinkers a necessary opposite to the Barthian type of supernaturalism was generated within the ranks of prior liberalism. Naturalist members of this opposition felt that liberalism, for all of its insight into the values of scientific naturalism, had never freed itself from certain transcendent, super-naturalistic entanglements of faith. Out of this progressive setting came the early works of Henry Nelson Wieman, a man with deep religious

sensitivity and an appreciative understanding of scientific naturalism. In simplest terms, he confronted the world as a scientific mystic.

ii. Theistic naturalism

In his earlier years Wieman had been a Roycean idealist. In time, however, he lost his appreciation for idealism's ethereally neat system for comprehending a very ambiguous, tangible world. Yet, he maintained an idealist's confidence in the capacity of reason to know reality. There could be no transcendent, sacred reality or noumenal world beyond the grasp of man's natural reason. Divine and human reason must be one. The unknowable is, by definition, a factor of no account in man's experience.

(1) A verifiable and religiously meaningful God-hypothesis.--

In his rationalistic ministry to skeptics Wieman desired "so to formulate the idea of God that the question of God's existence becomes a dead issue, like the question of other inescapable forms of vital existence."¹ Thus, he declared that God is an experienceable reality within, not over, nature. Holding that one cannot go beyond "events, their qualities, and relations" with human reason,² Wieman sought to formulate a God-hypothesis whose experimental verification would reveal God in the existential world of events, qualities, and relations. This God would not only be accessible to, but unavoidable in, human experience.

1. Henry Nelson Wieman, Max Carl Otto, and Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Is There a God? (Chicago: Willett, Clark, and Company, 1932), p. 276. Unless otherwise stated, all references in this chapter will be to works by Wieman.

2. The Source of Human Good (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 6.

Dubbing himself a "naturalistic theist,"¹ Wieman sought to formulate and test his hypothesis within the terms of careful scientific acceptability. This demand for scientific acceptability was not only for the sake of pleasing his scientific audience. It was to meet his own desire for a God of concrete dimensions in experience. "The only reason I insist on scientific method in religion, is because I want to deal with the objective, existential God, and not merely ideas."²

(2) Influences and influencers.--Several persons influenced Wieman at this point. In the writings of John Dewey, Wieman found a God of very concrete character. John Dewey had portrayed God as a superhuman (meaning super-individual) power uniting the actual with the ideal and giving unity and meaning to man's varied endeavors. (Dewey was yet to make his most definitive statement of this in A Common Faith, but already his position was before the public.) This activity of God was neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Indeed, it possessed none of the transcendent aspects of traditional supernaturalism. This God-process was so immanent as to be housed in the community of man as a matrix of community mind and ideal values. Wieman leaned strongly toward this humanistic and naturalistic appreciation for the experienceable God-function in community. Yet, he was also drawn by a transcendent image of God in his insistence that God transcends the social group. Human imagination and will can never unify the many natural and social forces beating in on man. God must be more than the sum of human will and imagination.

1. Wieman and Eugene Bernard Meland, American Philosophies of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1936), pp. 295-297.

2. "Theocentric Religion," Contemporary American Theology, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), I, 347.

The influence of his Harvard teachers, Hocking and Perry, gave Wieman confidence in the capacity of human reason to know the real God regardless of reason's innate egocentricity. In this confidence he sought to skirt the brink of anthropocentric humanisms and personalisms to find a theocentric theology capable of operating within the arena of anthropic concern. Ideas for such a theory came to Wieman from Bergson's evolution which revealed an immanent God-process worthy of all devotion and, perhaps, worship. However, Wieman remained true to the epistemology of scientific realism to accept Bergson's process without Bergson's epistemology for finding out about the process. Bergsonian intuition qualified as the experience of mystical immediacy, but not as knowledge which, for Wieman, demanded an irreducible dualism of subject and object.

Much thought had been expended on the concept of God as a process in nature for the progressive integration of the world. Theories like Jan Smuts' "holism," Hobhouse's "cooperation," F. S. C. Northrop's "congesting influence of the atom," and Michael Pupin's "creative coordination" had been expressed.¹ Likewise, the "behaviorism" of the psychologist Watson had made process or behavior respectable entities for realistic thought. If Watson could define the human person as its behavior, God could be His behavior accessible in nature. God would no longer be some inaccessible factor "behind" His work.

It was, however, the thought of Alfred North Whitehead as expressed in Process and Reality which had the most marked influence on the thought of Wieman. Whitehead, as Wieman saw him, declared that natural process is the ultimate reality of this single-story universe.

1. "The Philosophy of Worship," The Monist, XXXIX (Jan., 1929), 65.

God, within this universe, is the form-creator, impressor, or integrator who brings forth maximum meaning and value from the pan-inter-influential energies in the process of nature. At one point, however, Wieman saw Whitehead as an incurable fancier of what William James once called "over-beliefs." In this, Whitehead held the theory that God had a primordial or pre-existent nature. God, here, was a kind of pre-existent storehouse or surveyor of all possible forms of meaning and value, which were to be impressed on the natural process. Wieman could not accept this, since such belief went far beyond the bounds of scientific inquiry and tended to re-establish the old two-story universe as a story and one half "split level" structure. However, Wieman could accept the concept of God as a process existent in nature for the creation and growth of meaning and value. By this he could offer due regards both for theocentricity and for science.

Thus, Wieman formulated his hypothesis or definition of God, a definition which he believed capable of scientific verification. "God is that in the universe which will yield maximum security and increase of human good when lives are properly adjusted to him."¹ This hypothesis met the two requirements of scientific experimentation. First, according to it, God is something actually existent in the explorable universe; and, secondly, there are distinguishing features of the God-object by which it can be identified.

(3) Meeting the problem of evil.--Another great factor influenced Wieman's theory. It was the same one which had driven the thought of Whitehead beyond the bonds of the verifiable sciences he loved to a "consequent" or value-preserving nature of God. This factor was the problem

1. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 59.

of evil.

Moved by evidences of conflict, meaninglessness, suffering, death, and destruction in the universe, Wieman always defined the religious problem as follows: "What can transform man in such a way as to save him from depths of evil and bring him to the greatest good which human life can attain?"¹ In order to offer salvation in man's terms of value and meaning, the desired saving process had to be open to reasoned experience. It also had to be realistically set against the evil in human experience. It seemed like a false hypothesis before the fact of evil to assume with traditional supernaturalists that God is the totally good and powerful supporter of all creation. "He who makes an assumption which does not fit the known truth has a false problem [of evil] when he tries to make the facts fit the assumption."² Spurning what he deemed false ways of "escaping" the problem of evil when it is posed against the background of a totally good and omnipotent God, Wieman declared, "The problem [of evil] is simply an inquiry concerning what is the nature and scope of evil over against the nature and scope of what is good."³

Only an hypothesis of a good but finite God could deal with the evidences of conflict in the world. Following the mind of Whitehead, Wieman defined God as the producer or process of meaning and value subsumed in nature. Nature is composed of many other processes and factors of blind force and inertia which operate as vast adversaries of the good.

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), p. 10.

2. Wieman and Walter Marshall Horton, The Growth of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1938), p. 354.

3. Ibid., p. 357.

Going beyond this premise, Whitehead, holder of the previous over-belief (i.e. beyond scientific verification) in the primordial nature of God, held also an over-belief in a consequent nature of God. In this latter concept, God became a conserver of all the values which ever rose and fell within the long struggle of existence.

To this degree of belief Wieman would not go. Such belief lay well beyond the range of scientific verification.

It may seem here that Wieman was not sensitive to the religious cravings of embattled man who is led to such over-beliefs so that he may transcend evil. If not, Wieman was possessed with an equally authentic religious desire--the desire for a God of felt reality rather than a God who was only the object of man's ardent belief. While over-beliefs in a transcendent God may help to win man's theoretical battles with evil, it is a concrete experience of God which aids man most in his existential meetings with evil. Wieman has sought for such a God of felt reality, clarified, structured, and communicated by science, to prove to a skeptical and suffering world that "God cannot be denied."¹

2. An Empirical Epistemology

To understand fully Wieman's ontology and soteriological structure for the comprehension and redemption of evil, one must consider his epistemology. This is so because, for Wieman, epistemology precedes ontology. How and what man is able to know scientifically determines the inclusive scope of existence and reality so far as man is

1. Religious Experience and Scientific Method (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 10.

concerned. Thus it sets the limits for any discussion of the problem of evil.

1. Act, datum, and reason

The primary analyzable element in human knowledge is sense experience of quality and value.¹ Man acts against objective contingencies and finds the consequence or feeling of his act painful or pleasurable. In time, by observation, he comes to know the likely outcome of certain actions. His physiological propulsions are no longer blind. Instead, he knows the outcome of his act when it is carried out in accordance with certain patterns and under certain conditions. At this stage one can properly speak of knowledge. "Knowledge gained in this way is the only knowledge there is."² In this, reason is brought to bear on appreciable activity, whether such activity be initiated by man or by sources outside of him. "Reason, as the word is here used, can be most simply defined as the method of analysis, observation, inference, prediction, experiment and logical coherence."³

(1) Perceptual events.--Certain terms must be defined in this empirical theory of perception and conception. The term used by Wieman to house the whole of internal and external activity, feeling, and thought involved in the knowing experience is "perceptual event."⁴

All knowledge roots in perception. This includes metaphysical knowledge, which demands a more elaborate analysis of perceptual

1. "Values: Primary Data for Religious Inquiry," The Journal of Religion, XVI (Oct., 1936), 380.

2. Growth of Religion, p. 258. 3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 138.

4. The Source of Human Good (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 182.

events to the end of discerning both structures within selected series of events and structures essential to the possibility of the perceptual event itself.¹

(2) Concepts.--Reason operates by concepts. Concepts are human devices or mental constructions enabling one (1) to give clear attention to features of experience in an organized way, (2) to deal with absent aspects of experience, and (3) to infer from experience the existence of the unexperienced.

(3) Implicative use of concepts.--There is an "implicative" use of concepts by which they participate in whole systems of concepts as in pure mathematics. This implicative use, without reference to existential perception, may quicken the imagination with the pleasant feeling of thought's free romp through immensities, and it may comfort the imagination with what one wishes were true but knows is not. However, in all of this, one does not have "true knowledge." Clarity and consistency of concepts is the object of philosophy, the so-called love of truth. But, says Wieman, such an object of affection as clearly connected concepts regardless of their application to concrete existence is not the object of truth at all unless, by misplaced concreteness, one holds that these concepts are descriptive of some existent over-realm of Platonic ideas.²

(4) Descriptive truth-function of concepts.--The truth-function of concepts lies in their "accurate description of some feature of the existent world."³ Truth is a matter of the relevance of conceptual

1. Ibid., p. 183.

2. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 221.

3. Ibid., p. 235.

experience to reality which is concrete. One cannot have truth if he places his emphasis narrowly on either existential immediacy (the mystical inthrust of that which is not conceptualized) or on pure conceptualization (without regard for the sensory content to which it must apply). To constitute truth, meanings, concepts, and structures of reason must apply to the concrete world of experienceable events, even if only through a long chain of other meanings. Mysticism saves one from making the chain of abstract meaning too long. Rationalism saves one from making the span from immediate encounter too short.

(5) Scientific knowledge.--True knowledge by scientific method must include sensory observation, experimental behavior, and rational inference. No one of these is sufficient by itself. A statement is an instance of knowledge if (1) it has a reasonable theory or hypothesis, (2) makes an unambiguous statement whose terms are defined, (3) makes specific implications of the relation of its object to other elements, and (4) makes observational tests of the above.¹

ii. The ontological grounds of truth

(1) Subject-object process of reality.--It is at this point that the question arises: how can one be sure of the descriptive function of reason? It is one thing to demand that conceptual reason refer to concrete experience, a demand worthy of even the most ardent solipsist. It is another thing to go the second mile of epistemology in the demand that concept and perception be finally descriptive of objective reality. At this juncture, ontological presuppositions invade the realm of epistemology whenever epistemology is discussed prior to ontology, as in

1. "Knowledge, Religious and Otherwise," The Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (Jan., 1958), 13.

this study. Deferring the comprehensive discussion of ontology until later, it may suffice to say now that Wieman holds the theory that both subject and object come from the same creative process in nature.¹ Man's structure of understanding and the actual world will always apply to each other, for the same process generates both.²

(2) Common knowledge.--Man finds stable corroboration for his beliefs (perception integrated by conception) by three tests of truth held by science: "observation, agreement between observers, and coherence."³ There is a stable universality to the concepts of reason and a broad area for public agreement on the qualities of perception and the coherence and value of conceptions.

(3) Private knowledge.--Of course, there are vast areas of privacy and solitude in the individual's experience. Each has unique habits of selective attention, a unique angle of vision which no two persons can ever occupy at the same time, and an innate, constitutional difference of personality which preserves individuality of experience. The greatest of these determinants of individuality is, for Wieman, habit. "Habit-formation, then, is both world-building and self-building."⁴ However, Wieman exhibits little awareness of the fact that habit is not an entity with original, initiatory power for variation, but is, initially, a regular pattern and product of something beyond itself. Nevertheless, the scientific method for the verification of knowledge--observation, public agreement, and coherence--can operate well upon

1. Source of Human Good, p. 191.

2. Ibid., pp. 199-201.

3. Ibid., p. 211.

4. Wrestle of Religion . . ., p. 99.

Wieman's hypothesis of subject-object process. This makes neither subject nor object epiphenomenal to, or less basic than, its other. Both are epiphenomena of a creative process which is deeply involved (i.e. does not "stand behind" like some transcendent entity) in them.

iii. The ontological structure of reason

The process which creates the knower and his world relative to each other is the ultimate guarantor of the capacity of human reason to deal with reality. Man, by reason, is capable of metaphysical knowledge.

(1) Unity of creative change.--The conceptual capacity of human reason moves into metaphysics with its ability to abstract unities of structure from changing experience, even if these unities are only the consistencies of change themselves. But the subject finds unity of structure both in himself and in the world which transcends change. Otherwise experience would become segmented into meaningless novelty. There is evidence for unitary structure within change both for mind and its world. "This constitutive structure of the universe [change within form] can likewise be called the constitutional structure of the knowing mind."¹ Thus, as ontology previously moved into the epistemology of Wieman's system, now epistemology reciprocates.

From all this we must conclude that the ultimate constitutive structure of reality is creativity itself because the order of creativity is the only order necessarily present in all knowledge and in all forms of experience and changelessly present through all changes which human experience can undergo. It is the only order which is logically prior to every other order. No other can be ultimate because every other may be supplanted by creative

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 81.

transformation of the mind with corresponding transformation of the world as experienced by the mind.¹

(2) Dynamic aspects of mind and reality.--There is a sequence to this order of the emerging structures of the mind's creativity. One cannot leap by volition from Thales to Newton to Einstein. Mind and world wait upon a larger process of transformation whose creative "next stage" can only be comprehended in retrospect. No structure emerges other than what is knowable by mind. This is not subjectivism, given the above structure, but the bravest assertion of scientific epistemology. It is the assertion that whatever is unknowable lies, by definition, outside all human concern or consideration. Whatever lies that far outside the process of the all-encompassing world-subject lies outside reality and is non-existent by definition.

iv. Faith and value behind knowledge and truth

The question now arises: What is the motivating force in man's general essay at knowledge? What is it which leads him to reach out for truth? Wieman now makes this statement concerning his system thus far described: "Faith and value precede and undergird truth and knowledge."² Since the ultimate quality-datum of experience is one of value (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) before it is anything else, man makes his moves in this quality world with an eye toward satisfaction. Much depends, of course, on what satisfaction may mean to him at the moment (i.e., physiological, aesthetic, religious, etc.).

1. Ibid., p. 91.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 221.

(1) Faith as interested act.--It is here that Wieman defines faith. "Faith is appreciable interest sufficient to induce action."¹ It is interest which empowers initial action. It is not primarily belief or knowledge or ideational structure of any sort.

It [faith] is deep psychobiological propulsion. As roots penetrate the earth and flowers turn toward the sun, so this propulsion in man seeks the reality which creates more abundant living.²

Faith is not a cognitive function any more than breathing or digesting, but it may yield experience from which reason may find knowledge.³ Such propulsion out of interest in satisfaction induces or empowers initial action, out of which appreciable action emerges as the basic opportunity for knowledge.

(2) Ontological stimulus of faith.--Yet one cannot decide to be interested in something. One may only increase by volition an interest already "given by the grace of God."⁴ Such given interest is man's guarantee from the creative process (for the correlation of subject-object) that the values desired by faith are not subjective will-o'-the-wisps but reliably real. As epistemology demands assurances of its object (if the initial experience of, and interest in, that object come by way of experienced values), axiology demands similar assurances of the objective reality of its object.

(3) Quality and value, basic in knowledge and world.--From his former hypothesis of the trustworthy relation of subject and object

1. Growth of Religion, p. 261.

2. Communication, Journal of Religion, XXIV (Jan., 1944), 58.

3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 137.

4. Growth of Religion, p. 263.

guaranteed by their mutual source, Wieman proceeds now to declare the following. Since every event or experience available to man is a quality or complex of qualities (from the basic analysand or qualia of experience to the over-all quality which is one's total sense of life and purpose):

Therefore, relative to human experience, all energy is quality, and every event is quality. Quality, then is the ultimate substance of the world Quality, then, is objective fact. It is ultimate reality.¹

Values, the primary data of quality experience, are for Wieman the determining bases of truth. Faith is motivated or repulsed by man's "given" disposition toward positive or negative feelings of quality. These positive or negative experiences lead to man's value consciousness as well as his ability to know anything factual. Now, according to Wieman, it is a single basic process of reality which creates the world and man relative to each other. This process correlates man's basic interest or faith in value with the world in which values may be found by him. The process which permits knowledge propels man toward, and authenticates, knowledge by the values made available to man's experience. Truth must find its motive and proof in the "matrix of structured events as determined by the feeling-reactions of the organism."² In other words, one cannot build values on the structure of truth, but truth must be construed on a basis of value. Otherwise one has hothouse values of his own private creation, values not structured or authenticated by the basic creative process.

1. Source of Human Good, pp. 302-303.

2. Ibid., p. 172.

Truth rests upon the foundation of value,
not value on the foundation of truth. . . .
Also the issue of true and false, when it
arises, is always incidental and subsidiary
to distinguishing the better and the
worse. . . . Truth cannot be chosen as a goal and
lifted above all else unless it be valued above
all else.¹

In this, a real link between axiology and epistemology is forged. A theory of evil and a theory of error cannot be separated here, just as good and truth must be ultimately related, in a theory in which epistemology is so related to axiology. This being the case, the assurance of truth and the possibility of falsehood or error can be fully understood only through the discussion of Wieman's theory of value. The mechanisms of perception and conception must be described here if the range and technique of knowledge in Wieman's system are to be understood. But the motivation and evaluation of such knowledge demands a study of good and evil. By this one finds criteria for judging the "satisfactions" which prime man's interest in the knowing process.

3. Religious Knowledge

Man's basic propulsion toward the discovery of himself and his world has been depicted here as the venture of faith in search for value. Both faith and value are guaranteed by the ultimate process by which man and his world of value and meaning are created.

1. The subject and object in religious knowledge

Man searches for, or is motivated by, faith to desire, "the good." Wieman offers this preliminary definition of good. "By 'good' I shall mean the experience of being satisfied. This requires something which

1. Ibid., p. 164.

is satisfying and a self being satisfied."¹ The greatest good for the individual is the satisfaction of his whole being, not merely departmental satisfactions whereby man's life becomes disintegrated. In such a case, the satisfactions at one level of man's being frustrate the satisfactions of other levels of his total individuality. Whole satisfaction, then, is the subjective criterion for the greatest good.

The objective specification is as follows. The greatest good must be the source and supportive power in all human good. "This source is not metaphysically transcendental, but it is functionally transcendental."² "The most important reality which can command the loyalties of men is the unlimited growth of the connection of value."³

The creative, subject-object process in the universe (which was seen to be the ultimate structure in Wieman's epistemology)⁴ is "valuationally ultimate because it brings forth the greatest human good which man can ever experience."⁵

ii. Knowledge by committed adjustment

Religious knowledge must be man's discovery and formulation of this ultimate value-reality. The guarantor of truth in this venture is the fact that this value-reality is itself the creative motivator of man's faith and value experience. Thus, man does not reach out to find a super-reality totally bifurcated from himself, but he seeks to "adjust"

1. "Knowledge, Religious and Otherwise," p. 24.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 264.

3. "Values: Primary Data for Religious Inquiry," p. 403.

4. Supra, pp. 10-12.

5. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 92.

or open himself to the very knowledge-giving process which moves through him. Such an act is religious. It is man's attempt to know by commitment, discover through adjustment, and criticize by humble objectivity, the source of all meaning and good. This source is God. The meaning and goodness of this kind of God is relative, by definition, to the human constitution He made for meaning and value.

Human life at its best might be described as the search for that total object or bigger fact in which all experience might be integrated and made to yield up its maximum significance. This search finds its culmination in religion.¹

iii. Revelation and mysticism in empirical sciences

Since man is sustained by this process of God which he also perceives, it is fair to say that knowledge of God is by revelation.²

Man's source of being discloses itself as something more circumscribed and observable than the source of all being. Such revelation must occur within the dimension of events, with their qualities and relationships open to human experience. There is involved in religious knowledge an element of mystical immediacy, of felt quality and magnitude. This may differ in intensity and scope, but not in kind, from the mystical immediacy of any initial experience, whether it be the immediate experience of color, or sound, or touch. This is the concrete, tangible matrix of quality in experience.³ Such mysticism often reveals as much, or more, of the psychic constitution of the subject as of the object. However, this is neither knowledge nor truth until it has been struc-

1. Religious Experience . . . , p. 75.

2. Growth of Religion, pp. 269-270.

3. Religious Experience . . . , p. 77.

tured, integrated, appreciated, and made efficient for life by contemplation. Immediate experience, whether religious or not, must pass through the process of scientific consideration to be understandable and communicable. In this, science is analogous to a disciplined, habitual way of knowing. Religious or immediate experience is the dynamic impulse from beyond the habitual way which drives it. Religion frees the novel response, and science orders it. "Religion needs the consperience, guidance and tests of scientific method just as much as scientific method needs the freedom, spontaneity and creative impulsiveness of religious experience."¹

iv. Limitations of empirical science for religious experience

There are dimensions of religious experience which are beyond the scope of scientific examination. Science faces the universe piecemeal, in the sense that it specializes in its vision and abstracts from the wealth of experience only the repeatable events in their simplest formulation. Thus, no one science or total of sciences can adequately deal with the plethora of quality, novelty, and spirituality in man's experience.² Science can analyze a human handshake and miss entirely the glint of the eye, the squeeze of the hand, the line of the lips.

Religion is an experience of wholeness in nature, while science is a catalogue of analysis. However, the experience of God, regardless of its magnitude, is a concrete experience.³ And since the false inter-

1. Ibid., p. 132.

2. Ibid., pp. 180-200. Cf. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 240.

3. Religious Experience . . . , p. 10.

pretation of a reality as precious as God is the greatest danger man faces, science must be evoked, for it is the purest way of interpretation man has found.¹ The experience of God is as deserving of scientific attention as any other reality with which man deals. The experiences of religion, cultivated and evoked by disciplines of worship, demand, first, philosophy of religion which is a clarification of applicable concepts and, secondly, a theology which studies the beliefs into which these concepts have entered.² All of these--worship, philosophy, and theology--plus all other disciplines applicable to religious experience, must clarify with coherent structure, communicability, and applicability the unique release of energy found in religious experience.

v. Proper use of myth and symbol

Man attempts to define and understand this influential God of concrete existence. He must operate by the commitment, discipline, and procedures of all empirical inquiry. At times, myth and symbol will be his only available expressions of the felt reality of God. No matter how much philosophy clarifies the concepts or theology studies the applicability of myth and symbol, myth and symbol are not yet knowledge or truth. Myth and symbol have their value in directing devotion and conduct.³

However, man must never stop at these as if they were idols guarding the holy gates to mystery. Man must search to find the

1. Ibid., p. 42.

2. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 11.

3. Source of Human Good, p. 306.

objectively demonstrable, coherent principle which causes his myth-generating experience. In doing so he must trust two guides: reason, the structure of all experienceable reality;¹ and human value-perception, a definitive factor in the ontological source of all value.²

4. A Scientific, Pragmatic God-hypothesis

Wieman's hypothesis of the nature of God is consistent with the terms of his epistemology. It is a hypothesis of a God of specifiable and verifiable concrete existence. The definition of God must be one capable of explaining existential problems of life and death, good and evil, rather than one which escapes these issues through transcendence. It must be one exposed to logical and empirical verification. On this basis, Wieman moves into an hypothesis which, he believes, meets the minimal requirements of man's existential problems and religious needs. "Whatever else the word God may mean, it is a term used to designate that something on which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare, and increasing abundance."³ As Wieman's theory of knowledge roots back in his theory of value, so his theory of value roots back in his concept of God. The nature and scope of his God-hypothesis must be further considered now to understand his value-theory.

Wieman would identify God within the natural realm of human experience and seek to meet, by his God-hypothesis, the ultimate problem of existence--evil. On the basis of human reason there seems little likelihood of solving the problem through traditional belief in

1. Ibid., p. 199.

2. Ibid., p. 201.

Cf. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 165.

3. American Philosophies . . . , p. 297.

an all-good and all-powerful God. Wieman is cognizant of confessions like that of J. Gresham Machen:

How could a holy God, if he is all powerful, have permitted the existence of sin? What shall we do with the problem? I am afraid we shall have to do with it something that is not very pleasing to our pride; I am afraid we shall have to say it is insoluble.¹

The thing which is displeasing here to the scientific mind of Wieman is the willingness of traditional supernaturalists to surrender their quest rather than change their hypothesis of an all-holy and powerful God. For Wieman, an honest, scientific appraisal of the ever-present conflict between good and evil in the world clearly demands a definition of God which faces and opposes the forces of evil in the same finite way that evidential good faces and opposes evil. "He who makes an assumption which does not fit the known facts has a false problem when he tries to make the facts fit the assumption."²

Thus Wieman's final setting of the God-hypothesis puts God within the dynamic realm of finite, concrete existence as an opponent of the disvalues of life. Positively stated, "God is that in the universe which will yield maximum security and increase of human good when lives are properly adjusted to him."³ This is a God within the arena of human struggle whose nature is such that He opposes, is limited by, yet frequently overcomes other forces in the world which make for evil.

1. J. Gresham Machen, The Christian View of Man, p. 42. Quoted in Growth of Religion, pp. 356-357.

2. Growth of Religion, p. 354.

3. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 59.

i. God as creative value-process in nature

God is that creative process in nature whence comes all good and all meaning. "God is not the creator, the mysterious source of everything. He is only the source of good or rather is himself the good."¹ God is not the total process of a pantheistic nature.² Wherever meaning or value is found in the universe, there is God. "God is not everything and everything is not God."³ Obviously, it may be argued that the larger whole of nature in which God operates must have some minimal meaning (structure) and value (quality) to exist as something distinct from God. Not going the way of Whitehead, who explained this fact by a pre-existent opportunity of God to lend some meaning and value to process ahead of time (since this theory is well beyond the realm of scientific verification), Wieman seemingly allows certain minimal value and meaning in nature which is not God. He feels he has qualitatively differentiated God's kind of meaning and value from the rest by calling it the growth of meaning or "possibility for highest value."⁴

ii. A limited God and the problem of evil

Having limited his definition of God thus far, Wieman makes the further delimiting decision faced by all religious realists confronted by the problem of evil: the decision of whether God is all-powerful but not all-good, or all-good but not all-powerful. Wieman chooses the latter. This finitude of power follows quite logically from the status

1. "The New Supernaturalism," Christendom, III (Winter, 1938), 76.

2. "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1936), 778.

3. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 187.

4. The Issues of Life (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930), p. 162.

given God in nature. However, this is not to say that God is impotent goodness. "Creativity [God] is both good and powerful with a goodness and power that is infinite in the sense that no computation of units of human goodness and power can measure them."¹

Wieman has taken the most obvious route of empirical theistic thought to declare God a process or power in nature facing other powers. This is no new idea, of course. The question is whether his system meets the requirements of scientific validation while satisfying the religious needs of men in the problem of evil. This, then, must be ultimately a study in the coherence and religious meaningfulness of a theory whose new dynamic wine has been put in a rather old formal bottle.

iii. God as immanent function

Wieman, as noted above, holds a purely functional or behavioristic definition of God.

The method I follow finds God in his work. Hence God is an assured fact. This method does not preclude the depths and riches of reality which lie beyond its scope. But it does insist that God cannot be walled off into this inaccessible realm.

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The presence of God . . . is identical with the work of God. We know a reality by the way it works. The reality is its working.²

(1) Creative interaction and concretion.--Wieman has closed off the upstairs of metaphysics by erecting the partition of scientific epistemology. The work of God is the growth of meaning and value in the

1. "Power and Goodness of God," The Journal of Religion, XXIII (Oct., 1943), 271.

2. "God is More than We can Think," Christendom, I (Spring, 1936), 428, 440.

world through the creative growth of organic connections in the world.¹ This growth of organic connection is the establishment of internal relationships among elements of the universe to the effect that these elements come to subserve some higher creation than themselves. By their interaction they find their own meaning and value transformed by the new, greater entity. Wieman also calls this the process of interaction or the concrete event in the process of concretion. This last term is borrowed directly from Whitehead with this qualification: Wieman holds as scientifically unprovable, hence immaterial, Whitehead's theory that every creative concretion or interaction affects and is affected by all others that ever were or ever will be. The scope of Wieman's interactive influence is smaller; the principle is the same.

(2) Concrete value.--God is by definition good. Thus the God-process which is discoverable in its product, concrete existence, is good. That anything of structure and meaning should inhere in the universe is a value. It means that destructiveness has been stayed this far. The concrete is the good. "Good and concrete existence are identical. . . . Evil tends to destroy . . . this concrete order."²

(3) Creative value-process.--God is the process by which creative good emerges in nature. Although a full definition of creative good must await the discussion of Wieman's value-theory, suffice it to say that the God-process of concretion does not invest permanent, static value in any stage of the meaningful history of nature. Rather, each emergent good finds its true value not in its own present accomplishment but in its subservience to successive values in the process of creative

1. Ibid., p. 442.

2. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 201.

good. God is a tireless and creatively dissatisfied worker for good. Well He must be, for He works in a universe of blind force and static self-satisfaction or inertia, both of which can destroy or give the static kiss of idolatry to any present good. God is more accurately described as the creator of the "better" than as creator of the good or the best.

(4) The oneness of the work and the worker.--At this point, a further clarification of Wieman's concept of God as process seems in order. There is a habit of metaphysics to deal in terms of cause and effect and to keep the two separate. Thus one is tempted to ask, What does this work of God in the universe? What stable entity causes this process? In other words, Wieman's description of the work of God interests one in meeting the worker. Such an urge is suppressed in Wieman's thought. God is his behavior in the universe.¹ "If one wishes he can say this is not God but it is the work of God. Practically it comes to the same thing."² To those who demand a stable entity to cause interaction, Wieman declares that it is interaction itself which gives continuous character to objects. The interaction of atoms creates a cell. The cell is very different from the prior stable entity, the atom, hence these underlying bodies can hardly be held responsible for the continuing character of the cell. It is the interaction which does this. "To speak of power [of God] as 'back of' the process of growth . . . making it go from the outside, is an error, I think."³

1. Ibid., p. 62

2. Growth of Religion, p. 363.

3. "God is More than We Can Think," p. 429. Cf. Is There A God?, p. 17.

Interaction is process. Interactions are not persistent realities. "God is a total system of patterns embodied in a process operating with power to promote the good."¹

iv. God as supra-personal

Beyond this, Wieman does not consider God as personal. God does encompass the personalities of man in love which holds cells and organs, persons and cultures in meaningful, stable structure. God may be fairly called "the personality-producing process of the universe."² Also, "The creative event at the level most important for human living always operates between persons."³ Then, too, "God does respond to the intimate needs and attitudes of each individual personality."⁴ However, all of these factors which lead some men to conceive of God as personal are, for Wieman, proofs that God must be more than personal to do all of this. The above functions all bespeak the supra-personal.⁵ In other words, if the parts between which divine interaction occurs are persons, then that interaction which is God must be more than a person.

It may be argued that beyond all of the above symptoms of divine personality, man demands or craves a personal God for fellowship. To this Wieman, as a scientific empiricist, responds:

But the craving of the human heart cannot be taken as a standard for judging what God must be. If we did take such a standard, opium would be God for some craving human hearts, and bloody vengeance for others.⁶

Wieman becomes more sympathetic in the context of worship's

1. Ibid., p. 163.

2. Issues of Life, p. 228.

3. Source of Human Good, p. 266.

4. Growth of Religion, p. 361.

5. Ibid.

6. Issues of Life, p. 228.

symbol of a personal God. It may be an indispensable symbol for worship and communion if it is used intelligently.¹ Yet, in his latest book Wieman has decided to use "it" instead of the personal pronoun for God. He feels that "it" suggests the superhuman.²

Man must find something greater than personality to serve. God is that something greater. The greatness of personality lies in the fact that it can serve that order of existence and possibility in which are found greatest values That order is personal, if by that one means personalities are involved in it. But that is all that can be meant.³

v. God above mind

Wieman declares that God is more than mind. According to Whitehead's concept of the primordial nature of God, the God of all growth is seen to be a prior storehouse of possibility and intent, i.e., mind. Such mentality seems to be revealed in rational creation. Yet, Wieman holds that this is an over-amplification of the concept of mind.

Mind does not hold forms of potentiality prior to their becoming existent, as some prior repository of unactualized possibility. Mind can only know existent forms and their abstractions. It cannot envision possibilities of its own growth before they occur. "Mind is the servant of growth, not the arbiter and director of it."⁴ Man cannot think outside the culture which has shaped his mentality. The insightful systems constitutive of man's philosophy, science, and art

1. Source of Human Good, p. 268.

2. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 29.

3. Issues of Life, p. 227.

4. "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," Christendom, II (Spring, 1937), 209.

are given to the mind by a greater power, God, in the form of culture that grows.¹

It is not in the capacity of mind, as man knows it, to deal with unactualized possibility which is, as Wieman means it, possibility not yet conceived of. That power which creates mind, and brings creative possibilities of structure and form into the focus of mind, must, itself, be more than mind. Wieman calls this power growth.

It may well be felt that this offers no explanation but only a name for that which Wieman admits to be above explanation. It has to be above explanation, being above mind.

vi. The manifold unity of God

(1) Divine unity.--God is one, according to Wieman's theory.

"It is one single, pervasive, unitary creativity that builds up life and conscious awareness."² Given the pervasive and multiform operation which God performs in Wieman's system, it might well be questioned as to whether God is one or many.

Nature, as a whole, in its variety and change, escapes the unifying net of philosophy and science.³ Variety and change persist. Yet, when considering the God-process, Wieman calls for unified belief. The power which makes for the greatest good seems to be the integrating power for unity among entities. Human brotherhood, interdependence, and the human community of need make for good through unity. "This is a fact which human beings did not invent."⁴ It seems

1. "Man's Work and God's Work," The Christian Century, LIII (April 8, 1936), 532.

2. Communication, Journal of Religion, XXIV (Jan., 1944), 57.

3. Issues of Life, p. 163.

4. Is There a God?, p. 277.

that the power for good is one.

(2) Divine manifoldness in unity.--Of course, there is a multi-form aspect of God as well as a unitary one. "From the standpoint of practical efficiency and scientific analysis it [God-process] is many."¹ There is this aspect in any reality. Or, if one speaks of the manifold work of God as a separate category from God (a separation of structure from function for conceptual purposes), one finds a manifold aspect of God. But the unitary aspect of God is dominant in Wieman's emphasis, since God is defined as a kind of interstitial entity, "interrelation," binding all into meaning.

The important functioning of God is unitary, not pluralistic, because God is the organic connectedness (unity) of all the different conditions which are necessary to the growing good. The good is precisely this organic connectedness. God is this organic connectedness.²

For those who make the unity of God dependent on some substantial definition of a permanent God-entity, Wieman offers his own acceptable definitions here of substance as enduring, unified God-entity. "God is then (1) the most inclusive and organic system of activities, (2) the underlying system of activities, and (3) the eternal form of this system."³

(3) The eternal temporality of God.--By the structure of God's manifold unity Wieman explains the temporal versus the eternal aspects of his God. The primary aspect of God is temporal, since all process or activity is, by definition, temporal. But there must be the dimen-

1. Wieman, D. C. Macintosh and M. C. Otto, "A Conversation about God," The Christian Century, L (May 31, 1933), 727.

2. Ibid.

3. "Faith and Knowledge," p. 773.

sion of consistency in temporal process lest the process be chaos or sheer novelty, which is the same thing. This unitary aspect is analogous to Wieman's aforementioned substantial definition of God. However, this changeless aspect is the inseparable form of ordered process which exists in, not "behind," the process.¹

By such a distinction between activity and form, application and principle, Wieman describes the immanence and transcendence of a God who is both temporal and eternal. However, the distinctive emphasis is always on the immanence and temporality of God.

vii. The supreme worthfulness of God

As seen in the study of Wieman's epistemology, his metaphysics is an ontology focused on value. God is the supreme value.² God is the growth process of all value. "This growth with its infinite possibilities is the reality of greatest value. This is true no matter how incompletely these possibilities be actualized."³ God's work is creative interchange or the meaningful interrelation of lesser elements of existence into larger meaningful wholes or constellations of elements. By this, a larger and new creation comes into being in which the lesser elements are transformed by their new organic relatedness with each other and the larger whole. In morals this new value is spoken of as love or good will; in knowledge, as comprehensive, coherent truth; in aesthetics, as related form, pattern, and harmony; and in religion, as holy community or creative fellowship.

1. Ibid.

2. American Philosophies . . . , p. 299.

3. "Values: Primary Data for Religious Inquiry," p. 405.

(1) Created value.--It is apropos of Wieman's axiological definition of God that his distinction between created and creative good must be made in a preliminary way prior to a consideration of Wieman's value-theory. The good which God creates at any given stage of growth is called created good. This has its value as a definitive stage in growth. It has its disvalue in the idolatrous possibility of its static self-satisfaction. If man grows over-satisfied with created good, he obstructs the possibility for growth or creative good.

(2) Creative value.--The creative good is the ongoing movement of meaningful creativity. It draws on infinite internal possibilities within itself to meet obstructive forces of opposition. Since, however, it is never totally contained within any created good, it is not an entity capable of being destroyed.

(3) Limited power of the creative.--The God who operates as creative good is absolutely good. However, since this process is not, by definition, the sole or ultimate reality of nature, it is not absolutely powerful. For the interests of human desire, God is both good and powerful beyond all human capacity to measure. God is not growing better, nor is He growing more powerful. To measure the power of creative process in terms of accumulative accomplishment is dangerous in this system since such created good, as seen above, is a liability to process. Nor can one declare that God is becoming better.

No amount of created good added to it God can increase its value because its value lies in its creativity and not in what it has already created. . . . No amount of created good subtracted from it can diminish its worth, because it carries the promise and potency of all good that is to be.¹

1. "Power and Goodness of God," p. 272.

(4) Ultimate cause and supreme good relative to man.--All of the above establishes value on a foundation of ultimate meaningful process. Wieman, on the basis of his epistemology of value and logical analogy therefrom, declares that a concept of absolute being behind value is a neutral concept from which value cannot be derived.¹ If supreme good is not determined by ultimate, meaningful cause it is unattainable, for ultimate cause determines all that is and is to be. Likewise, this ultimate cause must be constitutionally immanent in man. Man must be a constitutional determinant of the process if supreme good is to be relative to human value-appreciation. "Since ultimate cause and supreme good are relative to human interests, human nature is one factor that enters in to determine what shall be the ultimate cause and supreme good."² This is Wieman's ultimate guarantee of the all-important proposition, so often assumed with naïveté, that God's values are man's values.³

(5) Organic work of God--mechanical work of man.--One element in Wieman's theory of the work of God seems a bit obscure to ready understanding at this point. It is his distinction between the work of God and the work of man. The work of God is the establishment of organic connections. The work of man is the construction of mechanism.

A mechanism is a system of external relations.
An organism is a system of internal relations
or, as I prefer to say, of organic connections.
Internal relations are peculiar. They are
creative. That means that when things or
parts of things are internally related, they

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1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 104.
 2. Wrestle of Religion . . ., p. 165.
 3. Growth of Religion, p. 266.

undergo transformation and mutually control one another.¹

This internal transformation is seen in all organic relations from chemical compounds to man. Each element is transformed by its relatedness to others from within.

God does not have to create mechanism or external relations, Wieman believes, for these exist automatically as the co-existent relation of any organic series to another.² It might well be asked whether a creator's by-product is not as much His creation as His product. However, man deals in mechanism or the external relations of things with things. Man's structure of mechanism can implement, or even obstruct, God's work of organism. Man makes mechanism. He enjoys or undergoes organism or growth.³ By organic growth God creates meanings, sensitivities of mind, societies and cultures. Man cannot think outside the culture which fosters him. Man undergoes this organic creation of God. He cannot make it.

viii. Overbeliefs of religious value

Thus far, Wieman's theory of God has been presented in technical categories of philosophy and theology without much consideration of man's worshipful imagination. A consideration of the meaningfulness of this God-hypothesis for worship and redemption will be made later. Thus far, however, Wieman has dealt a bit sharply with over-beliefful tendencies which inspire personalistic symbols of God and considerations of

1. "God is More than We Can Think," p. 442.

2. "Faith and Knowledge," p. 774.

3. "Man's Work and God's Work," p. 531.

some entity "behind" process to make it run.¹

All of this lies beyond proof. As noted above, Wieman will not allow human craving to shape the definition of God as personal. However, symbols of worship may be used if they hold coherence with what else is known of God as fact. For instance, one may, in this context, speak meaningfully of God as father inasmuch as He is the source of personality, He makes men brothers by interrelation, and He bestows love, value, and life on man.

God transcends this world of human mind in the sense that "God is the uncomprehended totality of all that is best."² There is a distinct aspect of God in this system of Wieman which reaches not beyond the knowable but beyond the discoverable. "God is so much 'other' than we, and in that sense so transcendent over us, that I do not see how to identify Him with mind or even mind plus."³ There is an aspect of mystery which is the fitting realm of critical overbelief.

I hold that God towers in unique majesty
infinitely above the little hills which we
call mind and personality.

.....

We know the specific nature of the foothills
of deity. But beyond the foothills rise the
purple heights of mystery.⁴

In the terms of strict philosophy of religion, Wieman has defined God as holy, immanent, but not all-powerful. However, there is a dimension of God in this system which speaks to the worship of man.

1. "The Philosophy of Worship," p. 68.

2. Growth of Religion, p. 259.

3. "Faith and Knowledge," p. 778.

4. Ibid., pp. 432, 437.

It is a theology of humble, self-conscious mystery which accepts almost hungrily the symbols of traditional faith to express itself. This is declared most poignantly, perhaps, in these words of Wieman which suggest the paradoxical nature of creativity; namely, that it is finite and definable, yet knows no bounds.

Which has priority in the category pertaining to God, power or goodness? Neither pertains to God if you are thinking of the power and goodness which are the virtue of man. Both pertain to God, merged into one, and infinite in the sense that this power and goodness cannot be computed or measured against any other. Only a babe wrapped in swaddling clothes can symbolize such power. Only a criminal crucified under law can symbolize such goodness.¹

In the interest of presenting elements in Wieman's thought conducive to a theory of natural evil, and presenting them within the context of his larger system from which they come, Wieman's larger system of thought has been briefly considered. How man knows, what man knows, the values and disvalues in his experience, and the basic structure of reality which permits all of this have been reviewed. It is hoped that with such a background, elements of Wieman's thought now to be considered in their specific relation to the problem of evil will be better understood.

5. Theory of Good and Evil

1. Realistic setting for the problem of evil

The chief problem of religion is, for Wieman, the problem of evil. "What can transform man in such a way as to save him from the depths of evil and bring him to the greatest good which human life can

1. "Power and Goodness of God," p. 275.

attain?"¹ To meet this problem Wieman demands a most realistic setting of the problem of evil. He considers the problem as false when it is set against the assumption of a good and all-powerful God who, while being the creator and supporter of the entire universe, somehow opposes an alien factor of evil. Such an assumption does not fit the facts of experience. Thus, the facts can never support or be clarified by the assumption.

Wieman discerns four classical strategies for dealing with the problem. The first denies the reality of evil, the second repudiates human rationality and holds antithetical dogmas of God and evil, and the third shows evil to be human error or exercise for the development of character.² Wieman chooses a fourth strategy which denies that God is the creator and sustainer of the whole universe. On this basis, without prior absolutistic assumptions (unless one counts negative ones), "The problem [of evil] is simply an inquiry concerning what is the nature and scope of evil as over against the nature and scope of what is good."³

This is Wieman's way of stating that the most realistic appraisal of evil demands opponent good, but not a prior power of good so great as to make any antithetical evil look like child's play. Evil is not really evil if it is bounded on all sides by good and the assurance of its own defeat. Evil must be an ultimate power in its own right. It is true, of course, that religious consciousness demands a sovereign God of a kind which Wieman does deny. But it is also true

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 10.

2. Growth of Religion, pp. 304-355.

Cf. Source of Human Good, p. 87.

3. Growth of Religion, p. 357.

that moral consciousness demands that the full reality of evil be faced.¹

In a world where good and evil are ultimate and objective realities, one's moral success or even his sheer survival demands intense sensitivity to, and extreme realism about, the fact of evil, regardless of the suffering this may entail. "Thus it is no paradox to say that the awareness of evil is a great good second to none, while the actuality of evil is the extreme opposite of good."²

Although Wieman insists that evil or brute forces in nature have independent source(s) and status apart from the good process of God, he nevertheless presents the work of evil as if it were somehow relative to the good it thwarts or destroys. This will be considered critically in a later chapter. However, in the present context, whether Wieman insists on the independent nature of evil or not, his system can hardly be rendered intelligible unless one first delineates the good against which this evil operates.

11. Created and creative good

Out of Wieman's theory of God as growth or processive good comes a distinction between created and creative good. It was formerly said that behaviorism allows no distinction between the work and the being of its entity. However, this seems to be an exception. Created good is the accomplished work of God. Creative good is God. It is obvious that in such a structure creative good is an infinitely higher value than any given created product of it. It is also the case that created good can

1. Herbert H. Farmer, Review of *The Source of Human Good*, The Journal of Religion, XXVII (April, 1947), 115.

2. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 134.

operate either as a means to higher good in the creative process, or as an enshrined, dogmatized obstacle to on-going process.

(1) Analysis of the creative event.--It is in the area of creative good that Wieman spends most time on definition. Creative good is the process which makes man what he was not and gives him what he did not have. The creative event or process as seen through the eyes of its highest emergent creation, man, runs as follows. (1) There is the emergence of new perspectives of quality-consciousness through appreciative human community. (2) There is the integration of these new meanings and perspectives into one's own unique personality. This process is largely subconscious; and often it is accomplished in solitude. (3) The appreciable world of quality and meaning is enlarged as a result of the first two processes. This is not a steady vision but comes and goes. (4) There is deepened community growth and understanding of others who participate in this creative event of intercommunication.¹

(2) Intrinsic value of creative growth.--The creative event can never be employed by persons. Persons, rather, are grasped by it and made by it. It is a creative interaction or intercommunication wherein man is transformed by the work of God. It may be that for some this creative event may yield ecstasy, but, "in the ordinary run of life . . . the creative event reorganizes the mind and transforms its appreciable world without the qualities of the creative event being themselves discriminated and distinguished from the newly emergent meaning."² This is the good which sustains and promotes intercommunication,

1. Source of Human Good, pp. 58-65.

2. Ibid., p. 57.

intercommunion, or organic relatedness among men. This is the definitive dimension of the creative good for men. Evil is best characterized as whatever disrupts this.

(3) Value and disvalue of created good.--Created good is the temporary, actualized stage of the creative. It is never to be disrespected. Man should enjoy it to the fullest, but never to the extent of loving it more than the creative process.¹ Too little appreciation of created good obstructs man's appreciation of the process of God which made it. Too much satisfaction in created goods keeps him from being a ready instrument for the emergent "better." This system is, perhaps, the ultimate metaphysics of good that can be the enemy of the better or the best. It is the ultimate reversal of Platonic value, for "being" now subserves "becoming."

iii. Absolute good--a finite God

In Wieman's system, the creative process which is God is the supreme or absolute value for man. Now it may be asked how anything can be called absolute, given a finite God and the transience of all created good. "Absolute" does not mean out of all relation. Good must be in relation to conditions, circumstances, and organisms to have any efficacious meaning.

But its [absolute good's] character of goodness does not change when these relations change. Instead of being out of all relations, it is rather the one kind of goodness that, without losing its identity, can enter into all relations. It is good always and everywhere, therefore relative to everything.²

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 107.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 80, n. 3.

Given the above definition of absolute value, it is conceivable that man's supreme object of value might be the whole universe. But the activities of this universe are not related so as obviously to support, enhance, and mean each other mutually. The universe offers no such picture of itself. There is a vast indifference to, and frustration and destruction of, value in the universe.

Thus the supreme value is one evidential process of creative value in this universe. This growth of meaning is superhuman, but not in the sense of its being out of life and the world. Growth of meaning can occur through humans only while standing over them to transform the human medium of its operation. It operates above the plans and foreseeable purposes of men to work through them, even if it be in spite of them. In all of these ways one may speak of creative value or God as being absolute, yet available.

(1) Value in subjective and objective interrelation.--Value is objective as well as subjective in this theory. "By 'good' I shall mean the experience of being satisfied. This requires something which is satisfying and a self being satisfied."¹ Value is the interrelation in enjoyable activities as much as the enjoyable activities, both subjectively and objectively considered. At its deepest level of understanding, value is an appreciable change of system or activity in and out of man. Such appreciable activity may change or qualify consciousness while not being conscious. The oxidation of blood would be such an activity. With activity, mind must see meaning to get value. Such meaning is the connection between the change or act of one system and its influence on other systems. A pulse beat is a meaningful value only

1. "Knowledge, Religious and Otherwise," p. 24.

for what it accomplishes beyond itself. Thus, value is "that connection between enjoyable activities by which they support one another, enhance one another and, at a higher level, mean one another."¹ This involves subject and object by definition. The privacy and uniqueness of the individual values must give itself over to comparison with other individuals' values to clarify the objective aspect of values. This forges between self and others one more chain in the association of meaningful systems. "Intimate association of personalities establishes an objective reference for values."²

(2) Human relevance of the ultimate good.--While supreme good must be identified with ultimate cause in order to be accomplished, ultimate cause must be relative to its created beings.³ Although value is relative to man, this does not make all value subject to his desire. As seen before, there is a creative good which transforms man beyond any of his present known desires. In this sense, creative good is intrinsic value rather than instrumental.⁴ Created good may serve as man's chosen instrument or as God's chosen instrument in the production of further good. Hence, intrinsic good escapes instrumental usage by being the very process in which instrumentation of values occurs. Man may use created good to instrument his good or evil purpose, but "man cannot use as a means or instrument the generative process which transforms him so

1. American Philosophies . . . , p. 298.

2. Wieman and Regina Westcott Wieman, Normative Psychology of Religion (New York: Thomas Crowell Company, 1935), p. 344.

3. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 165. Also supra, p. 33.

4. "Power and Goodness of God," p. 273.

as to create values which he cannot in their specific nature anticipate or see or desire."¹

iv. Derivative and independent aspects of the nature of evil

As there are two kinds of good, created and creative, so there are two opponent evils respectively. These are destructive and obstructive evil. In this discussion of the nature and characteristics of evil, it must be remembered that these evils are not merely respective absences of good. They are positive and powerful aggressors.

(1) Evil form derived from good.--The only sure characteristic common to all evil is its opposition to good.²

There is no general principle which characterizes all evils save the negative one that evil is opposed to good. Goodness does have a definable character.³

The logical character given to its opponent by created good is destructiveness. That which exists suffers by what destroys it. The logical character or form given to its opponent by creative or processive good is obstructiveness. That which grows and cannot be contained, thus not destroyed in any present state, suffers by whatever hampers its growth.

To the degree that evil obtains its structure from good it exists only in its opposition to good and is thus far parasitic. Likewise, the quality or degree of evil, if not its power, is determined by the quality of the good it opposes. The more elaborate the concrete existence (good) the greater the chance for deeper evil. In this sense, it seems con-

1. Source of Human Good, p. 78.

2. Ibid., p. 86.

3. Growth of Religion, p. 357.

tradiotory to declare as Wieman does that evil has independent and positive existence,¹ while agreeing with Whitehead that evil is parasitic.²

(2) The absolute nature of obstructive evil.--Having distinguished between destructive and obstructive evil, one may say that the greater of the two kinds of evils must be that which opposes the greater good--creative good. Destructive evil can hardly be called absolute evil since the destruction of created good is often the only way for creative good to overleap its previous bounds. Destructive evil, while largely the symptom of principalities and powers opponent to good, may actually be employed by creative good to clear the way through dogmatic, created values for the creative.³ On the other hand, the evil which opposes absolute good or creative process, the source of all good, is absolute evil. This is obstructive evil.

Such obstructive evil is absolute in four ways. (1) It is universally evident; (2) it is unqualified evil, i.e. evil from every point of view; (3) it is ultimate in the sense that it did not emerge from good nor will it eventuate in good; and (4) it is unconfined in the sense that it can rage where it will.⁴

(3) The independent status of pervasive evil.--"Evil is in the world independently of the creative event."⁵ It is evidenced in its surd form as "anything which interferes with the unlimited growth of connections of mutual support, mutual control, and mutual facilitation

1. Ibid., p. 358.

2. Wrestle of Religion . . . , pp. 200-202.

3. Source of Human Good, p. 300.

4. Ibid., pp. 90-93.

5. Ibid., p. 300.

between appreciable activities."¹ The source of evil is other than the creative process, in Wieman's thought. It is a force of irrational fury, felt in human catastrophes.

It might be noted here that there is a third kind of evil which enters into the above phenomena but not into the ontology of the independent and aggressive status of evil. This third kind of evil is the sheer absence of good. In one sense, this can be dubbed the weakest form of opposition to good, or, on the other hand, the ultimate challenge to creative good. The creative must work through the elbow room and the neutral (or evil) materials of the absence of good. Its life is as much a matter of filling in this absence as of overcoming the resistance and opposition of obstructive evil. Although creative good can fill in the absences of good which are original or left by the operation of destructive evil, there is no guarantee that it can ever totally overcome obstructive evil. It may overcome its opposition, but it cannot transmute the evil done by delay. On the other hand, there is a reciprocal, blessed assurance that evil can never fully overcome creative good. One wonders whether this is not the case because the structure of creative good is necessary to give form to its opponent evil. Of course to declare this priority of good as form-giver would be to contradict Wieman. Wieman, having dispensed with a primordial God, claims that there is minimal structure in all energy qua energy or nature qua nature, regardless of good. Hence, evil has some independent form. This will be analyzed and criticized later. Again, Wieman almost moves to a theory of the consequent nature of God to say, "No amount of evil can nullify whatever value there is. Good is good

1. Growth of Religion, p. 358.

and evil is evil regardless of their relative quantities or qualities."¹

(4) Sin as idolatry of the created.--Moving from the ontological to the existential point of view, all varieties of evil come to man either through, or from beyond, his responsibility. The line between the two is never distinct.² Evil through the auspices of human responsibility is sin. Evil from outside man's responsibility is natural evil. Sin in the context of Wieman's system is essentially the aspect of created good in personality turning against creative good (God). In fact, man's nature is so high in the life of God's creativity, that one might almost say that creativity here endangers its own life supremely. "The peculiar power of creativity is that it gives to man all the intelligence and ability with which he turns against it, so that when he fights he is fighting the source of all his strength."³

It has always been obvious to men, both before and after Socrates, that no man voluntarily pursues evil. In Wieman's system sin is given an object sufficiently removed from the creative to make it evil and sufficiently removed from evil to make it attractive. The object is created good. In this sense, all sin is a form of idolatry in which created good, the product, is loved to the exclusion of God, its source. In this, created good, both as subject and object, halts the growth of creative good through subject and object. The variety of

1. Normative Psychology . . . , p. 50.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 125.

3. "Power and Goodness of God," p. 275. Cf. Source of Human Good, p. 102.

forms which can be taken by such obstructive, responsible evil are as follows: (1) incomplete loyalty to the highest good in the interest of created good, (2) conflicting loyalties, (3) having no dominant loyalty, and (4) obvious idolatry.¹ In the theory of Wieman these are all varieties of one strain--idolatry of the created.

(5) Sin as demonic.--In a sense, all sin is demonic, the fallen, obstructive usage of former positive energies. When qualitative meaning seeks to usurp loyalty to the greater good of which it is the product it is demonic good. Nationality, sex, community may all be examples of the demonic when held as ends in themselves. Perhaps the most pious version of such obstructive demonry is seen in the sheer joy of dogmatic assurances. This obstructs all further growth of knowledge while exuding a warm feeling of relaxation from the alert, and expectant tentativeness necessary in commitment to the creative. "The 'joy of believing' can be one of the greatest obstacles in the way of getting knowledge."² Demonry is the tempting vision of good which refuses to hold itself subject to creativity.³

(6) Evil flaws in finite value-perception.--There is a constitutional flaw in man which not only permits him to offer supreme loyalty to the static, but which generally whispers the suggestion in his ear. This might be explained by a basic inertia in things which would rather stand with the static created than run with the dynamic creative. Or it might be understood in the fact that the created is

1. Normative Psychology . . . , pp. 148-152.

2. "Knowledge, Religious and Otherwise," p. 14.

3. Source of Human Good, p. 128.

more tangible, or that man being created good himself loves his own kind. However, Wieman suggests that it is man's faulty perception of the creative which is the major flaw. Such a fault seems inevitable if man cannot transcend his present created state to envision its emergent successor. It is the sheer wage of finitude. The faults of human value-perception are its selective and limited range, its distortion of fact by self-concern, and its static idea of good and evil (perhaps not all of which is constitutional). For instance, tragic art, such as depictions of the cross, interprets for man the creative possibilities he would fail to see in direct encounter with equivalent tragedy.¹

(7) Original evil--not original sin.--In such a theory of constitutional, perceptual fault, although moral and natural evil mingle and blend intricately, it seems that natural or irresponsible evil is the more basic factor. It stems from the fact of cosmic oppositions met by God in his creation of men. However, Wieman does not take this inherent weakness in man as the basis for a theory of original sin, which it almost invites. Sin amounts to man's satisfaction of his partial self in terms of the created good rather than his satisfaction of his total self through the integrating creative good. This division of self is not inherent in the new-born infant. It is produced through his social interaction with persons who are divided in their commitments. Thus original sin is a social phenomenon, not a fact of personal constitution.²

1. Growth of Religion, p. 260. Cf. Source of Human Good, p. 156.

2. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 133.

(8) Freedom to do good only.--Man who uses his freedom to love that which is not the source of freedom, as just noted, finds his freedom degenerating in its static object. Freedom used to adore the static becomes complacency and not freedom. Likewise, it gives satisfaction to a disintegrated, static element in man, less than the whole. Thus, man's personal center of initiation disintegrates. Freedom used to do evil reduces man's freedom of alternatives. Such freedom is not self-perpetuating.

Freedom operates by causation, to be sure, but when causation passes through personality there is response rather than reaction. The more inclusively one's whole self is in the response, the more free he is. The more segmental his reaction, the less free.¹ Freedom is a matter of operating in accordance with the creative event, according to Wieman's system. Thus Wieman can fairly say, "The metaphysics we are defending interprets freedom as a kind of determinism."² Thus man has choice of what determinism he will enter--the discreative, the created, or the creative. The first two constitute freedom-robbing sin. The third is freedom-giving life. In this sense man is free only to do the good, since freedom survives only in the exercise of the creative.

v. Nature versus God

Thus far, a larger setting in Wieman's thought has been presented for the problem of natural evil, its comprehension and redemption. This has cleared the way, it is hoped, for the specific

1. Ibid., p. 157.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 301.

consideration now of focal elements in the problem of natural evil in his thought.

God has been defined as the contender in the universe for the cause of meaning and value through concrete existence. God contends against discreative powers which are great and independent in their source. These powers are destructive and parasitic in their work. These are the forces of nature minus God. In this, Wieman sees nature as the totality of reality, including in it one process for value and meaning--God. One wonders what process gives form to nature as a single whole. However, Wieman offers little help at this point, defining the remainder of nature minus God as being either static creations, neutral absences of value, or forces like the following.

Much evil is due to the power of brutish masses that move without being organized and directed to meet the requirements of those more delicate organizations of higher value which are dependent on them. Fire, flood, earthquake, avalanche, famine, are examples; many accidents are of this sort. The higher values always consist of an organization of activities more delicate and easily destroyed than the underlying masses upon which the higher are dependent.¹

(1) Natural evil in protective hierarchies.--This universe, "full of brutish, destructive masses and forces that oft times tear in pieces . . . bonds of mutual support,"² is the raw material from which God must create value and meaning, and against which value and meaning must prevail. Thus, the germinal danger in all creation is the fact that higher creation rests on lower. The basis of the highest is only shortly removed from brute nature. Music may rest on horsehair drawn over cat-gut. Thus the foundation of value quakes at times before the

1. Growth of Religion, p. 359.

2. Ibid., p. 362.

onslaught of its former, unregenerate self. The highest spirit is based on physical forces whose deficiencies cause spirit to suffer.¹

Wieman calls this ontological structure for the comprehension of natural evil "protective hierarchy." The few most sensitive orders of creation stand at the top and at the mercy of less valuable creation. This is their crown and their liability, reflected biologically, psychologically, and socially.² However, a deeper question stands behind this theory of protective hierarchy. By what deep evil is the height of creativity kept so unpopulated and the base so popular? Why is the height of creativity pyramidal in form? What is this infection of the majority which keeps it from the height?

(2) Natural evil by inertias.--This factor limiting the scope of creativity Wieman calls inertia. Inertia is evidenced in the brutish resistance of nature to creativity, and in the insensitivity and unresponsiveness met in inanimate objects, earthquake and fire. It is evidenced in the quick exhaustion of energy stored in plants and animals, and in the quick susceptibility to fatigue in organisms, which often facilitate this running down of energy by wasteful conflict. Cut off from communication with other peoples (the medium of creative interchange in Wieman's system), societies are kept primitive by inertia. Every created good turns against its master, creativity, by inertia formerly noted in static dogmatism. The universal fact of death is the universal running down of energy, inertia.³ Wieman defines inertia only in terms of the negative aspects of its manifestations.

1. Ibid., p. 358.

2. Source of Human Good, pp. 117-118.

3. Ibid., pp. 105-109.

Where dynamic creativity is the good, inertia is the discreative or obstructive. There is inertia of atoms and molecules to creative interaction which makes rare their creative development into higher organisms. This is exemplified in the wastefulness and indifference of nature. "Throughout most of the universe, creativity seems to have been halted at the level of matter's inertia."¹

Wieman also treats under the topic of inertias the general running down of energy and the ultimate pall of death over all created beings. Although this is not so clearly an illustration of inertia, Wieman treats it so. This is not, however, an invitation to a theory that universal energy is running down. Rather, it is the running down of energy in the instances of creativity which are here considered. However, speculation might be in order as to whether Wieman's creative God is not the final form-giver and initiator of all energy in a static universe. Much of what Wieman describes as inertias and protective hierarchies can be explained by the inertia of nature as drag entering into or admixing with the energized created good to initiate conflict with creativity. Thus inertia, conflict, and limited creativity can run on a single source of energy and form--God. However, Wieman seems to hold out for other energy sources with minimal structure and quality not given by God.

(3) Pain and suffering as positive evidence of conflict.--In accordance with this ontology of evil, sickness is seen as failure to adjust to God, either responsibly or not responsibly. Out of the analogy of cosmic conflict, pain is not sheer evil, since sheer evil would have no formal structure for felt quality. Evil becomes pain in

1. Ibid., p. 110.

its frustration of some valued interest.¹ Pain is reassuring to the degree that it reports the holding out of some valued stronghold which has been attacked. However, there is the moment of pain, sometimes stretched for an eternity, in which the mind is reduced to a blur of meaningless or near meaningless experience.² There is in this an unredeemable factor of sheer evil.

A distinction must be made between pain and suffering. Suffering is pain in the employ of meaning. Physical pain taken over as suffering by man's creative attitude may act as warning or stimulant to growth. This positive use of pain will be more fully discussed later under the heading of redemption.

(4) Death and the danger of immortality.--The utter realism with which Wieman has faced evil stands by him when he confronts the fact of death. The theory of inertias gives ontological underpinning to the fact that death is not only an end-of-the-trail phenomenon but a continuous degeneration of all created goods. All that is prized is infected by death and evil. The fact must not be evaded. The evasion of death makes life superficial and non-sacrificial.³

Having denied the evidential credibility of a consequent nature of God as conserver of created values hereafter, Wieman admits,

There is loss as well as gain, and some losses are irrecoverable and irreparable. . . . It seems to us a fabrication of the imagination to comfort the human heart in its sore distress over the perishing of precious values. To

1. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 165.

2. Religious Experience . . . , p. 326.

3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, pp. 61-62, 107.

assert this perishing to be an illusion by reason of the consequent nature of God is to come very close to denying the reality of evil.¹

In fact, the death of man's spirit or spiritual atrophy is as common a fact as physical death in the life of man. And in Wieman's system, spiritual death comes precisely "when created goods are sought first and creative good served second."² This being the case, it is such attitudes as the belief in the immortality of created good which implements spiritual death. The unrealistic view of death can be devastating to man.

(5) Wrath of God.--Only by commitment to the creative can man transcend his death-bound bondage to the created. By such commitment he may then come to realize that the destruction of the created is the opening portal for the creative to flow through. Thus, destruction of the created by evil becomes readily redeemable by the creative. So much is this so, that at times it is the creative itself which must destroy the created. This has been expressed traditionally as the wrath of God or the "strange work" of goodness. God cracks and shatters human institutions and habits out of line with his demands.³ Wieman says this most bluntly: "If by 'evil' one means the destruction of created good which necessarily involved in the creation and conservation of the best possible, . . . then in these senses the creative event is evil."⁴ In other words, to the degree that man is content to view it

1. Source of Human Good, pp. 193-194.

2. Ibid., pp. 272-273.

3. Normative Psychology . . . , p. 532.

4. Source of Human Good, p. 300.

this way, his over-concern for the demise of the created is evil. His idolatry tries to clutch its object even beyond the grave through schemes of immortality.

(6) Positive shock of evil.--For the open-minded and open-willed, death is shocking reminder enough that only commitment to creativity redeems and spans the grave. Creativity employs the vacancies left by death as openings for greater good of the race. "Death stands at the end of the trail of observable facts and points with imperative gesture, commanding: Give yourself to the creative power."¹

6. The Redemption of Man from Evil

1. A present, felt power of redemption

"There is a creative power in history which is able to conquer and to save, but it is not any power of man, even though it works through man."² Just as the God of Wieman's theology is a felt reality rather than a beliefful ideal, so the power of God for the redemption of man from evil must be a present, temporal, actual reality. No eternal entity outside of history or a future hope within history will do.³

(1) No redemption in the a-historic.--Beyond history man is not saved but annihilated.⁴ Eternity is by definition static, hence, a belief in this is the ultimate idolatry in a theology whose God is creativity. This is why Wieman calls eternity a Greek idol.⁵

However, there is a dimension dubbed eternal in God. It is the

1. Ibid., p. 281.

2. Ibid., p. 309.

3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 97.

4. Ibid., p. 273.

5. Source of Human Good, p. 37.

constancy of form in process. It is also the aspect of God which must, of necessity, transcend the existence over which process is Lord.

Although Wieman has insisted that creativity lives and moves and has its being in existence with no primordial, consequent, or noumenal aspects left over, there are moments when the superpersonal or superhuman aspect of process begins to sound supernatural or superexistential.

The eternal is that order of value which is God. Its status in existence is always changing. As a form of existence in this world it may grow. But as order, structure, principle, whether in existence or not, it is eternal and changeless. When out of existence it is the possibility of existence. When in existence it is possibility actualized. It is never entirely out of existence, so far as we know, and it is never completely actualized.¹

(2) No futuristic redemption.--Such an aspect of possibility beyond existence might well open up a theory of futuristic salvation for all present ills. However, this area of possibility is, in Wieman's thought, so far above all that man, its product, can anticipate that it is not an adequate present power of redemption. Hope built on anticipation is illusion, for none can foresee the good to eventuate by creative process.² "This best [saving power] is not a future state but the actual process of creativity."³

(3) No redemption by beliefs or ideals.--Just as the God of redemption cannot be found in the a-historical or in the anticipatory future, likewise He is not found within the practice of belief or the

1. Growth of Religion, p. 321.
2. Source of Human Good, p. 115.
3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 128.

lure of ideals. Just as faith is not belief or comprehension but an internal propulsion, so the source-object of that faith is a reality felt in the process of belief and ideation. It is not some belief in a theistic redeemer which enables devotion, but a felt reality.¹

ii. God as the present power of integrating love

The creative good has been seen to be a process for the creation and integration of meaning and value in the world. Disintegration occurs through alien forces of destructive and obstructive evil whereby less than man's total self is supported and satisfied. Much of the evil enters man's responsibility in which he willfully clings to one created aspect of creativity (to the detriment of the rest) to satisfy one selfish aspect of his personality (to the detriment of the rest).

Creativity seeks to reintegrate the world and the person by bringing antithetical and conflicting aspects of the world and person into unity. This dominant aspect of the creative is called love. Love seeks to integrate immediacy and knowledge as defined earlier. It integrates opponent forces, and unifies the data of the sciences into the integrated, whole processive reality of religion. True love does not try to make its object over into its own fancies, but with respectful justice appreciates and seeks to improve the object for its own sake. Love seeks to correct inner conflicts in the beloved.²

(1) Forgiveness, conversion, redemption by creative interchange.--

In the analysis of the creative event from man's point of view it was shown that creative interchange or fellowship is the best vehicle for

1. Communication, The Journal of Religion, XXIV (Jan., 1944), p. 58.

2. Religious Experience . . . , pp. 101-102.

this love of God. This creative interchange is a sharing and integration of the original, private, deep experiences of persons prior to social conformisms and cultural overlays. In this, sin is forgiven in so far as man's divisive and idolatrous privacy (against communal creativity) is broken. It is broken by interchange with its self-criticism (repentance) and new self-esteem (sanctification).¹ This is the redemptive process of conversion.²

It was formerly seen that in Wieman's thought freedom is causation passing through a responsive total or whole self. Where less than the whole self assumes the causation one has deterministic reaction and loss of freedom. By creative interchange the whole self is released into decision; thus disintegrated, segmental rule is broken. In true freedom man is redeemed by conversion to God's grace, which finds its highest experiential expression in freedom.³

(2) Redemptive suffering--love's strange work.--This creative power which redeems by integrating love is not all-persuasive. It meets idolatrous obstacles of the over-ripe created which refuse transformation or redemption by growth. Thus a strange work of redemptive love ensues. It is the surgical approach to cancerous growth. God finally crushes human institutions and habits which are out of line with His demands.⁴ Wieman sees this work in much anxiety, guilt, and meaninglessness, the pressures of which deliver man from preoccupation with the

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, pp. 18, 22.

2. Normative Psychology . . . , pp. 165-167.

3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, pp. 159-160.

4. Normative Psychology . . . , p. 532.

death-bound created so that it may no longer obstruct the life-giving God.¹ "The deeps of evil never reach consciousness except in opposition to the heights of good."² In this case, the depth serves the height. The power which redeems produces also the purging sufferings of Job and the insightful dread of Kierkegaard. "One must recognize that he is casting himself in the wholeness of his being into the power and into the keeping of what not only sustains and creatively transforms but which also destroys."³

iii. Redemptive faith and commitment

Man is converted and redeemed from much evil by commitment to the creative. Now one's commitment or total interest in the creative, as seen earlier, is not something which reason can generate. That growth in man whereby he is brought to consuming interest in the creative is something he undergoes, not causes.⁴

The super-power which gives reason its life must also give reason its supreme commitment to that life. "Religious conversion is not accomplished by reason. Surely not. Neither does blood circulate by reason. Neither do flowers bloom in the month of May by reason."⁵

It is by faith that man is converted and committed, faith being man's responsible appropriation of grace or creativity. Faith is the appropriation in the self of the basis of the self.⁶

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 56.

2. Ibid., p. 57.

3. Ibid., p. 296.

4. "The Ultra-Human," The Christian Century, LII (July 24, 1935), 963.

5. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 143.

6. Ibid., p. 20.

(1) Faith as vision.--In the section on epistemology faith was seen as the interested, propulsive act behind all knowledge. Here, too, there is the vision-giving function of faith. In the darkest time man is rendered more sensitive by faith to the interests of the created and the creative, more keenly aware of true value and disvalue, more sacrificially willing to forgo the created for the sake of God.

Every painful experience, every trouble, disaster, difficulty of any sort, becomes a device by which one is rendered more sensitized to the fullness of all that is precious. . . . Without faith, trouble has the opposite effect.¹

The despair, anxiety, guilt, and meaninglessness of human value are transformed, by faith, into the way in which men are turned to God. One who strives to find good even in the despair of his own success opens himself, or is opened by grace, to the creative.²

(2) Liberal faith.--The faith which sees beyond man's static bondage to dying goods must never itself be allowed to grow static lest it become one of these goods. Man must hold to a liberal commitment against all dogmatism. Faith must be open if it comes from dynamic grace beyond. Otherwise, one's static commitment serves only the limitations of his own mind.³

Man's sheer joy in believing can be a great dogmatic danger. Where the source of all knowledge and redemption is dynamic, "infallible beliefs . . . are obstructive and evil in many ways."⁴ One must never fear that faith is destroyed by new knowledge. Knowledge must never be

1. "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," p. 205.

2. Source of Human Good, pp. 50-51.

3. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 21.

4. Is There a God?, p. 50.

taken as something more concrete than faith. Rather, faith being the root source of all man's knowledge, it is knowledge which must ever make its thankful bow to faith.

(3) Commitment by worshipful adjustment.--Man's adjustment to the integrating stimulus of God comes into clearest though not exclusive focus in worship. It is here that "religion undertakes to change man and his world in such a way that progressive integration and appreciation of individualization shall reach the maximum in human experience."¹ By worship, man's total past experience and its residue in him is adapted to his total environment. By stages in worship, man is exposed to God by whom he is diagnosed and reconstructed.²

(4) Mystical immediacy and transcendent symbolism.--In worship the mystical immediacy of the all-consuming redemptive object is brought into focus, interpretation, and receptive application. This immediacy is what Wieman calls the experience of the "wholeness of nature."³ Philologically this is also the holiness of nature. In a highly mystical vein Wieman speaks of this rarefied immediacy.

The mind is capable of a certain kind of awareness which . . . is our most immediate experience of God. It is not a form which the mind can apprehend or strive to actualize. It is a dim, inarticulate feeling. . . . It is a sense of communion with the order of life. . . . This quality of consciousness is the experience of being a participant in the stream of life.⁴

1. "The Philosophy of Worship," p. 78.

2. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 77.

3. Religious Experience . . . , p. 180.

4. "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," p. 213.

As previously seen, God being supra-personal and supra-mental, symbols are necessary to express the something more of God which transcends any present state of experience and knowledge.¹ The creative sea of quality which comes to man's raw experience seeks form and symbol for itself.²

Wieman realizes that his philosophical definition of God as a creative system of interaction offers little in the way of a provocative object of worship.

This system of interactions [as] a working definition of God . . . does not inspire devotion. . . . Devotion . . . is inspired . . . (1) by symbols that bring entrancingly to consciousness the rich concreteness of the reality which cannot be reduced to our concepts; and (2) by association with others who have this devotion.³

In this, symbols are generated by man's constitutional, devotional needs confronting the transcendent reality which created and serves them. Symbols must be used intelligently and with liberal openness. They must be coherently related to verifiable facts of experience and not mistaken for sure knowledge.

One of the guarantors of authenticity in symbols is the community of faith which worships. It is community, after all, through which creative interaction operates at its self-critical best. Community creates objective and self-critical standards for symbols.

Wieman accepts the symbols and evocative words of the Christian community and tradition. One must inject in them new motives and

1. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 140.

2. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 90.

3. Is There a God?, pp. 127-128.

meanings. But one must appreciate in them the deep symbolic patterns ingrained in one's civilization by the creative, communal interchange of his tradition.¹

(5) Receptive service.--Out of the practice of faith one prepares the way for the creative. He builds the mechanism through which God's organism or inspiration may work. He holds by liberal faith the conditions for the creative transformation of mind. He strives to overcome obstructive evil and rightly to face destructive evil. Ultimately, death, guilt, and catastrophe cannot be corrected by human effort. These are overcome by grace which reorganizes the human psyche to move in spite of them. Man recognizes the good directive in the shock of evil, the good at stake in suffering.

These dark realities are not good in themselves; but when the full recognition of them leads man to the more abundant and masterful life . . . then these dark realities . . . take on a positive value of their own.²

(6) Committed discernment of values.--Man has not the power to say that good will dominate nature, but he has the power to declare that good will dominate him. "Stated very simply, the cure of fear is the practice of the presence of God."³ Man must hold his objects of love and desire up against God to measure their true worth. He must hold his dreads up against this God and realize that their only evil exists in their ability to shut him off from God. To his redemptive amazement may come the realization that his goods are evil and his evils, good.

1. "On Using Christian Words," The Journal of Religion, XX (July, 1940), 267-268.

2. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 296.

3. Methods of Private Religious Living (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 110.

But all in all, evil is only that which can separate him from God, and God does save men from such evil.¹

(7) Jesus Christ as revelatory example.--Wieman finds the ultimate, though not exclusive, expression and revelation of his belief in Jesus Christ. "Christ is the domination by the creative event over the life of man in a fellowship made continuous in history."² As Wieman put it quite early in his thought, "Jesus made the experiment of total commitment". The results are not yet all in."³

Jesus Christ symbolizes God's coming to man in his sin. The fellowship established by the experience of Christ's life and death has become the church. This is not the communion made up of individuals on church rolls. It is the communion of creative interchange continuous in history which makes, rather than being made by, the redeemed individuals in it.⁴

The deity of Christ is in the fact of the organic unity of men which came to focus in him. This organic unity of men is the redemptive word of God seen in Christ.⁵ Jesus is not the exclusive revelation of this ever-present process, but certainly a key revelation among all others.

Jesus Christ revealed the evil of man's dogmatic idolatries.⁶

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1. "The New Supernaturalism," Christendom, III (Winter, 1938), 78.
 2. Source of Human Good, p. 269.
 3. "The Method of Religious Inquiry," The New Republic, XLVIII (Sept. 29, 1926), 143.
 4. Growth of Religion, p. 269.
 5. "Was God in Jesus?" The Christian Century, LI (May 2, 1934), 589.
 6. Ibid., p. 590.

He also revealed the patient, suffering, forgiving love of God which waits to forgive men in the shock of their awaking to evil, even if that shock must be occasioned by the death of one like Jesus Christ.

iv. Pain and disvalue redeemed in suffering and association

Of itself, pain is neither good nor evil but gains its classification by the way in which it serves the creative event. In the main, pain is destructive and obstructive since a man can lose his very humanity by pain. In the instances where pain operates positively for warning, stimulation for growth, or opportunity for the growth of new and communicable qualitative meaning, pain is subsumed in suffering. Whereas pain qua pain may destroy qualitative meaning (value) by focusing the mind hypnotically on a present event apart from all meanings, suffering always increases meaning. In fact, suffering is much more involved in meaning than in event. Sorrow, despair, regret, shame, and the like look much more to meaning than to event.¹ Thus suffering can be communicated; pain cannot. The communication of suffering is the stuff of folklore, legend, art, hero tales, and lives of saints. Art reveals the suffering essential to save life from complacency and increase qualitative meaning.

Suffering delivers one from bondage to the created.² Thus the mature man follows the good in spite of, and partially by the grace of, suffering. Man, mature in Wieman's faith, can accept the suffering of self-criticism and catastrophe as opportunity for good. The security of the mature is in the creative.³

1. Source of Human Good, pp. 95-97.

2. "The Interpretation of Kierkegaard," The Christian Century, LVI (April 5, 1939), 445.

3. Source of Human Good, p. 101.

Isolated disvalue may well become value in a larger system of relations. Faith in the creative good is the largest and most expansive system of relations man can know. The satisfactions of an inclusive interest can transmute evils suffered along the way. Pain is evil if it frustrates an interest. But pain can have its value as creative suffering for an inclusive cause. Wieman is not unrealistic here.

We do not mean to suggest that the present world with all its evil is the best of all possible worlds. It is very plain that the greater part of the evil in our world is not transmuted by any more inclusive interest [than the one frustrated].¹

However, realism is strength in the arms of faith. Wieman affirms:

We have two things to give to God. . . . Our success, our achievements, our strength; and then we have our failure, our brokenness, our weakness. . . . Not only the Palms, but also the Cross and after that the Resurrection, must have their proper place in every life that is held securely in the hands of God. He who lives thus is a warrior who wins in defeat even as much as he wins in victory.²

v. Immortality and eternal life

Wieman distinguishes between immortality, a term of quantity, and eternal life, a term of quality. Theistic naturalism must be silent about the first term. It can deal with the second.

Since naturalism requires observational evidence . . . for all its beliefs, it cannot claim to know there is any continued existence of the soul after death. On the

1. Wrestle of Religion . . . , p. 165.

2. The Directive in History (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 133.

other hand, it is very sure there is much it does not know and it is very sure God exists.¹

These noncommittal words of comfort about God's existence beyond our small knowledge only serve here to remind one of the eternity in which eternal life participates to derive its quality. It is the eternity of process whose form is constant, the stable ridge pole for the tent of change. Man's eternal life is an all-consuming confidence in this.

(1) Death as culmination and doorway.--In such a system, death is overcome by attitude, not fact. The human psyche in adaptation to the eternal God sees death as a culmination and a doorway of life. It is the culmination of individual life and the doorway for social life.

Perhaps the simplest way to conquer death is to take it as completion and ending. . . . With the vision of God as growth . . . one can welcome death as the only means of rearing an order of life cumulatively enriched by the contributions of successive generations and an almost infinite variety of personalities. . . . We must say that death is one of the doorways by which God enters into human life and history.²

Death and finitude form a bright gleam rather than a dark shadow over this world. By them comes social salvation and enrichment. The infinite variety of God's creations in and through personality comes both by the rising and the falling away of men, generations, and institutions.

(2) Cumulative social immortality.--Culture conserves many individual values. Perhaps the community of communities may preserve

1. Growth of Religion, p. 20.

2. Ibid., pp. 322-323.

the values of one of its departed sister cultures.¹ In this sense, there is a cumulative though realistic redemption of history from the fact of death.

Resources of appreciative consciousness are not sufficient to withstand the onslaughts of change, the evil impulses of the heart, and the wearing-down of continued effort. This is the tragedy of man. . . . History cannot lift this fate, but it can make the glow of swift decline cumulative through a succession of generations. . . . In this way it can endow the dying day of each generation with a splendor deepening through the ages. History is the field in which creative power wins this tragic victory over time and matter and the evil ways of men.²

(3) Redemption of what has been.--The past is as plastic as the future in redeemability. The past by accumulative reinterpretation through larger systems of meaning is ever changing. The creative usage of time must be cumulative lest creativity be segmented into novelty. In such a structure Wieman has optimistic hope for the work of man.

When this religious faith joins with education and the two work together with government, industry, and technology to meet the required conditions, creative power can transform not only the life of the individual and society but also the material world.³

This is no small aspect of solution to the problem of evil.

(4) No sure progress or victory of good.--In terms of Wieman's creative accumulation of meaning in history, there is increasing meaning in the world since the beginning.⁴ But, of course, with heightened good

1. Ibid., p. 20.

2. Source of Human Good, p. 309.

3. Ibid., pp. 287-288.

4. Ibid., p. 89.

there is the increased liability of evil. In a creative world, heightened good can readily cast a lengthened shadow of evil. Thus Wieman sees no sure evidence of progress or of final victory of good over evil.¹

This growth of organic unity does not necessarily mean progress. A tree can grow even though man and storm may break it down faster than it grows. Or evil may increase more rapidly than organic unity. Whether the world is getting better or not, is a very difficult question.²

vi. Indestructible creative good

On the other hand, there is no known evil which can destroy that good which is creativity. It can be obstructed but not destroyed.³ Likewise, "no amount of evil can nullify whatever value there is."⁴ Good is good and evil is evil, regardless of their comparative powers and quantities. As no amount of created good can increase the value of the creative, so no amount of evil can decrease its value, for evil by definition lies outside the nature of creative good. Even if earth and life end, the possibility of the creative will endure.⁵

It will be a fact that on this planet God took on existence to this degree. It will still be a fact that the episode on this tiny granule in the universe was an actualization of precious value. It was superbly worth all it cost, tender and beautiful and tragic as it was.⁶

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 273.

2. "Was God in Jesus?" p. 591.

3. Source of Human Good, pp. 87-90.

4. Normative Psychology . . ., p. 50.

5. "Values: Primary Data for Religious Inquiry," p. 405.

6. Growth of Religion, p. 321.

vii. The positive revelation of good in all evil

Above all, in all of man's experience of evil it must be remembered that only a standpoint containing good can be cognizant of adversity.¹ There is generally "the outcry of aspiring goodness beneath the stabs of evil."² The greatest evil is complacency in which men cease to suffer, holding no cause or purpose worthy of sacrifice or suffering. On the basis of his system, Wieman offers this final insight into the faith which redeems man from the evil of a suffering world.

Do not treat suffering as a basic evil. Great evil fully successful is always painless. Suffering is always the battleground where good and evil are at work. Suffering is the sign that good is fighting against a downward drag, or against an obstacle to an upward climb. Where suffering is, there is a good to love, an evil to correct. . . . Deliverance from suffering means that the struggle has ceased. That may mean either that the good has succumbed or that it has triumphed and risen to a higher level of functioning and integration. Whoever avoids or resists suffering as though it were the basic evil, is failing to meet one of the requirements of the essential brotherhood of humans.³

1. Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 57.

2. Is There a God? p. 239.

3. Ibid., p. 325.

CHAPTER II

EDWIN LEWIS: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF ULTIMATE STRUGGLE

1. Background and Development of Lewis' Position

Edwin Lewis has been one of the few theologians in modern America who has explicitly dealt with the problem of evil in the large. However, he has not emphasized or dealt systematically with the problem of natural evil. He began to formulate his system of theology during the 1920's, an age marked in America by much skepticism toward religion in general. Seeking to speak to this generation, Lewis developed an appreciative attitude toward the evidences of science and the capacity of human reason to comprehend ultimate reality. By an analysis of human religious experience he hoped to find a distinctive element functioning to give one belief in God. He was open-minded as to whether this element should prove to be purely psychological, objectively real, or both.

It makes no difference whether God is conceived as a self-sufficient being wholly distinct from man, or whether he is conceived as nothing more than a necessary constituent of human consciousness.¹

1. Edwin Lewis, Jesus Christ and the Human Quest (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1924), p. 63. Unless otherwise specified, all references in this chapter will be to works by Edwin Lewis.

1. Liberal influences

(1) Problem of evil in man.—In the fashion of a good liberal of the 1920's, Lewis placed his emphasis on the Schleiermacherian tradition of human experience and quest more than on the orthodox tradition which emphasizes a God who is presupposed in such experience and who satisfies such quest. However, it might be said that such a background in liberalism was to serve as a valuable preparation for Lewis' ultimate wrestle with the problem of evil. In a sense, one does not become involved in this problem so much by concentrating on the good and powerful God of orthodoxy but by first feeling with man the paradox, conflict, and confusion of human experience. It is from the study of this human problem that one may then turn to God both for an answer and for comfort.

By facing human experience with sober and liberal-minded exactness Lewis did not become like certain pessimists among the skeptics of his audience. Always there dwelt deep in him the spirit of the "good news" which proclaims redemption available for the cruel realities of man's life. Thus, Edwin Lewis, in spite of his preoccupation with the evils afoot in man's world, declared that one can see at least the beginning of the victory of good over evil in this life. In fact, evil sometimes serves this cause. Courage is born only out of hardship; service, out of inequalities; hope, out of uncertainties; faith, out of knowledge more limited than belief; truth, out of the ability to lie.¹

1. God and Ourselves (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1931), p. 93.

This was not yet a belief in God's power as the only thing that could redeem man from evil. Rather, it was a kind of humanistic optimism over man's natural constitution with its redemptive capacities. However, this too was seen to be a work of God through man. Thus, Lewis' thought was never utterly devoid of God-centered emphases on the matter of redemption. However, Lewis still lived within the influential world of American religious thought in which the solution to the problems of human evil was being sought largely through a diagnosis of man with little or no reference to God.

(2) Problem of evil transcending man.--Perhaps humanistic or man-centered varieties of liberalism operate best when the inconsistencies of life which they face are not present realities but recorded or hypothetical case studies. Whatever the case may be, with the coming of the depression in the 1930's, suffering became a very present reality in America, and Lewis became a party to the general trend back toward orthodoxy. In times of prosperity and progress, optimistic humanism and naturalism had seemed like the realistic viewpoints of the day. Where all goes well with man and nature nobody wants to go beyond them for comfort. But now, in days of tragedy, orthodox supernaturalism, with its transcendent pessimism toward the world, seemed like the only realistic outlook. Lewis revealed his sober reversal of attitude in no uncertain terms.

I would rather see the church recommitted to the whole Satanic mythology, with its implications of a great battle to be waged in which there could be, in the words of William James, "real losses and real losers," than for it to accept an easy-going evolutionary naturalism and settle down passively and innocuously.¹

1. A Christian Manifesto (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1934), p. 207.

ii. Orthodox turnings and deepening insights

Lewis' years of liberal optimism were at an end. He wrote:

Nobody but a facile optimist can face the spectacle of this twentieth-century world and not feel that a malign spirit is at work. The Zoroastrian visualized the world as the arena for the death grapple of the Spirit of Light and the Spirit of Darkness.¹

For Lewis, optimistic liberal and humanistic thought which put its confidence in the ability of human thought and work to understand and overcome evil was naive. It would never find there a power able to redeem the dark realities of human life. Thus, Lewis moved thoughtfully in the direction of orthodoxy with its emphasis on the stark reality of sin and evil and upon man's desperate need for divine grace from beyond himself. However, Lewis maintained a capacity for liberal open-mindedness by which he was able to appreciate insights from many schools of thought. This plus his honesty toward dark, experiential facts of life would lead him one day from an apology of Christian doctrine to a deep, dualistic revision of it.

The rallying call of orthodoxy in this period when Lewis first came to appreciate it was supplied by Karl Barth in Europe. Perhaps the thing that most attracted Lewis to Barth was a certain convincing, God-centered tone of doctrine in Barth which referred to God as if He really did exist. However, to this emphasis Lewis added the best insights of Herrmann and Harnack who held to a God immanent and even experiencable in history, nature, and humanity-- a God not

1. Christian Manifesto, p. 207.

utterly different or "other" than man. The Hegelian concept of nature and reality, with its comprehensive, dynamic dialectic, further inspired Lewis' concept of the Bible as progressive revelation. Thus, this new admirer of orthodoxy, steeped in Barth's same sensitivity to evil in the world, wrote what was, perhaps, the most telling criticism of Barth in that day. This he did in a series of three articles in The Christian Century.¹

Lewis proclaimed the sovereign reality of God, the inspiration of scripture, the centrality of the fellowship of the church in the work of redemption, and the cleavage and struggle of God and evil. These were all proper Barthian emphases. But Lewis' early liberalism flavored all of this new orthodoxy to the degree that he powerfully denounced Barthian emphases on the absolute cleavage between God and creation, the authoritarian concept of the Bible, and the almost docetic, superhuman definition of Christ.

In this world of evils, both moral and natural, a God of faith who is not an immanent experiencer of, and struggler with, evil has no religious availability for sufferers.² In such a world, a doctrine of scripture which takes no cognizance of the frailties and relativities of the human transcribers involved is not a doctrine for the poor in spirit.³

1. Cf. "What is Barth Trying to Say?", The Christian Century, L (Jan. 18, 1933), 82-84. "The Theology of Karl Barth," Ibid., L (Jan. 25, 1933), 121-122. "Where is Barth Wrong?", Ibid., L (March 22, 1933), 385-387.

2. God and Ourselves, pp. 149-155.

3. The Biblical Faith and Christian Freedom (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), pp. 45, 51, 57.

For men who want a redeemer but also want a guide capable of being followed, Jesus Christ must have a nature which is human as well as divine;¹ and God must confirm this revelation of Himself in Christ by further, coherently correlated revelation of Himself in all of nature and history.² This mixture of liberal thoughtfulness and open-mindedness about the facts of human experience plus a deep sense of need for the saving power of the transcendent God of orthodoxy was to lead Lewis in the direction of a theology both daring and different.

2. A Theology of the Experience of Natural Evil

Edwin Lewis has sought in his theology to find that conception of the basic structure of reality which, as far as possible, explains by reason and asserts by faith the experience of the historic Christian community. Facing man's dialectical experience of struggle with evil opposed to his witness to the good in creation, Lewis has tried to find an illuminating theology which offers both rational coherence and religious helpfulness.

Man finds conflict to be a basic element of his existence. He is born into a world of great fixities,³ yet he has the capacity for self-transcendence whereby he can freely will and execute, within certain limits, his response to the stimulus of these fixities of en-

1. A Philosophy of the Christian Revelation (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers), pp. 153-154.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. The Creator and the Adversary (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948), p. 40.

vironment, heredity, and culture. "It is through the human that the more than human Word, Idea, Truth, Reality, becomes flesh and enters the warp and woof of creation."¹

1. The experience of evil

(1) Self-transcendence in the experience of evil.—It is at the point of conscious self-transcendence in the human being that the problem of evil emerges. Perhaps all sentient beings know some quality of experience which is evil, but, because they cannot transcend such quality to reflect upon its alternative good, it is an experience but not a problem. Man becomes conscious of fixities—with the regularities of such fixities—which offer him both a challenging and a stable world in which to execute his freedom and work out communication with other rational beings. But it is a world which, partly because of its stability, may prematurely crush him out of existence in an accident, and in any event will eventually cause his death. Man also becomes conscious of a certain bent within him which is irrational, immoral, anti-social and discreative. Somehow, this causes in him psychological or spiritual drives or urges which, at times, lead him to use his freedom to sin—to violate that which he knows to be good for him and society.

(2) Transcendent factors.—There is in man conscience or moral sensitivity. It is not a moral standard, but a sensitivity to standards.² Man finds in the "hard knock school" of experience a moral order which he neither created nor escapes. Social pressures and constitutional standards of mental, spiritual, and physical health within the

1. Ibid., p. 49.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

individual cause him to experience distinctly different qualities of life if he obeys or breaks them. Man's compulsion or desire for his own welfare creates a sense of duty. Yet, according to Lewis, a desire in him for the exercise of his freedom causes him to rebel against duties he has not accepted as his own. Because of this, he is further pressured by the consequences of his rebellion, unless, perchance, he breaks through some valueless convention to establish a new standard of his total welfare which brings forth greater values than the old.¹

In the human yet superhuman Christ he finds an ideal and an experience of self-transformation. There is a living ideal which offers moral consistency to man's free will. There is also a power herewhich leads him to deepen and multiply those experiences in which man finds the high creative good of overcoming life's negativities with an assertion of consistent good will. Man, thus transformed, finds his creative capacity enlarged, for as he "seeks a personal relation to the supreme source of good there comes meaning and quality into the individual such as can be obtained nowhere else."²

According to Lewis, man may attempt to explain his lesser functions—biological, animalistic—in terms of naturalism and humanism. But when man tries to explain the higher functions of moral consciousness, creative insight, and reception of religious experience, the explanation of the higher by the lower not only confounds the problem, but also refuses to offer further inspiration along these higher lines of human capacity.

1. Ibid., pp. 57-58, 230-231.

2. Ibid., p. 89.

ii. Transcendent reality, revelation, and reason

Lewis moves to the higher, transcendent, causal ground for man's experience. He is led hither by the mutual influences of analogical hypothesis on the basis of existential evidence (an attempt to explain the known by the unknown which is hypothesized to be analogous to it) and the normative self-disclosure of God in Jesus Christ. These two, the evidences of human discovery through natural reason (basically interpretive) and of divine revelation, always have a reciprocal influence, for Lewis affirms the ultimate authenticity of both faith and reason in conjunction with one another.¹ The God of highest heaven, whom faith seeks and revelation discloses, is an object of belief that is consistent with comprehensive reason. Both God's revelational self-disclosure, as above described, and man's rational venture in ultimate knowledge is valid.²

(1) Man's rational capacity.--Man is equipped to explore the areas of natural and metaphysical knowledge through sense experience and rational organization and inference. He can also explore the "supra-sensible" by faith infused with reason. That is, his belief in what God has disclosed of the supernatural is belief in structures rationally relatable to, and meaningful for, natural man in the natural world. All of man's knowledge and experience, whether from above or below, must be correlated into whatever categories and unities of meaning man can discover. In this, Lewis offers no analytic epistemology but an assurance that in reality there are "inescapable permanencies which are the correlates both of man's experience and

1. A Philosophy . . . , p. 253.

2. Ibid., p. 232.

3. Ibid., pp. 232-233.

his rational nature. Man must believe that these are correlates also of the nature of God."¹ Revelation of God is not revelation at all apart from the convictions that what or who is revealed comes through the revelation in undistorted form, and that he who receives the revelation is able to understand and correlate it to his natural mode of understanding and living. "The Christian faith rests absolutely on the fact of this [God's] self-disclosure, . . . [which] presupposes on man's part the power to respond to it and accept it."²

(2) Transcendent directives in experienced reality.—All things mean more than themselves. They bespeak causal grounds, relations, and efficient powers beyond themselves. "To talk of meaning is to talk of symbols, to see the given as significant of what is not given."³ Everywhere this means that. By a dialectical and discursive rationale, the temporal points to other times and to eternity; the seen, to other sights and the unseen.

By such a theory Lewis is led (in his belief in the common rationale of mind and reality) to declare that all experience of nature and other minds suggests a common medium or meeting ground of Other Mind. God, the common ground of the understander and the understood, supplies the medium (rational world) in which minds can converse. Life and the world, being processive works, suggest to man a Processor or Worker.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 232.

2. The Creator . . . , p. 89.

3. A Philosophy . . . , p. 8.

4. Ibid., p. 14.

(3) Man's necessary God-hypothesis.--Man or human personality is the measure of all the experience man can know. Man knows he did not create and does not support himself in existence. Thus he turns to belief in a God who is productive and supportive of his kind of life and world. Such a God must be, at least, of a nature consistent with His creation--personality. God is wholly other to man, but He is not therefore wholly different.

Man turns to belief in such a God out of faith. "Faith is trust, and it is therefore primarily volitional and emotional. Belief, on the other hand, is primarily intellectual; it is the assent of the mind."¹ Man is moved by a constitutional volition of faith to a higher ground of belief. Lewis explains this by the theory that "no person is complete in himself, but has that in him which impels him to seek completion through relation with a larger whole."² In this sense, man is unavoidably religious. He is moved to commitment by any intimation of the truly valuable, permanent, and full in a world of disvalue, impermanence, and emptiness.

(4) Revelation and interpretation.--Faith produces belief, given intellectual content. Such content comes by natural exploration. It also comes from a higher source of confirming illumination which man does not discover, but in which he is discovered. "Revelation includes at least illumination. It is a disclosure of truth which would otherwise remain at best only a speculation."³

At this point it is difficult to discover whether Lewis is saying that original information is given by revelatory illumination

1. Ibid., p. 68.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

3. Ibid., p. 256.

or that revelation is a confirming, integrating illumination of information formerly obtained and held by natural reason. A bit of each creeps into the above statement and into the following:

It may belong to man to apprehend without interpreting. Indeed, awareness may be held to be fundamental. But mere apprehension is not man's highest capacity; such a capacity belongs in some measure to all sentient existence. It is much to know that something is. It is much more to know what something means.¹

In this sense, the data or illumined immediacy of revelation demand rational interpretation to be efficacious in the life of man. Lewis believes that the creator of human reason who now reveals Himself by revelation has equipped human reason to know Him. Within the Christian tradition man has the scriptures as a record of man's interpretations of inspiration and revelation. Through scripture man may know Jesus Christ who is a confirming key to all revelations of God given elsewhere. He confirms all preliminary revelation and pious speculation which has sensed the ultimacy of ethical struggle, the victorious power of God, and the concern of God for His creatures.

A man at prayer is the ultimate expression of human reverence before inescapable, transcendent mystery. It is also the ultimate testimony of the responsiveness of the mysterious to its creature. Just as in natural knowledge man must believe with faith in order to know, so in religion he must initiate, come forward, or put himself in a receptive position to acknowledge and employ the truth that is found or revealed.

All of this has been to say that what man knows of ultimate reality is correlated with what man needs to know to make sense of his experience and find saving power in his life. The ontological structure

1. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

which provides for this in Lewis is both revealed and discovered in part. It is an ontology of nature and supernature in at least analogical correlation. It is an ontology related to Lewis' epistemology of nature and supernature. This ontology will be presented now more or less in the large before its specific meaning for, and effect on, man is considered. It should be noted that the dualistic ontology now to be presented is a kind of culminating development in the thought of Lewis presented in his book The Creator and the Adversary. It is his ultimate attempt to comprehend the relation of God to forces of negativity in the universe.

3. Ontological Struggle

1. Basic elements of struggle

Elements of Zoroastrian dualism, as exemplified in forces of moral good and evil or ontic creativity and discreativity, and Platonic dualism, as exemplified in the "Demiurge" and "receptacle" in the Timaeus, seem to merge as Lewis declares that in the beginning there was a basic, uncreated, and undifferentiated existence which was impelled, by an internal law of necessity and self-determination, to take on, or express itself in, three distinct forms--the Divine (Creator), the Demonic (Adversary), and the residual. "There is one eternal existence, but it exists as three eternal existents."¹ Although this original existence is suggestive of monism, this three-fold self-differentiation in it is immediately original to it; hence, basic existence is somehow tri-istic.

(1) Creator, Adversary, and residual constant.--The Divine is the creative force for good and order in creation. It is the impresser of forms somehow within itself on basic matter. The Demonic is the discre-

1. The Creator . . . , p. 141.

ative force or evil Adversary. The residual constant is the basic stuff on which creative form and meaning are impressed, after which it becomes the prey for the discreative Adversary whose nature it is to destroy whatever the Creator forms from the residue. It is called "residual" because it is a form of primal self-differentiation which enters into neither the Divine nor the Demonic.¹ "[The] Creative creates by instrumentality of the uncreative constant, whose function it is to be the bearer of quality, of meaning, of value, of life."² Lewis does not define value here beyond calling it "things, events, or situations characterized as beautiful, true, or good."³

This is the basic structure of Lewis' ultimacy. It is a dynamic ultimacy of value or what might be called a value ontology. Ultimate existence, though potentially prior to value structure (i.e., tripartite division of value elements as seen above) is actual only in the dynamic contest of creativity and value. This underlies Lewis' statement that "values are intrinsic to reality. They are the very stuff of existence."⁴ In this, it appears that creation is, per se, good, except as somehow contaminated by the Adversary. In other words, Lewis defines the Creator as the maker of all meaningful existence. Whatever is created by Him is, by definition, good or valuable. This seems to be the same as saying that the fact that anything meaningful exists instead of nothing is itself value and good. However, Lewis insists that it is because the Creator operates out of love that creation is of value (i.e., a product of love ultimately capable of supporting man who is able to love as well as be loved). More of this, however, will be considered later.

1. The Creator . . . , p. 141.

2. Ibid., p. 143.

3. Ibid., p. 142.

4. Ibid., p. 143.

The language of cosmic struggle employed by Lewis has, for the naïve reader, a highly mythological flavor. For the more insightful reader it has an existentially descriptive flavor which has been thought out by the author. This is more than naïve mythos.

(2) Monistic inadequacy.—Monism for the sake of sacrosanct monism is all that Lewis can see in a great deal of traditional and contemporary theology. Such theology overlooks the pressing struggle of evil and good in this world in order to affirm the holiness and light of reality and God. Lewis, too, affirms that God is holy love, both as met in this world and as asserted ontologically. But holy love is a struggling love. Now, in Lewis' theory, this struggle is not merely a working against such passive recalcitrance as might be encountered in a "receptacle," nor is it only a working to fill in absences or gaps in the scope of creation. It is also a struggle against something bold and aggressive—a power in itself, an Adversary.¹ This sets the stage for Lewis' affirmation that only competitive dualism squarely meets the problem of evil.² This is a conclusion found frequently in scripture, according to Lewis, in all references to Satan, the Evil One, the anti-Christ, and others.

(3) Pluralistic inadequacy.—However, Lewis, as an alert metaphysician, realizes that if one gives positive, independent existence to that which is discreative, anti-social, immoral, and irrational, he

1. There are many theories of evil which see evil as a consequence of the artisan God molding the somewhat resistant stuff of creation. Others refer to it as a kind of lack or absence of God, but nothing having real existence in itself.

2. The Creator . . . , p. 132.

has a kind of ontological monstrosity with nothing tending to its continuance as a single, purposive force. What does not seem so explicitly obvious to Lewis is that if the Adversary be given equally ultimate status with the Creator then there is no explanation for the preponderance of rational order and, in a sense, goodness, necessary for anything meaningful at all to continue in existence. Nevertheless, Lewis' structure of reality seemingly anticipates this problem.

ii. The ontological drama of creation

By definition, only the Creator can work on the residue to bring forth created existents. The Creator impresses on the residue forms somehow internal to itself as a rational creator. It does this because of a creative drive within itself, since the Creator must, by definition, create. Further, the Creator loves what is created, according to Lewis. As a sculptor impresses forms which are a part of, or internal to, his mental life (i.e. in his mind) on shapeless clay and dubs it a creation; the prior existence of the basal matter notwithstanding, the Creator here is said to "create."

The Adversary exists only as potentiality until the moment in which the Creator creates.¹ The Adversary can find realized actuality only in the instances of its attempts to destroy what is created. This is not to say that the ontological foundation of the Adversary's life is something created by God. Lewis preserves the utter goodness of God at the price of His comprehensive and absolute power by declaring that

1. According to Lewis, God, the residue, and the Adversary never "began" to be in any temporal sense. Only the conflict among them began to be. (The Creator . . . , p. 148.)

the ontological basis of the Demonic is outside God, but existentially manifest in the creations by God. In other words, Lewis would agree with William James, who said that when the claims of metaphysics and ethics clash he would throw his ballot with ethics.¹

In a sense, the wholly good God meets a challenge in the act of creation, for He not only labors on a malleable and recalcitrant raw material, but He also faces the onslaught of evil which will infect and seek to undo creation. Yet, God does create, out of holy love. Such holy love, as here defined, clearly contains within itself elements of daring and suffering on the part of the Creator.

Lewis describes the Creator and Adversary as absolute opposites. In this, he uses highly anthropomorphic language to depict these two. "In the supreme achievement of creativity, namely, a perfectly good man, we get our best clue to the divine; . . . in a completely bad man we may get our best clue to the demonic."² Lewis proceeds to acknowledge the fact that there may be no such thing as a totally bad man since he could not exist as a single, meaningful existent. However, the symbol stands. To describe the demonic by pronouns: "He" says too much; "It" says too little. The relation between the Creator and the Adversary is very much akin to "hate" in Lewis' thought.³

iii. Intimations of the outcome

Having sacrificed the absolute being and power of God the Creator to maintain His goodness, Lewis does implicitly guarantee a prepon-

1. God and Ourselves, p. 148. 2. The Creator . . . , p. 146.

3. Ibid., p. 147. ↓

derance of God's power and creativity over the discreativity of the Adversary.

(1) Priority of the creative.—In the first place, God is given a kind of head start in the drama of creation. He first lays hold of the residue and molds creation before the Demonic can be manifest by its attack on the created.

The demonic element is a necessary feature of created existence. We do not need to suppose, in Zoroastrian fashion, two Eternal Spirits; one Good, the other Evil, who are fighting out their battle on the field of time. The evil of the world comes into existence, like space and time, with the world itself: there is evil only as there is creation.¹

(2) Creative domination of the nexus of struggle.—Secondly, the residual constant becomes the sole nexus by which the Creator and the Adversary can communicate or strike at each other. Now, according to Lewis:

Discreativity is operative only where creativity is already operative. There can be destruction only where there is something to destroy. The demonic is therefore pure passivity unless and until the divine becomes creatively active. . . . The demonic, being essentially destructive, cannot create the conditions of its own activity.²

That which is irrational, immoral, discreative, etc. cannot characterize any initial creation from the residue, but only attack what the Creator has done with the residue. The nexus of attack by the Adversary is not the residue per se, then, but the residue as the Creator has created from it or worked on it.

In this struggle, the divine has certain control over the shape of the enemy's line of communication or approach. In other words,

1. Christian Manifesto, p. 210.

2. The Creator . . . , p. 138.

though Lewis does not say much about this, it does seem obvious in his system that God can mold in creation the nexus by which the Adversary can strike. Thus, He can create with an eye to resistance or immunity to the Adversary. God, by love, does all in His power to make a creation as staunchly capable of resisting evil as possible. Such defensive forethought in creation illustrates God's love for His creation--His desire for its purity and endurance.

(3) Parasitic dependence of the Adversary.--Thirdly, in spite of its prior, independent status, the Adversary, on the basis of the above two considerations, is dependent upon the Creator for its aggressive form. In this sense, it is an aggressive parasite. This bodes evil for its victim, but it must always be evil of a type toward which the victim is somewhat predisposed or prepared. The parasite is not likely to bring forth any attack which may totally undercut its victim's resistance. The Adversary may have independent status in the dimension of potentiality, but its status becomes quite dependent and derivative in the instance of its actualization. Its onslaught is, by definition, always colored by a prior good whose cry is very loud and very persistent.¹

(4) Preliminary grounds for optimism.--One might say, then, that as long as there is any existent creation, there will always be a preponderant amount of goodness and order manifest in it, for these are the conditions of the existence of anything instead of nothing. As previously noted, the Adversary cannot work upon the residue to bring forth a creation marked by a preponderance of discreative nature. No

1. A Manual of Christian Beliefs (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 49.

creation could congeal in which the irrational, immoral, anti-social, and discreative were the principles of organization.

One finds here religiously available a certain ontic basis for confidence in the preponderance of God's goodness and power in creation. This generates hope for the ultimate victory in God's creation over the Adversary's challenge. However, more will be said later on this matter of hope.

iv. The effect on man

Lewis' dynamic and somewhat dramatic ontology must now be related to human experience of disvalue and value--of evil and redemption.

(1) Man, precious and vulnerable.--The higher the created product of God's holy love, the more it is prey to the Adversary's most intense efforts. Man is God's highest creation, bearing much of God's image. This is not to call God a person. Neither is it to call Him wholly other than a person. God does not create what is utterly contrary to His own nature when he creates man. Lewis is an explicit adherent to something like the orthodox doctrine of the imago Dei.¹

Holy love, God's motive in creation, seeks to create more of itself. Man is an agent who can reflect and generate this enlargement of holy love. In a sense, man, creatively capable of loving, becomes the image of God under the conditions of created being. Man is a free center of will, within certain limitations, for whom the grace of God is not irresistible. He can love, but may not. However, inasmuch as he does love God he somehow makes more vivid his likeness to God. The grace of God causes the divine will to take on a human outlet. Thus, man, for the Adversary, offers the most intimate opportunity for attack

1. The Creator . . . , p. 141.

on God.

"Sons of God cannot be created; they can only be grown."¹ Thus, man in his growing, not yet having reached the full stature of immunity to evil, feels the fury of the Adversary in the press of moral and natural evil.

(2) Man's egocentricity and evil.—Theories of the Adamic fall are but mythological or symbolic ways of showing the hereditary consistency with which the Adversary's efforts have contaminated man's body, culture, will, and world. Man, being a personal center of consciousness and free will (within the finite limitations of his physical, mental, and spiritual nature), is structurally self-centered. He sees, judges, and wills in his world from the viewpoint of his own centrality. This is easily contaminated, and it then becomes exclusive self-centeredness which refuses consciousness of its own Creator.² Man uses his God-given freedom to cut himself off from the very source of that freedom. Such "cut-off" freedom swiftly degenerates before the onslaughts of discreativity until the person himself disintegrates. Self-centered freedom on the part of man, a factor in God's whole of creation, causes both man and the whole of which he is a part to disintegrate both ontologically and morally. This is illustrated in the microcosm of man in whom self-centered freedom gives free vent to departmental urges and passions of the whole personality to the exclusion, detriment, and disintegration of the whole. This is also the story of the disintegration of societies and of the natural resources used by societies.

1. "Creator and Creature," Interpretation, IV (April, 1950), 145.

2. The Creator . . . , pp. 211-243.

Man becomes a house divided against himself and against his true destiny, which is the enlargement and generation of the love of God. It is this love which made man. The freedom of man, when considered from the viewpoint of theistic faith, always takes on aspects of God-instigated necessity, whether the inner compulsion of such freedom be called from the Godward side grace, or inspiration, or divine will. Lewis expresses it in this way. "It is through the human that the more-than-human Word, Idea, Truth, Reality, becomes flesh and enters the warp and woof of creation."¹ This being so, self-centered freedom readily becomes the crucial wedge in the Adversary's destruction of the bonds between the Creator and His highest creation. If God works through human freedom, His work is obstructed if that freedom be weakened.

(3) Natural evils.--"The face of God is a furrowed face, and we have plowed the furrows."² Man who is created capable of accepting or rejecting the promptings of his Creator and sustainer can very often trace the cause of his adversity or evil experience to some rejection of God on his part. Responsible freedom is a distinctive element in man's experience of evil. That is, he feels responsible for what he has done that now brings him hurtful consequences. But there is, too, a titanic sense of transcendent evil which sets the conditions for freedom's corruption or corruptibility. Man is not responsible for his inborn weakness or susceptibility to sin (i.e. self-centeredness or selfishness) or for a power--call it temptation or something else--which aggressively seeks to drive him to it. More immediately, the element of evil from

1. Ibid., p. 49.

2. Christian Manifesto . . . , p. 210.

outside human responsibility reveals itself in natural catastrophes.

"Natural or physical evil includes all such things as pain, material loss, hampering restrictions on activity, the various forms of destruction, and especially death."¹ Such manifestations of evil may always bear an admixture of human responsibility, of course. It is man who chooses his stance at the coincidental locus of tragedy, desists from measures to foresee and avert physical catastrophe, or responds to tragedy in a destructive fashion. Likewise, much of this evil may be seen as a necessary condition for man's free growth and the exercise of his creative ingenuity. But, as Lewis sees it, "There is, however, always more evil than can be accounted for this way."²

(4) Avoidable and inevitable evils.—This leads to a division which Lewis drew in his early years between avoidable and inevitable evils from the viewpoint of the human experience of evil.

The problem of avoidable evil that grows out of man's dependence on nature is the problem of a better understanding and control of nature. . . . As men increase in these various forms of knowledge and insight and control, certain forms of evil will grow less."³

On the other hand, there is a dimension of incalculable, inevitable evil which man cannot utterly escape.

There are certain forms of evil which the whole constitution of things makes provision for. It is inevitable that natural forces will sometimes prove destructive. It is inevitable that forms of life will fail at times to adjust themselves rightly to their environment. It is inevitable that men will err in their judgments and fail in their executions. It is inevitable

1. A Manual . . . , p. 50. 2. Ibid., p. 52. 3. Ibid., p. 53.

that sorrow and grief will come upon men because of their relations to each other. It is inevitable even that men will on occasion do what they know to be wrong.¹

(5) Similarity and difference in the situations of man and God.--

On the basis of the analogia entis, man finds in his experience the two dimensions of evil met by God--those avoidable or correctible and those inevitable. "Whatever comes into being or comes to pass tells something of its own origin."²

There is another factor here more implicit than explicit in Lewis. Man, though created in the free, responsible image of God, is much more a creature than a creator. Hence, unlike God, he is more a prey than a master of evil. For this reason man knows a phenomenon in which God cannot participate as thoroughly as man. "Life tends to inertia, and it needs continually to be prodded."³ Man runs down in energy, moral vigor, and life. He is subject to death both continually and finally. The muddy clay of the receptacle (if it may be construed, at least symbolically, as inert matter) clings to his feet even though the creativity of the Creator has energized it with life and value. Man is made of the very stuff which is the Adversary's avenue of attack on God--the residue. This being the case, the plight of man in the struggle between evil and good must be described with the utmost realism and soberness.

God struggles to free His creation from the Adversary and bring to fulfillment His will for it. In a sense, if one is true to the vocabulary of struggle, evil here cannot be eliminated, or excluded, or neutralized, but only "overcome." A God who is able in any way to over-

1. Ibid., p. 51.

2. God and Ourselves, p. 236.

3. A Manual . . . , p. 60.

come evil must be a God who is somehow victor over it after struggle. This victorious struggle may be called the drama of redemption.

4. The Drama of Redemption

In the venture to redeem His creation God evokes the assistance of His free creature, man. Grace is not irresistible. Man must repudiate the claims of evil on himself by offering himself to a deeper creative center of devotion.¹ All of this Lewis writes with an eye more to moral than to natural evil. However, much of his thought is applicable to evil in general. Perhaps Lewis' system lends itself more readily to the comprehension of natural evil, for whereas in moral evil one can, and often does, sense his own responsibility—even though he may have been relatively powerless in his temptation—it is in the instance of natural evil that one's existential experience best corroborates Lewis' theory. In natural evil and pain one does feel that titanic forces are struggling over him, and that the individual's only responsibility here is one of not having rightly predicted inevitable disasters which he himself did not cause.

Now the creative center of devotion to which man must give himself for the redemption of his evil experience has become flesh. It has become manifest in available, human terms in Jesus Christ. Man, beset by a sense of great forces struggling over him, finds in Jesus Christ a revelation of the nature of God and of the Adversary as they clash in a life thoroughly given or obedient to God. In this sense, when the divine became flesh, so did the "beast." This double revelation showed man the terms of the struggle.

1. Ibid., p. 155.

1. The nature and role of Jesus Christ

The Christ, in this context of Lewis' thought, at times bears resemblance to a creation of God, for Lewis declares that the higher the creation, the more ferocious are the onslaughts of the Adversary. Indeed, the Adversary can attack God only via His creation. The Adversary, seeing the highest creation in Jesus Christ, used all of his discreative resources against Him. Although there may be aspects of this theory which do not harmonize with traditional creeds which speak of Christ as "begotten, not made," it is a fact that the human element of Christ has always been deemed an element of creation. Jesus Christ exists under the category of creation (man) and of revelation (God). Thus he reveals the serious plight of man and the concomitant and concerned struggle of God.

(1) Divine entrance into human struggle.—One may sense a theory of incarnation in Lewis' idea of man as God's holy love enlarging or generating more of itself. God in Jesus Christ is the fullest incarnation of the divine in the arena of existential struggle. In a sense, God puts Himself in the arena where once His creation struggled at His behest. Holy love can know no greater act than that of emptying itself sacrificially in the trials of its object. As noted above, the Adversary takes particular interest in destroying those higher creations which bear similarity to God. In this sense, the Adversary lashed out at Jesus Christ in the fullness of his fury. Jesus Christ submitted to the fullness of the onslaught at the crucifixion. But in the resurrection he broke the bonds of the Adversary's ultimate weapon—death.¹

1. A Philosophy . . . , p. 303.

(2) Human entrance into Christ.—According to Lewis, Christ offers to man an inspired assurance of God's concern for him and a reason to hope for the Creator's victory over evil. A man "in Christ" may not overcome the experience of the consequences of evil, but he may free himself from entanglement with its cause and from despair at its presence.¹

The suffering of Jesus is the vision of God's suffering. Jesus Christ's victory is God's victory. His life, transcendent over, yet bravely in, life's negativities, is the life which God makes available to man. It is not an escape from evil. It is life's perpetual quality of vicarious victory over evil through the grace of the Creator seen in Jesus Christ.

ii. The inner meaning of redemption

Maintaining his belief in the supernatural grace of God (i.e. power of God from above to redeem man), Lewis offers in this context a kind of psychological theory of redemption. Within the person there is an experiential split between the "good I" and the "bad I." In this, one makes his penitent approach to God when the "good I" vicariously takes upon itself the guilt of the "bad I" and comes to God bearing innocently the wages of sin and asking forgiveness for the bad self. Christ performs this for humanity as he bears the evil of humanity to God who then "takes it away."² In other words, the "good I" places the work of the Adversary at the mercy of God by using its freedom to expose to God the Adversary working in it.

Although Lewis does not delve deeply into the implications of

1. Ibid., p. 305.

2. The Creator . . . , p. 253.

this in his system, there is a certain wealth of pertinence in this aspect of his theory. The Demonic can only attack creation. God can control creation only as He takes it into Himself. Thus, in Augustinian fashion, if Christ is God entering existence to receive the attack of the Adversary--and the more Godly the creation the more total the attack of evil--then the divinity of Christ is the "fish hook" in the bait, Jesus, who bears the evil presence to God to be overpowered.

The final strategy of the demonic is to frustrate the divine where the very image of the divine has been stamped. The final strategy of the divine is to meet the demonic precisely where this image has been defaced.¹

iii. Victory of the immanent God over evil

In any concept of redemption which makes true contact with the religious needs of suffering men there must be two elements. First, loving concern by a present God must be the "felt experience" of man. Secondly, along with this subjective, felt reality there must be a believed, objective victory of the forces of good over evil. Gustaf Aulén has made a monumental study of many of the traditional theories of atonement and redemption in Christianity. In many of these he has noted an authentic allusion to an objective victory won somehow by God in Christ over the power of evil.² Lewis preserves this element which offers great religious value in his theory of evil--here natural evil--and its redemption.

(1) Victorious power of an immanent God.--The crucial victory for the individual's soul is won by Christ's victory. As seen before,

1. Ibid., p. 155.

2. Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor, trans. A. G. Hebert (London: S. P. C. K., 1931).

natural evil does not spell evil on the part of God. Now it is seen that it does not spell powerlessness either, for God already has won the crucial victory in the struggle. God is a dynamic creator whose omniscience is limited by the contingencies of a temporal creation, and whose internal experience of temporality, struggle, and suffering are real for Him.¹ Man, in the experience of natural evil, finds the solace of a God who is unblamable, understanding, sympathetic, struggling, redeeming, and victorious.

Although the motives for belief in an impassible God have been, at times, profoundly religious--as seen in the thought of Philo, Plotinus, Christian Neoplatonists, John Scotus Erigena, medieval mystics, von Huelgel, and others--it is hard to conceive of outgoing love which is not sympathetic to the struggles of its object. As much as a First Cause or Sustaining Power man desires a God who is interested in the work of His hands. A God who cares must be moved by the changing shape of His creation, whether altered by Himself or by its own delegated freedom.² "Nothing can be quite so unreal to the human mind as a God to whom what is most utterly real to that mind, namely, life as a hazardous process in time, is not real at all."³

Creation is the arena of struggle for Lewis, and he has sought to give ontological comprehension for the experience of natural evil in it. The victory won in Jesus Christ is one whose aftermath requires con-

1. "Is God Really Omniscient?", Religion in Life, XX (Spring, 1951), 185.

2. A Manual . . . , p. 201.

3. "Is God Really Omniscient?", p. 185.

tinuing redemptive effort by God and by man. It is obvious in such a structure that all of man's scientific and educational efforts to inspect, predict, and alter nature for the overcoming of suffering are in accord with the creative efforts of God.¹ In fact, such work on the part of man is an aspect of creation or creativity which man does in alliance with God. It is the clearing of the world's wildernesses of evil and the creation of a good home. This is secondary creation through materials God has already put at man's disposal, but it is primary redemptive process in the cosmic struggle of life. God needs man's efforts, just as man needs God's, if both are moved by reciprocal love which calls each other forth to overcome evil with good.

(2) God's power available in man.—In the instance of man's suffering, his bearing of it and struggle against it, one begins to find an experience in which tragedy is almost redeemed by the quality of living promoted in him.² This fact seems most comprehensible in the structure of tragedy in which God shares man's struggle to transform it. Man takes on this peculiar divinity of the Creator to the degree in which he willingly participates in the deepest aspects of creative strife. Man enters, or becomes a party to, Christ's way of life. This is the Christ whose "power was the power that sustains the universe, . . . [whose] sufferings were the sufferings of the Eternal."³

1. The Creator . . . , p. 150.

2. God and Ourselves, p. 92.

3. The Faith We Declare (Nashville, Tennessee: The Cokesbury Press, 1939), p. 83.

5. Grounds for Enduring Hope

1. God's capacity for consistent concern

Just as the elements of immanent love and victory are essential to man's religious needs in the struggle against natural evil, the element of patient, enduring hope is also essential as the struggle grows long. Confident hope demands a God of consistent concern for man's welfare.

(1) God's acquaintance with human hope.—Man is given much hope by the victory in the heart won through Christ. It is hope born of what has happened or is happening to him. In the case of God, it is conceivable that even though God is not held here to be omniscient, some may declare that God is sufficiently gifted with foresight to see that good will eventuate from many of the struggles with evil. His hope is built on foresight. Thus, to God, evil is never as desperately real as it is for men. Lewis has anticipated this. "Out of evil good may come, but his [God's] knowledge of that fact does not make the evil less real. And a holy God cannot be implicated in the process of evil without suffering."¹

Theologians have very often sought to base their hope on the omniscience or foreknowledge of God. In such theories, this blessed experience of hope on the part of man is an element eternally denied to God for whom all things are presently realized or comprehended. Thus, already the experience of man and God are tragically different.

1. God and Ourselves, p. 159.

Man's prayerful hopes suddenly lose their authenticity when presented to a God who is able to know all things but one, namely, what it feels like to hope. Omniscience which oversteps time cannot return to it innocent and hopeful. To do so would not be paradoxical, but self-contradictory.

The God whom Lewis describes is able to hope with men. God's hope is based on more comprehensive knowledge, love, and power than that of man, but it is hope, none the less. God is involved in struggle which is a meaningful term only where temporality is ultimate. God cannot foresee conclusively the outcome of struggle, nor can He totally predict the eventualities of finite freedom given to man by Him.

There are some things, especially those involving the strategy of the "enemy," that even God must wait to know, and if He must wait to know, then He must also wait to act.

We ought not to demand for God a "knowledge" [of the outcome of conflict] which He did not demand for Himself.¹

(2) God's time.—One basis of hope is the belief that God is in time, with man, literally able to be concerned with man's kind of temporal concerns. Now hope must also be based on the belief that God somehow stands over time as master of its content and outcome. A creative God must transcend time to envision His potential purpose and be in time to create it (i.e. move from potential creativity to actual creator). If He is a living God, not an inexorable force, time is real to Him.² Time apart from content and existence

1. "Is God Really Omniscient?", p. 186.

2. The Creator . . . , pp. 161, 163.

is meaningless. Since God creates content and existence it is He who sets time in motion, figuratively speaking. Thus He is the master and the subject of time. The consistency and permanence of God's creativity and goodness forms the eternal dimension of time—time which His creativity set forth and in which His creativity is immersed. In this sense, it is true to say both that time is in God and that God is in time.

"Time changes as the progressive manifestation and realization of the content of the unchanging eternal—in one form or another, this is the core of philosophical tradition at its highest level."¹

In any case, time must be seen as a definitive function of life and creativity. Man can know life and creativity only from within the structure of personality. Personality is immanent in every time yet transcendent over time. Only the present is actual and real. Man, by memory, recalls representations of former presents, and by imagination foresees the form of potential presents. Yet, even in his remembering and foresight the present is the dominant reality. In this sense, "there is only present existence."² God may outstrip man's memory and foresight, but He cannot gather up as present the all-time of creation and reality. Creation and reality do not have an existent all-time. God is in time, subject to the earnest present. Likewise, the present is subject to God who has filled it and brought it to pass.

(3) Confidence in a finite God.—Lewis has presented a finite God as the ground for man's hope for redemption. Somehow, it is by

1. A New Heaven and a New Earth (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941), p. 195.

2. A Philosophy . . ., p. 156.

His very finitude that God is presented as being most capable of entering into the concerns of His creatures. Yet, this is a finite God of power to overcome evil.

It might be said that Lewis has "paid the price" for his belief in God's immanence in man's struggle with evil. It is the price of the absoluteness and omniscience of God held to be so precious by so many traditional theologians. Perhaps it will ever be a debate among religious thinkers whether it is better to pay this price to preserve rational immanence, or to sacrifice rational immanence for dogmatic, supra-rational transcendence. Nevertheless, Lewis is completely honest with himself in this matter of sacrificing omniscience and absoluteness.

This possibility of new happenings [in time] for God is the more apparent when we consider the Incarnation of the Eternal Word. Under the point of view of "unqualified omniscience," there is no difference for God between the Incarnation as "fore-known" and as historical actuality. The cost of our redemption to God was no more at the moment of the Cross, when "all nature shuddered at the groans of her expiring Lord," than it was before "the morning stars sang together for joy." This is a high price to pay for metaphysical dogmatism. Better a crude anthropomorphism that sees the creative-redemptive process as a dramatic conflict that is real at every step, and of which the outcome is always in the balances, than the reduction of crucial moments to virtual nihilisms. Conflict, even supposing that God initiates it, means opposition, and the nature of the opposition destroys both absoluteness and omniscience.¹

In such a structure of struggle by a holy God, Lewis concisely suggests what is man's ultimate reason for hope.

We may trust God for the future for the simple reason that God trusts Himself. The initial act of

1. "Is God Really Omniscient?", p. 185.

faith, of which both creation and redemption are the issue, is God's faith in His own resources.¹

God's consistent concern for man is not a powerless concern. It is not the concern of a God who wrings His hands in anguish, but the concern of a God who has confidence in His own power to redeem creation.

(4) The dependable consistency of divine purpose.—Present confidence is a decisive ingredient in future hope. The grounds for such confidence have been revealed to man in Jesus Christ. The fact that God revealed Himself to the world instead of remolding the world arbitrarily for Himself suggests much about the Creator. It suggests the trustworthiness of God's purpose; namely, to maintain a stable world and free persons capable of enlarging His holy love in it.² In spite of the struggle God has undergone in the creation and maintenance of this world, He will not renounce His purpose. Not even for the sake of redeeming the world will He radically alter its basic stabilities, for to do this would not be to save the world, but to crumple up an old plan of creation and start again.

God, having chosen His purpose, will not, and, for the sake of divine self-consistency, cannot, act contrary to that purpose. "The maintenance of the world as a systematic whole is nothing at all but God's respect for His own chosen procedure."³ The fact of God's consistent trustworthiness in the maintenance of free creatures besides Himself in a stable world, just like God's inability to contradict Himself, is not a fact of divine limitation but of creative power.⁴ On

1. Ibid., p. 186.

2. The Creator . . ., p. 164.

3. God and Ourselves, p. 96.

4. Ibid., pp. 96-99.

this can be built present confidence conducive to much hope.

(5) God's respectful revelation through Christ's victory.---

This present confidence in the consistency of the divine will forms a further aspect of background for comprehending the Christ. God has entered His world to save it. He has not pulled nor elevated it into some transcendent heaven to get it out of conflict. Where conflict is ultimate, as in Lewis' theology, no such snug haven can be found anyway. The life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, previously studied as an ultimate revelation of dualistic conflict in reality, are now presented as the revealed grounds for man's ultimate hope. Patient hope is a matter of bearing with confidence the experiences of adversity. The confidence born in Jesus Christ is the assurance of the ultimate victory of God. Jesus Christ "dramatized" the conflict of good and evil.¹ In a preliminary way He revealed the dominant power of holy love over evil in casting out demons, the healing of physical ills, the redemption of self-centered or idol-centered spirits of men, and the overpowering of his own temptations. The Cross revealed the struggle. But the Cross must be seen in the light of the resurrection. "The resurrection is the dramatization of the finality and indestructible nature of self-giving love."² It is a love which saves but does not "replace" or "renounce" the original purpose of its creation.

(6) The enduring finality of Christ's victory.---The Creator who has priority in the struggle of existence (as described earlier) also has finality. The consistent concern of God for His creation is one which has sought and won the final redemptive victory over the

1. A Philosophy . . . , pp. 300-303.

2. Ibid., p. 303.

evils which have invaded it (His creation). The resurrection of Christ is the dramatization of the victorious power of Divine love. The God of immanent concern and presence in the career of His creation is also a God of transcendent power to win His campaigns. God's patient power is not sufficient to make victory easy, but sufficient to make victory sure. "The price of triumph must be the willingness to accept defeat. The pathway to domination must be suffering."¹

Christ's resurrection is not an all-consuming rout of evil. It is the normative insight into "how goes the struggle." The evil which was overcome in Jesus Christ did not serve to show that all evil is henceforth overcome. It served to show that evil can be overcome. "The demonic power has not been done away: it has only been shown to be limited, to be defeatable, to be under an ultimate doom."² The ultimate victory of the Creator over the Adversary is not one which did happen. It is the continual victorious quality of divine love everywhere and at all times. Men become "more than conquerors" through this.

ii. The confidence and comfort of eternal life

(1) Individual immortality and the conservation of value.—

"Hope that is seen is not hope," said Saint Paul.³ It might be added that hope without time for fulfillment is not hope either. Regardless of Christological victories and ontological optimism, man, the highest creation and chief love of the Creator, is dying and does die. According to Lewis, "Values are intrinsic to reality. They are the very stuff

1. Ibid., p. 305.

2. Ibid., p. 304.

3. Rom. 8:24.

of existence. . . . The final reason for the natural order is in the moral order."¹ This being the case, value cannot be separated from being. The destruction or death of existence is the destruction or death of value. Thus, the death of man cannot be conceived of as the death of man's being but not of his value, as it were. Human value cannot be found or conserved apart from the receptacle of existent man. Man is his value.

The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the act of God's ultimate victory over evil in ways explained above. It is victory in another sense also. It is the monumental instance of God's victory in man over the final stronghold or ultimate work of the Adversary—death. Evil may pervert or counter-attack Good, but ultimately its object is death or destruction of God's good.

Lewis, consistent with his metaphysics of value, refuses to accept social immortality as a solution to the problem of death, since the unique value of the individual cannot be obtained apart from the individual. Then too, society is not securely immortal.² Above all, this does not answer the plaintive, universal cry of man for his own personal fulfillment.³ No transcendent scheme of value-preservation can be admitted which dispenses with man while conserving his values on high. One cannot be had without the other. "Destroy persons, and while you do not destroy existence, you do destroy existence in that form in which alone persons can experience it."⁴

1. God and Ourselves, pp. 210-211.

2. A Manual . . . , p. 128.

3. Faith We Declare, pp. 229-231.

4. A Philosophy . . . , p. 157.

(2) Qualitative and quantitative eternal life.—There is a scheme of religious thought which would reduce the quantitative aspect of immortality to a qualitative emphasis on eternal life. True to a consistent metaphysics of value, Lewis sees as meaningless the vertical dimension of eternal quality apart from the linear aspect of eternal existence. To say that quality or value exists demands the solidarity of value with existence. "If values must be conserved, it can be only as the life is conserved in which values are realized."¹

Although statements like the above, explicitly dealing with immortality, are highly infrequent in Lewis' writings, they appear in the broad context of highly supportive theory and faith.

(3) The extended and transcendent harvest.—Just as man's hope of redemption demands support from the past and the present, it also demands extended horizons of the future. The struggle of man with God against evil has an extended schedule of opportunity for victory. "It [individual immortality] means that the law of the harvest is not confined in its operation to the here and now."²

Of course, extended opportunity for good must imply extended opportunity for evil, hence, struggle and growth hereafter. Lewis is strangely silent in descriptive discussion of an after-life. Although his optimism suggests only the sheer joy of faith in immortality, his metaphysics has left no precinct of heaven or earth inviolable to the onslaught of evil.³ Thus, no static, blissful existence beyond the

1. A Manual . . . , p. 128.

2. Ibid., p. 129.

3. It may be that the positive priority of the creative over the dis-creative, which has been noted several times in this study, is what flavors the transcendental, victorious quality (the quality of victory from above) of eternal, immortal life as it is expressed in the theory of Lewis.

grave can be derived from Lewis' thought.

However, immortality does root back in the victory over death won by Jesus Christ. This is not to say, in the temporal idiom, that immortality started with the Christian resurrection. It is to say that the resurrection was the normative revelation of the immortal dimension which God has made available for the life of man. This sheer fact of immortality itself presents a tremendous victory and strategic advantage over evil for man. The physical existence of man, so far soiled and weakened by the onslaughts of nature's death-dealing inertias and powers, is exchanged for a new dimension of existence. The dimension or nature of such new life is as fully beyond man's present comprehension as is redeeming faith to the sinner or maturity to the immature. It is an unforeknowable next step in man's creative growth. By it, death, the ultimate symptom of evil in man, separating him both from life and from God, is overcome. In a theology of ultimate conflict, redemption comes as victory. "Death itself takes on new meaning, for when the earthly house of his [man's] tabernacle is dissolved, a building from God awaits him, a house not made with hands."¹

The ultimate healing of man's corruptible nature comes when man is raised to incorruptibility.² To the extent that this occurs in a next life, man overcomes the problem of this world's natural evil by an exit from its domain. But, in so far as man in this world enters this incorruptibility of a life wholly confident in God, a life whose only disvalue is separation from God, immortal, eternal life begins early. Here natural evils of space, time, and firmament are

1. A Philosophy . . . , p. 243.

2. I Cor. 15:42.

not eluded, but borne and overcome through God's power in man.

CHAPTER III

PAUL TILLICH: NATURAL EVIL IN A THEOLOGY OF ABSOLUTE BEING

1. Background and Introduction to the Thought of Paul Tillich

i. Nature romanticism

A deep mystical and romantic attachment to nature is reflected in the thought of Paul Tillich. For him, creation, fall, redemption, and fulfillment, great categories of religious thought, must refer to nature as well as to man, because man and nature are intimately "bound in the bundle" of reality. "For there is no salvation of man if there is no salvation of nature, because man is in nature and nature is in man."¹ Thus, all of Tillich's system, whether dealing specifically with personality structure, history, epistemology or ontology, opens up new insights into the role of nature in the experience of man. His quest for a systematic and revelatory depth dimension of reality has been so insightful in the area of nature that some persons have used this as at least one reason for referring to him as a naturalist.² Perhaps statements like the following by Tillich have been partially

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1. Paul Tillich, "The Redemption of Nature," Christendom, X (Summer, 1945), 304. Unless otherwise stated all references in this chapter will be to works by Paul Tillich.
 2. Walter Marshall Horton, "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 37.

responsible.

I was always at odds with the Ritschlian theology which establishes an infinite gap between nature and personality and gives Jesus the function of liberating man's personal life from bondage under the nature within us and beside us. When I came to America, I found that Calvinism and Puritanism were natural allies of Ritschlianism in this respect. Nature is something to be controlled morally and technically, and only subjective feelings of a more or less sentimental character toward nature are admitted. There is no mystical participation in nature, no understanding that nature is the finite expression of the infinite ground of all things, no vision of the divine-demonic conflict in nature.¹

All of this presents at least an initial qualification of Tillich as one to be presented in the study at hand. He is a man with a sympathetic interest in nature, the domain of natural evil.

ii. Correlation of existentialism and essentialism

Before further consideration of the background and introduction of Tillich's system of thought, the following should be noted. The language and structures of Tillich's thought may seem very strange at first to one not acquainted with what might be called Tillich's "thought world." Yet, it is felt in this study that no other language can adequately express the meaning of Tillich's thought as adequately as that which he has used. It is the language of German philosophical idealism mingled with terms from modern existentialism and even ancient Greek thought. Yet, in all of this, Tillich is a careful and thorough philologist who has sought the most adequate terms to express his concepts.

1. "Autobiographical Reflections," *ibid.*, p. 4.

Therefore, in the interest of presenting Tillich's ideas in the highly meaningful language of their author, and in the interest of using his concepts with fairness to the mode of their original presentation, an introduction to the background and nature of Tillich's thought will now be presented.

Tillich's education and early thought occurred during the great European conflict between humanism and religion in the early decades of the twentieth century. This conflict was, in a sense, the European counterpart of the struggle between scientific naturalism and religion in America. In the tradition of great comprehensive synthesizers like Kant and Hegel, Tillich sought for a way of synthesis or correlation between the humanist's concern for man's existential experience and the concern of philosophical theologians for ontic, soteriological structure. Tillich could not find in the "practical knowledge" of Kant a sufficient attainment of objective, rational structure in reality, nor in the great panlogism of Hegel an authentic consideration of the existentially vital experience of man. Living in an age when the new psychology was influencing all areas of the humanities and sciences, Tillich saw the subliminal dimension of man as an obvious point at which vitalistic nature bridges into personality to influence it. Here it energizes in man deep anxieties of a destructive and irrational power constitutive of the nature of things. Tillich sought a systematic structure to comprehend this realistically.

In the later "positive philosophy" of Schelling Tillich found a balance between existential and systematic insights. Likewise he found in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard a brilliant analysis of existential anxieties finding their source in ontic depth dimensions of the world's

structure. However, Tillich brought to the existential approach deep systematic concepts and habits of thought from Hegelian idealism. "I am an idealist if idealism means the identity of thinking and being as the principle of truth."¹ Tillich desired to unite, yet preserve, respectively, the subjective as well as the objective aspects of thinking and being. As he saw it, "existentialism is the protest against the dissolution of the existing subject into the objects of his own creation, into the world of things and the essences which constitute them."² This was Tillich's double resistance both to naturalism and idealism. Yet, Tillich was influenced by the German tradition of dialectical idealism. Thus, while appreciating existentialism, he held fast to many values of essentialism. Tillich realized that to describe existential subjects in their essentials, is to use universal concepts. Concepts of so-called "existentialia" such as nonbeing, freedom, self, anxiety, estrangement, guilt, and courage, can be seen as essences in the ontological sense. That is, they can be construed as essential structures of reality somehow over man. Also, the negative or finite aspects of existence, in their self-criticism, suggest a prior essentialism from which or against which they are finite. Existentialism presupposes essentialism.³ For Tillich, there was to be a balance between the existential and the systematic in philosophy and theology.

1. The Interpretation of History, Part I, trans. N. A. Rosetski; parts II-IV, trans. Elsa L. Talmay (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 60.

2. "The Nature and Significance of Existentialist Thought," The Journal of Philosophy, LIII (Nov. 8, 1956), 741.

3. Ibid., pp. 741-744.

This interest in uniting the essential with the existential has been the crux of Tillich's purpose as a religious thinker. He has sought to be a synthesizer of dimensions of human experience and thought. He would bind together the transcendent, abysmal mystery of being and God with the immanent understandability of existence. This has to be a union of Θέος and λόγος (divine ground and rational structure), the only true theo-logy. This is an integration of Hellenic speculation with Hebraic, prophetic pragmatism and its concern for the immediate fruitfulness of doing as well as thinking the truth. Soteriologically speaking, this is a bringing together of man's experience of limitation and evil with God's unlimited good.

Behind all of this in Tillich's thought there has loomed the inescapable and all-comprehending concept of God. This is the concept which was to develop and finally hold the diverse elements of so "ambitious" a system together. Basically, Tillich saw God as the inescapable reality in whom creation lives and moves and has its being. The skeptic's fulcrum for doubt is God. So is the believer's basis of faith. However, man is separated from God as is all creation from its creator. This separation is the ground of all evil experience for man. Sin enters at the point where man forgets this separation and holds the created as ultimate. When the source, depth, and meaning of created facts are ignored, knowledge becomes shallow and short-sighted.

However, man can never rest easy in his idolatry of existence. Both he and the things he loves are infected with negativity which breeds anxiety, doubt, and guilt. Tillich recognized an authentic appreciation for this negative aspect of existence in the thought of existentialists since Kierkegaard. Jean Paul Sartre has noted the pervasive

element of negativity in all existence and called it nothingness.

Since nothingness, by definition, can have no roots in being, no salvation can quite reach it. In an area far removed from existentialism, Karl Barth, too, has felt the cold breath of the nihil in the world's evil, and he, too, has refused to explain it from the side of God or being.

Tillich was particularly influenced in this kind of thought by thinkers like Karl Jaspers. It was Jaspers who suggested that the breaking up of finitude and the threat of nonbeing do, themselves, cause man to grasp and be grasped by faith in being, the ground of life and only savior. Heidegger, in his study of human existence, Dasein, went so far as to see nonbeing as an element rooted in being. This Tillich recognized as the great explanatory concept for the fact that the shock of nonbeing (anxiety, doubt, and guilt) drives one to deep concern for being.

Yet, somehow, nonbeing has to be rooted in, or related to, being which it threatens, if only to explain this fact. According to Tillich, man's separation from his creator is pulsing with power of union or reunion. This reuniting thrust in all existence must be the unearned, undeserved grace of God. It comes to man in his quintessential attitude necessary for the reception of salvation. It is an attitude of shocked dissatisfaction with the negative experience of existence. By this, even the very shock of guilt, doubt, and anxiety, even the so-called "wrath of God" (the felt disapproval of God with creation), may be called works of God's grace if they produce this promising effect in man. These signal, negative results of idolatry (which finally drive man to God) must be nothing but the reaction of

idolatrous man to the searching, devastating, reuniting love of God.

This may be put most simply, perhaps, as follows. In Tillich's thought, the divine declares "No" to every finite claim to ultimacy, in the best Barthian tradition. But this No is but the finite encounter with a transcendent, saving Yes, in the traditions of both Barth and Heidegger. Tillich's challenge has been to build a bridge between the transcendent Yes and the Immanent No.

With comprehensive interest in the human situation, existentially and systematically considered, Tillich has studied the meaningfulness of the human world, life's spirituality, and the rational structure of culture and history to relate these to meaningful philosophical structure and redemptive theological insights.

This is not to say that through the above modes of exploration and cogitation man can discover God, according to Tillich. If this were true, God would be relative to human modes of discovery, hence incapable of transcending man's question-situation to offer any answer. It must be remembered that in the interest of soteriology, unlike technology, man's question moves beyond his finite world, and a transcendent question requires a transcendent answer. Tillich has declared that in the conditioned, finite existence of man there breathes a sustaining concern for being, and beyond just being, being meaningful and being good. Only a God of absolute being, meaning, and goodness, over yet near all finite negativity, evokes man's ultimate concern. Man needs an unconditional revelation of an unconditional God who is, at once, dialectically opposed to, yet in correlation with, creation. Such a God must be the very "ground of being" in history and nature—infinately transcendent over them, yet immanently present in them.

iii. The dialectical structure of being and existence

Now such a mating of transcendent and immanent factors may appear to be a systematic self-contradiction in the sense of pure logic. However, the contradictory elements of transcendence and immanence find synthesis and correlation in dialectical reason employed by Tillich. Here opposites refer to each other and call each other to generic unity in a transcendent ground which gives opposites their creative capacity for contrariety, synthesis, or correlation in creation. Whereas pure existential description of life thrives on paradox in the sense of self-contradiction, and logically objective systems demand lifeless continuity and coherence, Tillich finds in dialectical reason (with its rational movement of theses and antitheses toward syntheses) a systematic approach which, at the same time, appreciates existential vitalities. But it must be noted that "dialectic" is a term used by widely alien thinkers. In Hegelian idealism, meaningful categories in dialectical continuity are declared capable of portraying reality as a whole. This, of course, makes reality relative to human thought. On the other hand, in Barthian neo-orthodoxy, which calls itself "dialectical theology," the bifurcation between God or reality and the human situation seems total.

Tillich has sought a middle course. He insists that a God who inhabits some transcendent world is irrelevant to nature and history; a God who exists in nature and history is impotent to redeem them; and a God who exists beside nature and history (i.e. as a person distinct from His creation) is not God but a demi-god. Tillich claims that God must be found in the ecstatic character of the world as its ground and depth. This suggests that Tillich can hardly be called a supernaturalist

(neo or otherwise), as Wieman has called him,¹ or a naturalist. If the epithet of naturalism is to be used at all, one might best describe him as an ultra-naturalist or, after the adjective of the new psychology, a "depth naturalist."

iv. Ontological Reason

For Tillich, ontology precedes epistemology, for reason is the structure of reality which underlies and works through the mind.² This does not refer to technical reason which is man's sheer cognitive function when dealing with his world, but to ontological reason which is "the structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and shape reality."³

"Grasping," in this context, has the connotation of penetrating into the depth, into the essential nature of a thing or an event, of understanding and expressing it. "Shaping," in this context, has the connotation of transforming a given material into a Gestalt, a living structure which has the power of being.⁴

Tillich holds that subjective reason in the mind of man can grasp and shape, with varying degrees of emotion (as exemplified in music) or non-emotion (as exemplified in mathematics) the reason of reality. Reason here is to be conceived of as both static and dynamic, for there is in the reason of the mind or of reality "duration within change and change within duration."⁵ All of this is reason in the sense of the

1. Henry Nelson Wieman and Walter Marshall Horton, The Growth of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1938), pp. 253, 456. Cf. Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland, American Philosophies of Religion, pp. 88-92.

2. Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 81.

3. Ibid., p. 75.

4. Ibid., p. 76.

5. Ibid., p. 78.

Logos of dynamic being. Rational structure is the necessary attribute of all reality, but, in all reality new structural forms are forever dynamically arising, both for the mind and reality.

(1) Depth of reason.—There is a "depth of reason" which, metaphorically speaking, precedes reason. In this sense, reason points to what is revealed through it—call it "substance" or "being itself" or "abyss."¹ To illustrate this in the cognitive dimension of reason, reason points to reality which gives it its existence; or, more specifically, aesthetics points to beauty itself; legal reason, to justice itself; etc. This depth is not some separate reality from reason but the power of being integrally expressed in reason. This depth is irreducible to other functions of reason, psychology, or sociology. Man, under the conditions of existence, grasps this depth in an inadequate or distorted fashion. It makes entry into his conscious life only through semi-rational though irreducible myth, cult, and symbol.

(2) The fallen state of human reason.—All of this is to say that reality is rational, yet, in man, reason stands in a fallen state, torn from its logos-self while still organically bound to it. Being itself, which for Tillich in its abysmal side transcends reason, in its self-manifestation moves through reason. The Logos comes to man in expression of essential man and nature which man in existence cannot attain unto or fully comprehend. Human reason tries to grasp the infinite by finite categories and fails. Under the conditions of existence the structural elements of reason move against one another. Theonomous reason which finds its authority in the above depth of reason, easily for-

1. Ibid., p. 79.

gets its depth to become autonomous (i.e. fallen reason playing the role of its own critique and authority), or heteronomous (fallen reason appointing some idolatrous authority outside itself as a kind of self-effacing transplant from its own depth).¹ Again, in fallen reason the dynamic, vital aspect and the static, structural aspect oppose each other. The former in its victory yields relativism (all life-process), the latter yields absolutism (all structure).² Formal and emotional elements also conflict to create either legalism (formalism) or irresponsible romanticism (emotionalism) in their respective victories.³

(3) Symbolic meaning.--All finite things refer to God for their meaning and are potentially revelatory. On the other hand, no finite article can offer direct knowledge of God, for He is infinitely transcendent over it. Every rational statement of a rational being reveals something of the structure of reality which is "closer than hands and feet," yet every statement falls abysmally short of directly plumbing the ultimate ground of being, according to Tillich. Thus, all statements made about God are symbolic. They participate in, yet fall far short of, the reality to which they refer.

All of this initial expression of the evil tendency of meaninglessness in finite reason calls for a consideration of ontology before the liabilities of finite reason can be further discussed. This is because ontology preceeds epistemology in Tillich, in the sense that only ontology can explain the ultimate factors of negativity responsible for fallen reason (considered thus far) and for all other evils experienced by man.

1. Ibid., p. 85.

2. Ibid., p. 86.

3. Ibid., pp. 89-94

v. God as ground of being

Tillich's concept of God transcends traditional and conflicting concepts of naturalism and supernaturalism. Naturalism presents God within the arena of experiential conflict and makes the existential anxiety mentioned above absolute. Man who finds his limitations binding and hurtful has nowhere to turn beyond them. Supernaturalism sets God beyond the realm of relevant helpfulness in nature. Both of these are guilty of pronouncing God finite--a reversed but, to Tillich, no less demonic and idolatrous action than elevating the finite as God. For if God be included in, or set beside (or above), nature He is not absolute but exists "besides" other reality.

There is sought here a God both immanent in nature and transcendent. This would be a God available to aid finite man, yet above and unbound by finite man's limitations. Such a God must be self-transcendent or "ecstatic" (i.e. capable of standing out of or above Himself).

God as the ground of being infinitely transcends that of which he is the ground. . . . The term "ecstatic" in the phrase "ecstatic idea of God" points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without renouncing it.¹

This is a God who does not come to man from beyond. Rather, He stands over those in Him.

(1) The power of being and nonbeing.--Having thus introduced God as ground of being or being itself, esse ipsum, Tillich seeks to set

1. Systematic Theology, II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 7-8.

forth a concept which will account for all further correlation between man's existential, philosophical quest, and the revelatory answer of theology's God. But first the fountain-head must be clarified if the streams are to run clear. "Being-itself," while sounding like the height of philosophical abstraction, is seen here as the existential correlate to man's felt experience of "being" against "non-being" or of positivity versus negativity--the creative versus the discreative. "Therefore, it [being] can be described as the power of being which resists non-being."¹

For being to be dynamic or processive, the category of non-being must be ontologically basic with it or to it.² Nonbeing operates on being as its capacity for limitation and, hence, creative expression. Nonbeing is the factor or aspect of being whereby the ground of being can express itself in finite creations. Tillich cannot transcend symbolic statements and describe its nature, for, by definition, nonbeing lies beyond the reach of human reason. Thus, it cannot be called a recalcitrant raw material which, when given form and meaning by being, serves to express being in determinate form. Nor can it be called the formal capacity of being to be articulated as beings. It is a power of negativity which outlines all creation that is by what it is not and limits all things by aggressively destroying them. It is the "no more" and "not yet" of space, time, and power. It is the ground of metaphysical limitation which Tillich sees as the ultimate ground of life's negativities. This equation of

1. Systematic Theology, II, 11.

2. The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 32-34.

metaphysical and axiological categories will be criticized in a later chapter.

However, being is always more basic than nonbeing. This priority of being is existentially obviated by the sheer fact that there is something instead of nothing. A thing must be rooted in being to exist. Also, the priority of being is logically necessary since nonbeing is meaningless apart from being which it negates; nonbeing takes its form and its power from being. Being takes nonbeing into itself to eternally overcome it in creative self-realization. By this work of being on nonbeing, "the infinite embraces itself and the finite."¹ This dynamic and creative, self-limiting capacity of being is metaphorically designated as the "power of being"² by Tillich. Apart from this dimension of nonbeing, being would be meaningless self-identity. "Nonbeing makes God a living God."³ This is a God who has something to work against, or work on, or work with. This conception of Tillich's will be further considered below.

(2) The symbol of a personal God.--Such ontology does not deny the personal God of traditional Christianity.⁴ Indeed, Tillich sees God as "superpersonal" or "suprapersonal" and gives reminder that this does not mean "impersonal." It may well be that to call God personal is the most adequate symbol to express the self-transcendence and freedom which characterizes being as persons know it. It may also be the most adequate expression for the felt presence

1. Ibid., p. 180.

2. Ibid., p. 179.

3. Ibid., p. 180.

4. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 83-84.

known in religious encounter. Religious men claim that the presence they meet in worship is a responsive Thou. Nevertheless, the fact that persons most readily realize the ultimate dimension of reality through the irreducible fact of personality is no sign that ultimate reality is personal. Also, if God be conceived as a person, then one ignores a greater reality—personality itself, the ground of all persons. It must be remembered that the personal aspect of God is that of God in His self-manifestation under the conditions of encounter. Even here, God whom one finds to be no less a person than one's self, must be more than a person to be God. He must be the very ground of the subject-object or person-person duality which structures the experience of encounter. In other words, God is the power and structure which creates and relates persons. Therefore, He is, perhaps, "at least" personal, but He is operating in ways which seem to transcend vastly anything that personality has ever been known to do in the experience of man.

2. The Concern and Question of Man's Existential Situation

An introduction to Tillich's basic ontology and epistemology has been presented. This brief consideration of language and structure in the thought of Paul Tillich having been made, the meaning and effect of this in human experience, particularly in man's experience of negativity, will now be examined. It is with this concern for the relation between ontology and man's existential experience that further aspects of ontology may be considered.

1. The correlation of existential question and answer

Tillich relates God and man, being and existence, by what he

calls the method of correlation. Tillich defines correlation as the "interdependence of two independent factors."¹ Question and answer are correlative, yet neither can be reduced to the other. The questions of the human predicament do not lead one by rational implication to some divine self-manifestation which, by revealing the larger ground of being, will remove the predicament. On the other hand, revelation must be correlated to a question-situation to have any relevance. Man is the question which he asks out of ultimate concern for his being. By this existential involvement with the problem of life (as opposed to objective philosophical speculation) man operates as a theologian whose satisfaction can come only from a revelation of God, the divine guarantor of his being. In other words, all ontology is finally pressed by the demand of life into soteriology.

The relation of philosophy to theology in which ontology relates to soteriology will be considered in detail in connection with the effects of nonbeing on human reason. In that connection it will be seen that philosophy is construed by Tillich as a discipline in human reason which is "fallen," i.e. split or bifurcated in all of its dialectical categories. Theology is a discipline in the revealed reason of God, the transcendent Logos, in which dialectic finds reunion (i.e. finitude with infinity, freedom with destiny, etc.).

ii. Nonbeing in existence

The consequential effects of ontological nonbeing are the negative aspects of the experience of finite man. Just as Tillich seeks to illuminate human experience by the ontological concept of nonbeing,

1. Ibid., p. 13.

conversely, it is in terms of this experience that he says the most about the nature of nonbeing. In this sense, he may be said to illustrate nonbeing more than he explains it.

Out of a profound interest in classical philology, Tillich has looked closely at the ubiquitous term "existence" to find in it symbolic description of the ontological status of man. The Latin existere meant to "stand out"—to stand out of nonbeing, to have the power of being invested in one, and, thus, to exist. It also implies standing in that power of being which rescues one from nonbeing. Now the nonbeing referred to is not altogether the absolute οὐκ ὄν (nothingness), although created being does stand out of this too. Rather, one is brought into existence out of μὴ ὄν or relative nonbeing. It is this nonbeing which keeps potentiality from actuality. It may be described as the "not yet" or the "no more" of being,¹ as mentioned before.

The power of being is latent in all things potential, but it is kept latent (instead of realized) by nonbeing. This relative nonbeing is overcome by being to become actual. Yet, it is not fully overcome, since an inexhaustible dimension of potentiality lingers about all things actual. To put it philosophically, the power of being never exhausts itself in the state of existence nor fully overpowers the limiting factor of all existing things—nonbeing.²

(1) Negative appraisals of existence.—Tillich has drawn on the classical distinction between essence and existence, potentiality

1. Systematic Theology, I, 189.

2. Systematic Theology, II, 21.

and actuality. He claims that existence is a fallen or degraded realm characterized by suffering and death, limitation and dissatisfaction. Hegel sought a positive affirmation of this split in statements that existence is the logically necessary actualization of essence, with no degrading gap or devaluation between essence and existence. Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx rose against this to declare existence a falling away, or state of estrangement, from essence. They believed that no other view could duly appreciate the elements of anxiety, meaninglessness, guilt, and passion which man finds in his nature. These elements in no wise seem like the rational self-manifestation in history of Hegel's panlogistic God.

(2) Demythologizing the symbol of "the Fall."—The declaration of existentialism that existence is a falling away from essence has brought it into the tradition of the symbol called "the Fall" in western philosophy. Tillich sees his phrase, "transition from essence to existence," as a half-way demythologization of the myth of "the Fall."¹ In this, the temporal "once upon a time" element is largely removed, though not wholly lost. Since this transition is not a matter of logical necessity but comes upon the scene as a sheer fact, it has to be described in mythical terms.² Sin and evil are not dialectical steps of reason from essence. They are brute facts. Otherwise they would be logical implications of essence, hence essential themselves. Such brute facts can only be described in a kind of retroactive mythos which, while suggesting "once upon a time," portrays the structure of all time. Now to comprehend Tillich's concept of the fall as it is experienced by all

1. Ibid., p. 29.

2. Ibid.

men, one must look at his concepts of freedom and destiny.

iii. Freedom and destiny

Man, the irreducible subject, can transcend finite circumstances of his existence to participate freely in universal concepts and imperatives. He can rupture again and again the continuities of stimulus-response and imaginatively transform their efficacy. Man can follow the innate directive of infinity which is the ability for self-transcendence without a prior limit. "Freedom is the possibility of the existential subject. It is its very nature."¹ Man has been made this way by God who has caused him to participate more fully in the power of being (whose existential manifestation is freedom) than any other creation known to man.

But, in all of this, man must return to himself to realize the ponderous factors of finite limitation on his life. Man is a determinate creature with freedom. This determinateness, in its correlation with human freedom, Tillich calls "destiny."² That which is called "necessity" in nature becomes, in man, in the correlation with his freedom, destiny. It is, in a sense, necessity plus man's response, regard, and use of it, or necessity grown self-conscious in man. This is the framework of dynamic limitation within which human freedom exists. Finite freedom, the freedom bounded by destiny, is

1. "The Nature and Significance of Existentialist Thought," p. 746.

2. Systematic Theology, II, 32.

man's capacity for movement from potentiality into actuality, from essence into existence. These concepts are further illuminated by what might be called Tillich's illustrative kind of explanation. Freedom and destiny are explained here by what they do.

iv. The fall as existential self-estrangement

Prior to man's finite freedom there is no Adamic state of perfection. There is only the symbolic "dreaming innocence" of unactualized man. Man in such a state has what Tillich calls "anxious freedom."¹ There is the urge or temptation to actualize one's self opposed by the inertia of innocence. This is well illustrated in man's urge for sexual self-realization. Man has a potentiality over which he experiences twofold anxiety. The anxiety over not realizing his freedom is opposed by the anxiety over becoming one who has realized his potentiality and lost the life of semi-innocence, the life in which the choice was still his to make. Myths of "the Fall" frequently operate on sexual imagery. However, the ontic anxiety which presses one toward self-actualization and freedom wins out in all who become existent. Thus, by finite freedom one falls from essence. "Original sin" moves into ontological vocabulary to become "existential self-estrangement," a term often mentioned in existentialism.

In all of this, it might be said that man who realizes his freedom is disillusioned by the fulfillment of his dream, as it were. This is because the fulfillment does not come as a final satisfaction but as an opening for further potentialities, and new tensions and re-

1. Ibid., p. 35.

sponsibilities. Something in man's reaching out to fulfill his potentialities taunts him by the knowledge that he might have done his act better, or that there is more to be done, or that his act has set him at greater variance from others, perhaps in the form of lonely individuality. Something in man--something unattainable--stands over his act. Tillich calls it man's essential self or his tie with divinity.

(1) Human responsibility in spite of destiny.--This self-estrangement (the falling away of one's existential self from his essential self) is, at the same time, man's tragic destiny (he is not author of the conditions and pressures which yield the Fall) and his freedom, for it is man who appropriates, underwrites, and assumes responsibility for, this destiny. He makes it his own self-actualizing act. Man has to act to be man or to survive as man. Yet, although he has to, it is "his doing."

By this theory, "the Fall" is, at the same time, a cosmic event and an event through the responsible auspices of man. "Man is responsible for the transition from essence to existence because he has finite freedom and because all dimensions of reality are united in him."¹ Ultimately, in the theory of Tillich, "the Fall" is so written into ontology that it may be fairly said that creation and fall are correlates.² But it must be remembered that this correlation leaves room for freedom and is not a joining of a necessary pair of events. Likewise, it describes the continual state of creation and not an exclusive, primal event. It may well be asked at this point whether

1. Ibid., p. 40.

2. Systematic Theology, I, 255, 256.

this is a theory of the creation of man or of his emanation in which God initiates potentialities in man and man appropriates responsibility for them and their pressures for fulfillment. On this, Tillich maintains that he still has a concept of creation by God.

(2) The mutual fall of man and nature.—According to the Genesis account, the fall of man had consequences in the structure of nature. Tillich seeks to make the term "fallen world" intelligible by his concept of the fall of man in whom all levels of reality are present and influenced, including nature. As mentioned above, the fall of man is not an event in time and space, but the "transhistorical quality of all events in time and space. This is equally true of man and nature."¹ By this intricate mingling of moral (responsible) and natural (destined) evil, it can never be said that man is responsible and nature "innocent." The necessary element in the fall of man plays a significant and "culpable" role in that fall. "This means, however, that Christianity must reject the idealistic separation of an innocent nature from guilty man."² This is highly symbolic and poetic language which moves in the direction of pantheism, or even animism. It is Tillich's way, apparently, of expressing, if not explaining, the felt content of man's action. It is the feeling that man is neither totally free nor totally determined. But that which determines his act, whether from within himself or from the outside, does seem to be personal, if only by reason of its personal consequences in man.

There is no discontinuity between naturalistic animal nature and human freedom. There is no discernible nor stable boundary line

1. Systematic Theology, II, 40.

2. Ibid., p. 41.

between natural determination and human responsibility. In the terms of the new psychology, the two mix and blend in man. The opening up of the subliminal dimension in man by the new psychology reveals startling incursions of vitalistic nature (here, "destiny") into those decisions of man which were considered, heretofore, consciously responsible. Man bears a biological, psychological, and sociological inheritance and determination in all of his freedom. "Freedom is not the freedom of indeterminacy."¹ Such would be accident; "Freedom is the possibility of a total and centered act of the personality, an act in which all the drives and influences which constitute the destiny of man are brought into the centered unity of a decision."²

Man's sense of freedom to choose among meaningful alternatives is imbued with a kind of inner testimony to the fact that he is not fully responsible for the alternatives being what they are, nor for his limitations being what they are, nor for his present attitude and intent being exactly what they are. Free man is aware of a complex leverage of necessity, determinism, or "destiny" on his free choice. But being conscious of it, he even comes to use the leverage of such natural law or causal order to get his own will or self-initiated response accomplished. Tillich appears to be saying that at the focus of determinism in man stands man himself with a capacity to break partially the chains of cause and effect if only for the sake of reflecting on them or knowing them. Beyond this, he may appropriate them as his own, or, within narrow limits, initiate his own free response.

Conversely to the factors in nature, seen above, which are analogous to destiny (necessity, determinism), Tillich notes analogies

1. Ibid., p. 42.

2. Ibid., p. 43.

from freedom in nature. These are the spontaneities to be found in the subatomic as well as, in the total, centered "responses" of animals. Of course, centered spontaneity is not responsible freedom to which guilt applies, but "as there are analogies to human freedom in nature, so there are also analogies to human good and human evil in all parts of the universe."¹ William James' "trail of the human serpent" which is over all of nature, structuring it by analogies from human freedom, suggests a reciprocal influence out of the determinate or destined earthiness of nature which has rubbed off on the "human serpent." "Man reaches into nature as nature reaches into man."² Since man and nature (the world of created facts in which man finds himself and of which he is even constituted) are inseparable, interdependent, and interinfluential, the term "fallen world" takes on symbolic meaning. The transition of essence to existence is the creation overture and dirge of both man and nature.

(3) The mutual relation of moral and natural evil.—In spite of the ontological net which spreads a feeling of inescapable cosmic necessity over all aspects of "the Fall," one must bear in mind the key to the preservation of human responsibility in all of this. The key lies in the theory that the transition from essence to existence is not one of a system totally bound by necessity, but a leap of responsible freedom. By this, natural evil is inextricably bound up in moral evil, just as it seems to be in most areas of man's felt experience. Man feels both responsible and not responsible for his acts. The evils he suffers are both his fault and not his fault. Perhaps nothing comes harshly to man by even the most impersonal winds and

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

tides but what he can find somewhere in retrospect his own act of commission or omission which set him up for the blow.

v. The pattern and symptoms of estrangement

This separation of existential man and nature from essence, considered above, is called by Tillich "estrangement." This word suggests the separation of one from that to which he nonetheless belongs. Estrangement, briefly speaking, reveals itself in the dimension of moral evil in terms of unbelief or "unfaith." This is a turning away from God in will, emotion, and knowledge or a confounding glorification of estrangement. Hubris is a second sign of estrangement. This is a self-elevation or idolatry. The third aspect is concupiscence, an insatiable hunger to draw reality into bondage to the self rather than restore the self to the worship of reality. All of this has social as well as individual application.

Throughout this study of moral-natural evil Tillich is aware of the question of theodicy. How can a good God permit either moral evil or natural evil? Tillich believes that freedom must allow man to sin or turn away from God as well as toward Him. Freedom thus used by man to turn from God must meet an inexorable consequential destiny or world in which the evil of sin is realized. This is the reverse side of the fact that freedom positively used demands a stable consequential world to show forth good. World-correlated personality in its greatness must show the spell of estrangement or nonbeing, for only one in the image of God can turn away from God. "His [man's] greatness and his weakness are identical. Even God could not remove the one without removing the other."¹

1. Ibid., p. 33.

(1) Being and nonbeing in ambiguous existence.--Man is essentially good, but existentially ambiguous. In estrangement he drives himself and is driven toward self-destruction. This destruction, as has been shown, is not the effort of some alien, demonic force, for the force of destruction has no independent status in creation but is dependent on what it destroys. Nonbeing is dependent on being.

Here, as everywhere in the whole of being, non-being is dependent on being, the negative on the positive, death on life. Therefore, even destruction has structures. It "aims" at chaos; but, as long as chaos is not attained, destruction must follow the structures of wholeness; and if chaos is attained, both structure and destruction have vanished.¹

Nonbeing can only resist being because it is not utterly foreign to being. In a sense, nonbeing may be referred to as a quality of being whereby all existing entities find determinateness and negation. "Non-being is the negation of being within being itself."²

(2) Demonic bifurcation of dialectical existence.--A first or basic symptom of self-estrangement is self-loss. The centered self or subject disintegrates and surrenders to disunified drives. The free, centered self is submerged in the vitalistic natural drives of one's world, or environment, which show up as insatiable and disintegrated, departmentalized urges in the self without concern for the health or wholeness of the individual. The subject-object, self-world relation considered above, which is the basic structure of finite being, is lost.³ Man then becomes a determined being in an environment

1. Ibid., p. 60.

2. Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 38.

3. Systematic Theology, II, 60.

instead of a free transcender and responsible subject in a world which is ordered in part by his outlook. In a sense, he has given over to his environment complete control over his life. He becomes an "it" controlled by an "it"--a slave of natural passions.

Beyond such subject-object polarization, other polar elements of ontological being become estranged in the experience of fallen man. These polarities each represent, in a sense, an element of being and freedom on one side, and nonbeing or determinism on the other. When finite being seeks to cleave to either one without the other, existence becomes meaningless. Freedom and destiny, necessary correlates to provide spontaneity within structure, become bifurcated. By this divorce, freedom without destiny becomes arbitrariness; destiny without freedom, mechanical necessity. The polarity of dynamic and form is separated. Dynamic becomes a romantic urge to power or libido void of reason, and form becomes lifeless legalism. Finally, the polarity of individualization and participation becomes split. It is this polarity which makes sense of all created beings, revealing their distinction from, yet grounding them in, source and world. Totally individuated man becomes an irresponsible, revolutionary subjectivist. Man in total participation becomes an objectivized cog enmeshed in world machinery.

(3) Nonbeing in the categories of reason.--As noted above, reason, the structure of reality, is fallen in man's estrangement too. Thus, the very categories of finite thought become infected by nonbeing. By the categories man witnesses the limitation of his finite reason in his attempt to grasp the divine. There is an element of negativity (evil) present in the categories which, on the outside, may be objectively spoken of as being versus nonbeing. On the inside, it is felt by man as

anxiety versus courage. "Categories are the forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality."¹ The categories are also ontologically rooted in being or reality, hence, the inescapable form of being and reality. "In the categories, the unity of being and nonbeing in all finite beings is manifest."² "Each category expresses not only a union of being and nonbeing but also a union of anxiety and courage."³

Time, the central category of finite existence, creatively offers the present stage for reality to play on. It also provides anticipatory vistas of possibility and ground of memory for past achievement and record. But these are all but overwhelmed by the transitoriness of time which devours and antiquates and forgets. Being moves past into nonbeing. "Time unites the anxiety of transitoriness with the courage of a self-affirming present."⁴ The moving finger of time which points forward as the fleshy fingers of youth, points backwards as the bony finger of death. In all of his sense of the transitory, man is aware that time moves toward his own negation and death. This anxiety in man bespeaks the deep ontological character of time.

The category of time exists in close alliance with space. "Time creates the present through its union with space."⁵ The possession of space is the affirmation of finite being, while the fact of spatial limitation or the insecurity of all space-occupation reveals

1. Systematic Theology, I, 192.

2. Systematic Theology, II, 68.

3. Systematic Theology, I, 193.

4. Ibid., p. 193.

5. Ibid., p. 194.

the infection of nonbeing. Man has the anxiety of Job, that "his place will know him no more."¹

Causality points to the basis of an effect, to its grounding in the being of its cause. This gives a sense of foundation. But causality is also an anxious reminder that there is no aseity in all of finitude. Nothing created can be as confident of its cause as of itself. Yet, every creature has to rest on its cause which is not itself.

Substance suggests the underpinning of appearance. Yet substance is known only through the dark glass of accidents, and the question of depth never finds solution on the surface. The question of the permanence of substance, or of the adequacy of accidents to indicate the true nature of substance, both promote the anxious quality of nonbeing here again.

As one may see, the scourge of nonbeing lies over all of finite reason. Hegel believed that the true was the whole. Man cannot possess or know the whole or the depth of reality. The insecurity of knowledge is seen to be an insecurity written into man's ontic structure. Thus doubt, the fear of meaninglessness, invades his life. Man is sometimes driven by this to sheer cynicism and skepticism or to idolatrous fanaticism for the sake of finding an absolute.

(4) Nonbeing as destiny and guilt in suffering and death.--The negative symptoms of nonbeing in man's world are not yet fully listed. There are more. There is suffering and there is death.

The fact of suffering in finitude has led Buddhism to identify suffering inexorably with finitude. Here all elements of human responsibility are secondary. Here, any idea of salvation has to

1. Job 7:10; 20:9.

provide for an exodus from finitude. In Paul Tillich's interpretation of Christianity finitude is not man's automatic lot. Man with finite freedom appropriates responsibility for finitude. Thus he is not in a position to seek Nirvana from a purely alien state of existence inflicted, as it were, on him. Man is not totally a "pilgrim here." He has taken out his citizenship papers.

There is, of course, what Tillich calls "meaningful suffering" as opposed to "meaningless suffering." Suffering can have meaning in so far as it serves as a warning signal for health and welfare. Much depends on both "the objective character of suffering and the way it is taken by the suffering subject."¹ There are, however, instances of suffering which destroy the human subject or prevent him from acting responsibly. This is seen in severe mental destruction, environments that dehumanize, or reduced capacities for bodily resistance. Again and again one finds instances of suffering for which no meaning can be found on the part of the subject who suffers.

Such a situation, of course, is not implied in essential being. It is based on the transition from essence to existence and on the conflicts which follow from the self-actualization of being in encounters with beings. It is implied in existence.²

"Physical evil is the natural implication of creaturely finitude."³ This all applies to nature, "red in tooth and claw," as well as to man. "Nobody who has ever listened to the sounds of nature with sympathy can forget their tragic melodies."⁴

1. Systematic Theology, II, 71.

2. Ibid.

3. Systematic Theology, I, 269.

4. "The Redemption of Nature," p. 302.

Tillich sees death as the ultimate object of human anxiety, in so far as anxiety can be specific enough to have any object. Freud's concept of "free floating anxiety" seems ideally descriptive of man's fear of death, for death is a diffuse object of anxiety permeating every cell and moment of life. "Anxiety about non-being is present in everything finite."¹ Yet, for man, the sting of death is the sting of sin,² because of the responsible element which, coupled with destiny, brings to realization this death-bound human existence.

This intricate mingling of guilt and anxiety revealed in psychological studies of man bespeaks what Tillich has called a "double resistance" to being and to nonbeing. Man's self-actualizing and individualizing resistance to being brings guilt, and man's self-preserving resistance to nonbeing brings anxiety. "Creaturely existence includes a double resistance, that is, resistance against nonbeing as well as resistance against the ground of being in which it is rooted and upon which it is dependent."³

Tillich has insisted from the first that the concept of being always includes nonbeing which it seeks to overcome. Somehow, this is universally reflected in existence. Being's existential awareness of nonbeing, characterized as the demonic or the transitoriness of the created, is within man, the state of anxiety. It is the experience of self-conscious finitude expressed in the idea, "I too must die." Although allied to fear it has no specific object of terror but is a general and all-permeating negation of all objects and selves. A

1. Systematic Theology, II, 67.

2. I Corinthians 15: 56.

3. Systematic Theology, I, 261.

specific object of fear can be challenged by courage-giving specificity, but in anxiety man faces an all-pervasive unknown. The influence of nonbeing, which threatens man's spiritual self as doubt and meaninglessness, confronts man's moral affirmation of self as guilt and condemnation. It presses in on his ontological self-affirmation as fate, contingency, unpredictability, and, ultimately, as death.¹

(5) Despair and the concern for salvation.--These areas of anxiety mingle and blend and flood in on man at times to the extent of defeating all sense of self-affirmation. Nonbeing becomes the seeming victor. This state is called despair. Man's existence seems to be so taken over by nonbeing, that even being seems to surrender and underwrite man's destruction. At this point man may desire to take death into his own hands by suicide. But here nonbeing in finitude trips itself up by stymying the attempted act of absolute import which is suicide. No finite act of suicide can smother the import of an infinite problem of meaninglessness, condemnation, or death.²

All of life struggles against the horror of despair. On the ontological plane, this is being's struggle to overcome nonbeing. With existence there comes anxiety. Man and all of creation "groan and travail" in such a plight, and ask the question from their depths, "Who will deliver me from this body of death?"³ The question is whether being can prove its victory over nonbeing in a way humanly relevant. Can God, transcendent over the conflict of essence and existence, finitude and infinitude, move into these dimensions with

1. Courage to Be, p. 41.

2. Ibid., pp. 54-56.

3. Romans 7:24.

saving power? From the inside comes the same question, Can anxiety be swallowed up in courage?

3. The Answer of Theology

i. The courageous affirmation of being

Basic self-affirmation is something ontologically prior to judgments of one's ontological ground which call it spiritual or natural, good or evil. It is the sense of sheer being which must be the stage on which these judgments play. This is not a tabula rasa but a kind of terra rasa concept. This primal assertion of being not only affirms the self but its larger structural world to which it is bound. However, this prior affirmation of being behind all negativity must not be a leap into some sanctuary of the absorbent absolute. Here too individuality would be threatened with absorption into the whole or ground of individuality. The sense of being which gives man deep "courage to be" must hew to a fine line between courage to be a part of immensities, and courage to be one's individual self.¹ The world must be maintained as a "structure of unity of manifoldness."² Romantic excesses of individualism and collectivistic excesses of absorptionism must be guarded against. It is only in the balance of such polarities that life is meaningful.³ Man as man must maintain his finite freedom which, as noted above, is a thoroughgoing expression of individuality and participation in the absolute. This is also man's transcendence and immanence with the world.

1. Courage to Be, p. 90.

2. Ibid., p. 170.

3. Supra, pp. 137-138.

Tillich has sought a ground of being or God which is able to save created beings without obliterating or absorbing or "cutting them off." This must be a ground of being which is capable of taking nonbeing into itself, hence, a source of courage which is able to take anxiety into itself. This courage bears toward anxiety the typical attitude, "in spite of." Any other type of courage is not courage at all, but either utopian escapism from, or Quislingian acquiescence in, nonbeing.

ii. God as transcendent and immanent

The existential correlate to man's ultimate concern (God) must be transcendent over all existential anxiety, yet, concretely present in existence as its power of being and link with ultimacy. "The power of being must transcend every being that participates in it. . . . On the other hand, the power of being is the power of everything that is, in so far as it is."¹ One must not speak of God as existing, for then transcendence is lost. One must not speak of God as essence, for this is the heart of pantheism.² Nor can one call God an "infinite being," for then all connection to finitude as man knows it is lost. No being is infinite. To exist is to be finite. Infinity is a directive of self-transcendence. Being itself transcends, yet participates in both infinity and finitude.³

However, one must use terms and structures of finite experience to speak of God at all and not remain utterly mute. But one must remember, as before mentioned, that he is using symbols which exhaust

1. The Courage to Be, p. 231.

2. Ibid., pp. 235-237.

3. Ibid., p. 191.

themselves trying to portray ultimacy, but never exhaust ultimacy. Also, one does have ontological grounds for using finite segments of creation as the vocabulary of ontology, because all creation does participate in God. Thus, the analogia entis properly brings the divine down and lifts the secular up.¹

(1) The near aspect of God.--Man beset by life's negativities desires a God who is "in the world," capable of "working on the world" to overcome negativity. God in his creative or "near" aspect is called the "living God." Life is the process of potentiality becoming actual. Herein nonbeing plays the role of limitation both in the potential and the actual. Thus one may speak of God as working against nonbeing. In this aspect the ontological rooting of individuality-participation, freedom-destiny, and dynamics-form is in God. These are polar categories symbolically expressing the life of God in His creativity. Creation is not to be conceived of as a "once-and-for-all" event, but, rather, God's constant "near" relation to the world. This creative presence has three aspects expressed within the symbolism of time. God has created (originating creation), is creating (sustaining creation), and will create (directing creation or providence).²

The ex nihilo of traditional Christian theories of creation is interpreted by Tillich as ὡν ὅν, the relative nonbeing which becomes the infectious inheritance of creation. This gives insight into the potentiality of tragedy and the necessity of death--man's freedom making responsible decision in this. Man is a creature out of nothing or, in Tillich, nonbeing. But this is the same nonbeing in God, on which God

1. Courage to Be, p. 241.

2. Ibid., pp. 252-254.

works. Thus, the near aspect of God for man, who is beset by the anxiety of nonbeing, is the fact that God also works against, or on, nonbeing, producing in man, by that work, courage which overcomes anxiety. This courage is grounded in God who overcomes or transcends nonbeing. This problem will be given further consideration below.

(2) The far aspect of God.--On the other hand, there is a "far" or transcendent aspect of God which is beyond all symbolic designations such as "living" or "creating." God is abysmal.¹ He transcends the split of essence and existence, infinitude and finitude, and all ontological polarities. It is this aspect of Him which guarantees the transcendent element in His "near" or creative relation with the world. As Tillich sees it, man's ultimate concern is not only for a God who is a telling fighter against nonbeing, but also for one with an indisputable capacity for victory--here, transcendence--over the very struggle. The quest for courage demands this aspect of God, while still affirming the aspect of struggle. Courage is the faith in victory which faces and takes anxiety into itself. This concept of courage is responsive to the two aspects of God here described.

iii. The integrating attributes of God as spirit

Such a "God above God"² transcends the power of nonbeing in the ontological elements and is the comprehensive ground on which polarities move. Thus He gives courage to man within the polarities of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny, to cleave neither to the one nor to the other, but to realize the two as but one master. This is a God who can "lift man up" or cause him to

1. Ibid., p. 237.

2. Ibid., p. 182.

sense the final resolution of life's hopelessly bifurcated Yes and No.

Tillich sees "God as Spirit" to be a symbol of God's comprehensive transcendence and fulfillment of the ontological polarities and the negative aspects of the categories of reason. This is the aspect of mystery in God which Tillich calls the prior ground of unity for the subject-object structure characteristic of all reality. It is a unity deeply desired in epistemology and sensed in mysticism.¹

The negativity of the categories is transcended in the symbolic attributes of God. The concept of His "omniscience" moves reason into the very structure of reality. The split between ontology and epistemology, substance and accidents (doubt), is overcome. Omnipresence overpowers the anxieties of spacelessness or separation from causal ground (anxiety).

As omnipresence and omniscience symbolize the overcoming of respective splits in ontology and epistemology, so the eternity of God symbolizes the divine transcendence over "time," "no time," and "all time." Eternity suggests God's relation to time. It is time by which man is anxiously measured for the grave. If God be a living God, time must be a reality in Him. He must be capable of knowing man's temporal anxiety. This eternity does not mean endless time or timelessness. Tillich declares that the eternity of God in His relation to time can be conceived of only in "analogy to eternity found in human experience, that is, the unity of remembered past and anticipated future in an experienced present."²

1. Systematic Theology, I, 108.

2. Ibid., p. 275.

iv. The redemption of temporal evil through the eternity of God

This is the structure of nunc eternum which is not sheer simultaneity. This is the concept of a God in times, in all time, yet above time. Tillich realizes the problems involved in a Bergsonian insistence on the absolute openness or indeterminacy of the future to God, and in a Calvinistic insistence on a closed future. The first removes the transcendent confidence of courage. The second removes the living risk of experience.

Therefore, a relative although not an absolute openness to the future is the characteristic of eternity. . . . Without the element of openness, history would be without creativity. It would cease to be history. On the other hand, without that which limits openness, history would be without direction.¹

In this view, both past and future are open. The past becomes new through each new eventuality of the future. The potentialities of the past are open toward renewal, transformation, or redemption in the openness of the future. Yesterday's or today's evils may not be the last word.

The creativity which leads into the future also transforms the past. . . . Neither the anxiety of the past nor that of the future remains. The anxiety of the past is conquered by the freedom of God toward the past and its potentialities. The anxiety of the future is conquered by the dependence of the new on the unity of the divine life. The dissected moments of time are united in eternity.²

As Tillich again puts it, "If temporality is completely separated from eternity, it is mere nonbeing and is unable to give the form for experience, even the experience of suffering and despair."³ Behind the

1. Ibid., p. 276.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 284.

hurtful transience of time there must stand the unifying structure of the creative constant. Only this latter can make the former intelligible.

Tillich declares that "the divine life includes temporality but is not subject to it."¹ The time of existence is determined by non-being, but there is a divine time different from man's--God's time.² Here one sees in Tillich's system the possibility of redemption for past evils if the past is open as is the future, yet open within the God of transcendence who structures and guides this openness after His own divine purpose.³

v. Providential courage

In Tillich's theory the directing purpose of God moves creatively through the processes of temporal creation as an inner directive in the creature for self-fulfillment--a τέλος. This is the future dimension of providence. Man, as self-conscious finite freedom, is the goal of creation. God works through the spontaneity and structural wholeness of his creation, through the freedom and destiny of man and nature. Now the goal of providence is not sheer happiness nor is it

1. Ibid., p. 257.

2. Ibid.

3. Eternity is a vertical or depth aspect of time to the man of courageous faith. It is not a matter of stretching out temporality in hopes of not running out of it, for time is the very thing that creates the anxiety of passing away. Tillich holds that the belief in eternity as a temporal continuation of life beyond death is poor ontology. (Biblical Religion . . . , p. 77) Such a belief gives ultimate status to the very negativity which marks existence. It is a kind of conservational idolatry which can never face the facts of death since it refuses to face the facts of life--namely, transitoriness. Eternal life, in this sense of the word, would involve eternal death which is a contradiction in itself.

the mass salvation of history alone. It is individual as well as historical, and its feeling is courage rather than otherworldly happiness. The catastrophes of nature and society make happiness an unrealistic criterion for providence. Likewise, collectivistic philosophies promising historical syntheses of life's polar negativities ignore the basic cry of man. "The individual man passionately asks that he be allowed the possibility of believing in personal fulfillment in spite of the negativities of his historical existence."¹ The transcendent sense of security given to the individual by providence needs to be one capable of effecting courage in the midst of natural and historical necessities. "It is the paradox of the belief in providence that, just when the conditions of a situation are destroying the believer, the divine condition gives him a certainty that transcends the destruction."² This is not only certainty that history and nature will be fulfilled "far off at last," but that the individual qua individual can find fulfillment at present.

(1) The key to theodicy.--The question of theodicy is answered for Tillich by man's faith in providence which transcends and works through historical and natural circumstances without obliterating them.

Theodicy is not a question of physical evil, pain, death, etc., nor is it a question of moral evil, sin, self-destruction, etc. Physical evil is the natural implication of creaturely finitude. Moral evil is the tragic implication of creaturely freedom.³

The question of theodicy lingers on as man asks why so many beings are excluded from any kind of fulfillment.

1. Ibid., p. 266.

2. Ibid., p. 268.

3. Ibid., p. 269.

(2) The existential answer.--This question must never be asked as cool, abstract speculation, but must be kept in existential correlation with theology. The person must ask the question as an involved subject. One's own destiny is intimately related to the destiny of others. Thus the faith which one finds to meet the question of theodicy for himself moves out to fulfill all. God participates in life's negativities. God in his "near side" includes the finite with its nonbeing, though He also transcends it. In this transcendence, nonbeing is eternally conquered and the finite reunited with the infinite within the transcendent life of God. It is by faith in this divine ground which is the victoriously stable underpinning of being and meaning that Tillich sees the question of theodicy answered in both its existential and systematic dimensions. This is, in a sense, the satisfaction of Job--a faith in a firm foundation of all good that seems threatened, but a faith which still holds enough doubt, hesitation, and "whirlwind" haze in it to be courageous rather than dogmatic.

vi. The pervasive range of the demonic

As seen above, Tillich's whole system operates on the metaphor of separation and return, estrangement and unity, as the pattern of the man-God relationship. It is also the pattern of all ontological reason and knowledge. This is seen in the ontological elements, the polarity of subject and object in all epistemology and ontology, and the positive-negative aspects of categories and all existential experience. Now, the power in the universe which perverts polar structure, causing one pole to become bifurcated from the other, is nonbeing. Nonbeing, which Tillich first presented as the faculty for self-limitation in being, has grown increasingly aggressive in Tillich's theory. It has been charac-

terized as the power of negativity, limitation, and death against which God struggles in all creation, whether "originating creation" or "sustaining creation." Further, it has been shown to be a power which distorts and perverts human reason and experience at large. Ultimately, it becomes a dynamic, demonic force which, although it arises from within being, operates as an almost alien force against being. However, it is its very foundation within being which enables it to pervert creation from within. This is more than a negation; it is a perverse affirmation of power. As James Luther Adams has expressed it:

The principal opposition to the divine unity is not a satanic principle of mere negation; it is a demonic power that perverts the creative power into a mixture of form-creating and form-destroying energy in history. A demon is something less than God which pretends to be God. The demonic operates not only in the individual's wilful yielding to the temptation to give reign to the libido of sensuality, of power, and of knowledge. It operates even more powerfully in human situations.¹

In place of Hegel's panlogistic synthesis of absolute idea, Tillich presents the dialectic of a dynamic form-creating and form-bursting power; and in this way he renounces the Hegelian hybris, which presumes to grasp pure being and which in reality identifies essence with existence. . . . [There is] a pushing beyond idealism to a realism in which there appears a sense of guilty separation from the inner infinity of being as well as a kinship with it. Thus human activity, both intellectual and practical, tends to be compounded of the demonic and the divine.²

1. James Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," concluding essay in The Protestant Era, by Paul Tillich (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 304.

2. Ibid., pp. 304-305.

vii. The comprehensive grounds for courage and faith

(1) The "in-spite-of" quality in being and existence.--Anxiety and doubt are grounded in ontology, as are courage and faith. As the influence of nonbeing is found in the anxiety of all men, so the power of being is experienced as courage. Courage is God's answer in man for man's anxiety. This, then, is the pattern: an "in-spite-of" power of being meeting and transforming the negativities of its own internal nonbeing all the way from God's highest act to man's humblest confidence. Tillich has clearly set this forth as follows:

If one is asked how nonbeing is related to being-itself, one can only answer metaphorically; being "embraces" itself and nonbeing. Being has nonbeing "within" itself as that which is eternally present and eternally overcome in the process of the divine life. The ground of everything that is is not a dead identity without movement and becoming; it is living creatively. Creatively it affirms itself, eternally conquering its own nonbeing. As such it is the pattern of self-affirmation of every finite being and the source of the courage to be.¹

Rooted in such being, finite man's courage bears an analogous internal "in-spite-of" which meets nonbeing in the form of anxiety. "Courage as an element of faith is the daring self-affirmation of one's being in spite of the powers of 'nonbeing' which are the heritage of everything finite," says Tillich.² Finite man's faith knows this internal nonbeing as the worm of doubt. But for man's faith and courage, as for ultimate being, nonbeing is the price of creativity and dynamic life. The struggle with negativity is its own positive reward.

1. Courage to Be, p. 34.

2. Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), p. 17.

(2) The power of self-transcendent realism.--Tillich further describes man's victory of courage over anxiety. It is by "beliefful" or "self-transcendent realism" that man looks not above reality to a transcendental world of spirit, but down into its depths to an inner infinity. In this he realizes that the ground of being, the foundational God, is the power of victory over nonbeing. Such a looking within is faith. But faith which looks at its own ground of being is not an act of objective cogitation or emotional striving. It is a sense of "being grasped" by the ultimate power of being. Here, even the polarity of subject and object are transcended as "deep calleth unto deep;" the deep in man calls to the deep in God and realizes that they are one. Such faith does not repress, but, rather, takes doubt into itself ~~as its~~ internal critique and tie with existential circumstance. "Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the state of ultimate concern."¹ The element of doubt in faith makes the combined experience one of courage. "In spite of all forces of separation between God and man this [separation] is overcome from the side of God."²

viii. The soteriological meaning of being-itself as love

This concept of the God-initiated pattern for the reunion of anxiously estranged man serves as an introduction to Tillich's ontological concept of love. In Tillich's system one of the deepest of all ontological statements is the declaration that being-itself is love.³ By love, being moves to reunite the separated. Such love desires the

1. Dynamics of Faith, p. 22.

2. Ibid., p. 104.

3. Systematic Theology, I, 279.

fulfillment of its object, and must have in it the structural element of power to resist or take into itself (i.e. redeem) nonbeing or non-love. God can bear an infinite amount of nonbeing.¹ This is the area of guarantee for the prevalence of being over nonbeing in the balances of opposition.² There must also be the aspect of justice (logos) which preserves the integrity of the beloved. A God who would save creation must preserve the integrity of that creation. Sentimental love without justice would seek to smother creation with its own form instead of saving creation within the maintenance of creation's own true nature.³ Thus, the love which saves man from being a total victim of anxiety must never erase all anxiety from his experience lest, by this, he should cease to be man.

(1) The self-limitation of love's power.--From this, the problem of theodicy arises. "How can an all-powerful God who is, at the same time, the God of love, allow so much existential misery? Either He has not sufficient love or He has not sufficient power."⁴ But, as Tillich sees, if physical and moral evil were inadmissible in creation, God's creatures would not have independent initiative, which is the quintessential element in man's capacity to participate in reuniting love. "The world would have become a paradise of dreaming innocence."⁵ One actualizes his potentialities by becoming estranged from his essential being. Man is estranged metaphysically, morally, and epistemologically. This breeds in him anxiety, guilt, and doubt.

1. Love, Power, and Justice, p. 40.

2. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 12.

3. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

5. Ibid., p. 112.

"The power of God is that He overcomes estrangement, not that He prevents it."¹

(2) A suffering God.--This is the inner life of the symbol of a suffering God. God takes creation's suffering upon Himself. To create, God has to put up with, or take on, nonbeing, i.e. self-limitation. He thus separates from Himself (i.e. puts forth from Himself) what He desires, nonetheless, to reunite with Himself. This is creative suffering. God's love desires fulfillment of the object or person with which it is to be reunited. Thus God has to suspend power which might avert the fall, for the fall is, after all, man's opportunity for self-actualization, and this too is a necessary phase of fulfillment. Yet, as one who loves, God enters into this estrangement of man, and, by the power of His love, strives to thwart the power of nonbeing without destroying the creation it infects. He must struggle from the inside of creation, take its plight upon Himself. The act of separating from self and returning to self implies love. "The more reuniting love there is and the more conquered nonbeing there is, the more power of being there is."² The separation and reunion of being taking nonbeing into itself is the basic formula of love and power. Tillich sees these considerations as keys to the problem of theodicy.³ The theodicy or justice of God lies in the fact that whatever elements of existence "hold out" against God's love, these are then allowed to go their way of self-destructive estrangement. God, apart from the reciprocal act of love in the creature, cannot temper or assuage these self-destructive consequences of estrangement, since they belong to the very structure of

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 49.

3. Ibid., p. 113.

being. Love, operating through a just respect for structure, must resist and, ultimately, crush what stands against it. This is not some calculated act of individual punishment by God. It is the hurtful consequence of creaturely self-estrangement.¹ In so far as love must move against what opposes it there enter the symbols of "wrath" or the "strange work" of love. However, such "wrath" or condemnation must not be held as eternal, for such a symbol would confer eternal status to the opposition of nonbeing to being.² It must further be remembered that only a finite God could be angered by finite deeds. Wrath has always the primal subjective aspect of being the sinner's reaction to the love of God. On the surface love is harsh on the wicked. This concept of divine love by which Tillich seeks to account also for man's experience of "divine wrath" must be further illuminated by Tillich's concept of divine justice.

(3) Love and justice in redemption.---Justification and salvation are the conditions for transcending the state of wrath. "While the tension between love and power refers basically to creation, the tension between love and justice refers basically to salvation."³ Justice is the logos of all. It is that structural aspect in the movement of being, from separation to union, which seeks adequacy of form to dynamic, equal validity of equals, and freedom essential to spiritual freedom. Love fulfills justice in a fashion analogous to the fulfillment of reason by revelation. Love moves into the situation of disparate claims to legality and reminds the parties of their essential oneness. Justice is

1. Systematic Theology, II, 174.

2. Systematic Theology, I, 286.

3. Love, Power, and Justice, p. 113.

the principle policing the reuniting of that which is estranged. Like all policing principles, it is deeply taken up with the immensity of estrangement. Love moves inside the situation and listens to the inner motive of the unjust. Love understands from within. It brings back to union by forgiveness that which justice could only declare deserving of union but separate. In this, love "makes just" by forgiveness.¹ This is justification by grace, God's acceptance of the unacceptable. Grace is the movement of love to the unjust.² Such grace or bringing to unity (atonement) must be received by faith. Faith is the creature's experience of being grasped by this atoning, unifying, justice-bringing ground which soteriologically as well as ontologically transcends his plight. This is God moving through the sinner to Himself. Prayer offered in pure self-awareness now can be seen in its true nature, as God praying in man to Himself.

4. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ

As portrayed by Tillich, man and nature are in a continual fall. "So long as there are the old heaven and the old earth, man and nature will be subjected together to the law of vanity."³ God nevertheless "loves" what is fallen and seeks to bring it back into right metaphysical, moral, and epistemological relation with Himself. That is, God would overcome the distortions wrought in His creation by non-being and bring to metaphysical anxiety or fear of death the confidence

1. Love, Power, and Justice, p. 86. Cf. Systematic Theology, II, 178.

2. Dynamics of Faith, pp. 109, 114. Cf. Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 111-112. Cf. Systematic Theology, II, 178.

3. The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 84. Cf. Romans 8:19-22 and Revelation 21:1; 22:1-2.

of life. To moral guilt or human will lost in self-idolatry He would bring forgiveness. To epistemological doubt caused by fallen reason in ambiguous and unresolvable dialectic God would bring confidence of what Tillich calls truth, i.e. namely the comprehensive ground or unified meaning of reason in God. All of this may be further clarified now as Tillich presents his concept of the manner in which God expresses this to the world. This expression he calls "the Christ" or "the New Being." Just as Tillich first presents his theories of epistemology and ontology prior to his Christology in his system of thought, so here, Christology is considered in the same order of presentation.

In Jesus as the Christ Tillich points to the saving New Being. Estrangement is brought to reunion in a man, Jesus, who was the bearer of essential manhood under the conditions of existence without being conquered by the conditions. The logos, the universal principle of divine self-manifestation, has become flesh.¹ The energies of reuniting love in nature and history find fulfillment in Jesus as the Christ. "To experience the New Being in Jesus as the Christ means to experience the power in him which has conquered existential estrangement in himself and in everyone who participates in him."² In other words, the power seen in Christ is available continuously to man. Devotion to Christ points man in the direction of it. Knowledge of the Christ gives man confidence that it is available.

This is participation by faith. Just as man gives himself over to the courageous Yes of God which stands over every finite No, so too

1. Systematic Theology, II, 94.

2. Ibid., p. 125.

he gives himself over to the same power of divine grace operating in Jesus Christ. In Christ man is confronted by the power of being which for man's salvation accepts and "makes acceptable" the unacceptable. Man, responsive to this grace, accepts the power which accepts him in Christ.

1. The divine working under the conditions of existence

Jesus Christ, to whom man looks to find saving power for the evils of his life, was thoroughly immersed in the ambiguities, anxieties, and insecurities of finite existence as portrayed in his temptations, passion, and death. Yet these he conquered by the transcendent power of God who moves into creation's plight, leading the creature to accept and transcend life's negativities without having them removed. The resurrection is the symbol of the conquest and victory over estrangement's final stronghold--death. God has suffered in man's plight to transform it.

If we try to say more than the symbolic assertion that "God takes the suffering of the world upon himself," we must add the statement that this suffering does not contradict God's eternal blessedness and its basis, namely, God's eternal "aseity," his being by himself and therefore beyond freedom and destiny. On the other hand, we must refer to what has been said in the sections on God as living, namely, the element of non-being which is eternally conquered in the divine life. This element of non-being, seen from inside, is the suffering that God takes upon himself by participation in existential estrangement or the state of unconquered negativity. Here the doctrine of the living God and the doctrine of atonement coincide.¹

All men are partially healed or holy, i.e., they participate in the New (or integrated) Being, otherwise they would have no being. In

1. Ibid., p. 175.

the Christ, the power of the New Being is victorious over nonbeing.

However, no man is totally healed or saved to utter blessedness, for this would be to surrender creaturehood altogether.¹ By Christ, man accepts the negativities of life without having them removed.² In Christ, man sees the living God aspect of being take on revealed concern for finite creation to the point of entering it with man and overcoming its anxiety, doubt, and guilt in man.

ii. The paradoxical nature of the New Being

It has been shown that the movement of creation from essence to existence is not one of structural or logical necessity. Such a close binding system would render sin and evil necessities. Rather, there is a "leap"³ in which existence, under freedom, appropriates responsibility for self-actualization. This "leap" is irrational, and its irrationality is the wellspring of irrationality in all of creation.⁴ The entrance of the New Being in the Christ is also a "leap" through the initiative of God, but this is not irrational (God does not operate thus) but paradoxical, in the Tillichian sense of the word. "Paradox" here means that which transcends human expectation, accustomed opinion and possibility.⁵ Tillich sees the coming of the New Being as "an offense against man's unshaken reliance upon himself, his self-saving attempts, and his resignation to despair."⁶ The statement that Jesus is the Christ does not create a demigod, half-way between creation and God, or a rational

1. Ibid., p. 167.

2. Ibid., p. 135.

3. Ibid., p. 44.

4. Ibid., p. 91.

5. Systematic Theology, I, 57.

6. Systematic Theology, II, 92.

absurdity which sees God becoming man. Rather, God in His self-manifestation which is the logos has become flesh which is paradoxical enough to amaze man. The absolutely universal ground of the concrete has burst through the veil of estrangement to show the preponderant transforming power of being in the realm of concrete existence. By faith, having oneself grasped by the power of being, one receives and recognizes the Christ who is Jesus. Man in a world of evils meets God where least expected--right in the midst of the most vicious evils. In the darkness of the crucifixion shines the light of God's near power to save man.

iii. The mutual plight of man and nature

In Tillich's concept of a "fallen world" into which Christ comes man and nature are intimately bound together. Metaphorically speaking, they have fallen together, with man's responsibility running over into nature as spontaneity, and nature's determinism running over into man as destiny. Tillich's monistic ontology supports such a monistic concept here.

Personality is the point at which subject and object, man and nature, collaborate in their existential predicament.

The incomparable expression of personality in the face of even the simplest individual, shows that spirit becomes body, and that nature is not strange to personality. The system of cells and functions we call "body" is able to express the finest change of our spiritual being.¹

Man is related to sub-human nature, being a microcosmos in which all levels of creation concur, both of transcendent spirit and objective

1. Shaking the Foundations, p. 86.

nature.¹ This is a Whiteheadian concept in which the whole universe is expressed in man who is a part. Although nature has something of a history or record, it enters soteriological history in personality.

"The tragedy of nature is tied up with the tragedy of man, as the salvation of nature is dependent on the salvation of man."² Tillich's Christ comes to redeem the evils of nature and of man, for nature is in man, even as man is in nature.

(1) Disintegration and sickness.--This dimension of nature in man is a complex integration of manifold structures and relations. However, in both the spiritual and physical dimensions of man, as well as in their interrelation, man is not a whole. He is disunified and disintegrated into different elements under the conditions of finitude and estrangement. Each element can disintegrate independently.³ Man calls this disintegration sickness, and its ultimate cure comes from a rediscovered and re-exerted common ground of integration.

(2) Love's healing power.--"Love is the power in the ground of creation which drives every element beyond itself toward reunion with the other one, and ultimately to reunion with the ground from which all are separated."⁴ The civil war in the vertical dimension between essence and existence has its horizontal dimension in sickness and suffering. Love works in both dimensions.

1. Systematic Theology, I, 260-261.

2. "The Redemption of Nature," p. 302.

3. Dynamics of Faith, p. 111.

4. Ibid., p. 114.

The transcending of the breach brings healing.

The coming of the Kingdom of Heaven is accompanied by the healing of the human body. . . . In the body of the Christ nature is united with history. In the "center of history" nature reaches its fulfilment in the body which is the perfect organ and experience of the Spirit.¹

iv. The redemption of nature in the New Being

Tillich has kept his lifelong romantic sympathy toward nature in balance by seeing not only nature's supportive and constitutive role in and for man, but also its pathos. He quotes the words of Schelling, "A veil of sadness is spread over all nature, a deep, unappeasable melancholy over all life."² And he asks, "Why is nature tragic? . . . Who is responsible for the suffering of animals, for the ugliness of death and decay, for the universal dread of death?"³ Tillich has written an ontology in which he has used concepts of axiological and soteriological import like "the Fall," and the reintegration of this fallen world in the "New Being." This New Being is not a new creation to replace or succeed the old, but a new revelation of saving power to illuminate and redeem the old.

(1) Demonic distortion transcended.--In the New Being, the demonic distortion of nature is transcended. Man sees even the basic subject-object structure of reason, which is the structure which relates him to nature, transcended by the prior ground of subject and

1. Protestant Era, p. 106.

2. Friedrich Schelling, Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing House, 1936), p. 76. Quoted in Shaking the Foundations, p. 82.

3. Shaking the Foundations, pp. 82, 83.

object. This is not to reduce one to the other (subjectivism or naturalism) but to see both subject and object as original, irreducible phenomena. In this, the structure of creation is transcended without being obliterated or reduced. A generic unity for the polarities of subject and object is met in God.

(2) Courage for the tragic scene of nature.--There is a veil of death spread across all of nature and man, and this has caused man's cardinal anxiety. Catastrophes in nature have cracked man's belief in bland happiness as the criterion of God's providence in creation. "The real miracle of time and of every present is not only that it can transcend itself but that as a result of unpredictable catastrophes it must transcend itself ever and again."¹ Man is caught in the transience of a nature which he transcends but cannot escape. He is buffeted by the spontaneities of nature whose regularity he tries to trust. He is too much above nature to be satisfied and too much in nature to escape. Thus, any salvation here which is realistic and respectful toward what is being saved must again be of the nature of courage, holding an "in-spite-of" attitude primary.

(3) Suffering borne by courage.--There are some who would insist that an adequate salvation of man and nature should remove pain and offer pleasure as the criterion of the New Being. Such hedonism is unworthy of man.

There are people who believe that man's life is in continuous flight from pain and a persistent search for pleasure. I have never seen a human being of whom that is true. It is true only of beings who have lost their humanity.²

1. The Religious Situation, trans. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), p. 10.

2. The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 144.

Some will ask where in the New Being is the "good news" or the tidings of joy, if old adversaries of pain assail the new courage.

"Joy seems to be the opposite of pain. But we know that pain and joy can exist together. Not joy but pleasure is the opposite of pain."¹ If man were suddenly rid of all experiences of disvalue including the tensions of hope and the painful courage of creativity, for instance, he would not be man. Hence, it would not be man who was saved but some new kind of creature. The story of man would end in his doom and God's failure to redeem what man was.

(4) Acceptance and guiltless suffering.--One of the darkest aspects of the evil man has borne has deep psychological roots. This is not to use the term psychology to mean "purely human, hence not real" but to use it as a term meaning "purely human and very real." The sting of adversity, as seen earlier, is its deep element of guilt and resentment.

Everybody carries a hostility toward the existence into which he has been thrown, toward the hidden powers which determine his life and that of the universe, toward that which makes him guilty and that which threatens him with destruction because he has become guilty.²

In a sense, man who leads a life which is unacceptable feels himself unacceptable to life. He needs to know that by grace, the unacceptable has become accepted. He wants to hear it said to him, "Life accepts you; life loves you as a separated part of itself; life wants to reunite you with itself, even when it seems to destroy you."³

1. Ibid., p. 144.

2. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

3. Ibid., p. 11.

In accordance with Tillich's system, it appears that the experience of being accepted exerts a reciprocal force in man, urging him to accept his lot. The power of being which accepts man in spite of his unacceptability is the ultimate power and motivation of man, thus man "accepts in spite of its unacceptability" his life with its pain and its doubt and its death. "It [man's acceptance] is the courage to say yes to one's own life and life in general, in spite of the driving forces of fate."¹ Both God and man finally accept the unacceptable, but the motivation to do this is initiated from the Godward side.

v. Realistic redemption

It has been shown that salvation does not obliterate the conditions of negativity, these being the conditions of creative existence. "Salvation does not destroy creation; but it transforms the Old Creation into the New one."² Thus, death continues as a condition of finite existence, but the sting of death which is guilt is purged.

We are slaves of fear, not because we have to die, but because we deserve to die. . . . It [salvation] is rather a judgment which declares that we do not deserve to die, because we are justified.³

By this, the bifurcation of essence and existence, the gap between actuality and potential norm, is transcended in the reuniting ground of divine love. But neither essence nor existence must vanish into the other, for they exist only in correlation with each other.

(1) Redemption "in spite of" suffering and death.--Existentially, courage and faith declare the prevalence of being over nonbeing. But,

1. Ibid., p. 53.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

3. Shaking the Foundations, p. 70.

"A life process is the more powerful, the more nonbeing it can include in its self-affirmation, without being destroyed by it."¹ By courage and faith, one can creatively bear pain and the threat of death, once the anxiety of guilt is redeemed; for then one's creative expressions of being cease to be further confounded by the sin and guilt of estrangement in which they formerly operated. "The cross of Christ is the symbol of the divine love, participating in the destruction into which it throws him who acts against love. This is the meaning of atonement."²

However, even after guilt is removed and man participates by faith in the New Being, there are the continuing facts of pain and death. "We feel a tragic element in the passing of the old people, with their experience, wisdom, and irreplaceable individuality."³ Even when we are shown the vast redeemability of present evils in the openness of the future which can transform an open or uncompleted past, one needs a prior, deeper faith to generate courage. "But even if the creative possibilities in the catastrophes of our day were more apparent than they are, they would not concern the victims of these catastrophes in their immediate existence. . . . The people of our day must be enabled to say "in-spite-of."⁴ Man must live in spite of death. Tillich does not believe in the ongoing life of the individual after physical death. This would be a matter of perpetuating the split between existence and essence. Eternal time-continuation becomes a contradiction in terms. Thus, eternal life is present life so grounded qualitatively in the eternal God that it takes into itself and conquers all anxiety over physical

1. Love, Power, and Justice, p. 40.

2. Ibid., p. 115.

3. Shaking the Foundations, p. 70.

4. Protestant Era, p. 187.

death.

(2) Existential theodicy.--In all of this, it must be remembered that the answer of theodicy in the immediacy of catastrophe must always be as individual and personal as the pain itself. In other words, all of these concepts of courage and New Being must be individualized and not dogmatized for the race or the masses of men. "A man can say with the paradoxical confidence of faith, 'Nothing can separate me from the Love of God' (Romans, chap. 8), but he cannot say with any degree of confidence that other persons are or are not separated from the Love of God or from ultimate fulfillment."¹ However, in the correlation of faith one does ejectively affirm the fulfillment of others in the love of God, for one is a participant in a whole of creation in which his destiny is of one fabric with all.

The principle of participation implies that every question concerning individual fulfillment must at the same time be a question concerning universal fulfillment. Neither can be separated from the other. . . . The question of theodicy finds its final answer in the mystery of the creative ground.²

Ultimately, in the "transcendent realism" of the felt ground of being even the ontological shock of nonbeing in death itself is led captive. It is led captive by the providential or "prevenient" grace of God to the effect that man's very anxiety over death itself becomes the instigator of man's ultimate concern, which finds answer without destroying the question in the New Being. Tillich has systematically presented his claim expressed in the last sentence of Love, Power, and Justice: "Man cannot solve any of his great problems if he does not see

1. Systematic Theology, I, 270.

2. Ibid.

them in the light of his own being and of being itself."¹

(3) A comprehensively sacramental world.--Natural and moral evil, so intimately bound together in Tillich's concept of "the Fall," have found a common atonement in the salvation of man and nature. As man in his essential nature bears the image of God,² so nature in the New Being yields itself more readily to a transference which pierces ambiguities to reveal the depth of creation. Nature, the stage of natural evil, becomes redeemed as the material of sacrament.

The holy is omnipresent in so far as the ground of being is not far from any being; the holy is demonized because of the separation of the infinite ground of being from every finite reality.

.....

Nature must be brought into the unity of the history of salvation. It must be delivered from its demonic bondage. And just that happens when nature becomes a sacramental element.³

The demonic element is conquered in nature in so far as it enters into the body of the Christ. In him the divine ground of nature has moved through nature to reveal God. God's healing power has revealed itself as triumphant over the demonic. The power of being given to all creation inheres in spite of finite distortion. Thus, in the terms of Tillich's protestant principle, man and nature retain their divinity. There is conflict and duality in nature and man, but man stands in life even while fearing death, in truth while doubting, in acceptance while guilty.⁴ In so far as the demonic is overcome by the

1. Love, Power, and Justice, p. 125.

2. Systematic Theology, II, 94.

3. Protestant Era, pp. 111-112.

4. Ibid., p. xv.

New Being, the holy moves in redemptive power through the natural. This supports the eschatological declaration, "If we could see the holy in every reality, we should be in the Kingdom of God."¹ For those living prior to such a culmination, however, Tillich sums up his theory of soteriology in nature: "Nature, by being brought into the context of the history of salvation is liberated from its ambiguity. Its demonic quality is conquered in the New Being in Christ. Nature is not the enemy of salvation; . . . rather, nature is a bearer and an object of salvation."²

1. Ibid., p. 111.

2. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICAL COMPARISON FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING

1. Philosophical Understanding in Convergent and Divergent Systems

A critical study of the convergences and divergences of the three thought-systems presented will now be made, primarily from the viewpoint of the philosophical understanding of these theories. The religious significance or the adequacy of these theories for worshipful man will be dealt with later. Subjects like worship, redemption, and immortality, in their connection with the problem of evil, will be considered at that time. It must be remembered, however, that the thought-systems presented thus far might all be called philosophical theologies. Philosophical examination of experience and reality here goes hand in hand with religious commitments and predispositions. Thus no utterly clear line can be drawn between philosophical understanding and religious significance. Man is a determining factor in his experience of reality, and his constitutional religious needs influence his rational effort to comprehend reality. Thus some concern for religious adequacy must be given in this study of rational, philosophical adequacy.

1. Dominant convergences

There are many convergent relationships among the three religious thinkers presented. Initially considered, all three thinkers express a

deep sense of involvement in the problem of evil in human experience. All three trust human reason to be somehow capable of grasping the realities involved in the problem. The experience of evil is not an illusion but a fact which must have some ultimate explanation. Human reason is authenticated for all three in the fact that it both comes from, and is grounded in, the nature of God. Again, all three believe in the irreducible subject-object structure of all human knowledge.

The orientation of these three men is distinctly Christian. They are interested in the intelligible availability of God to overcome existential evil. This availability is held to be revealed uniquely in Jesus Christ. The three are theologians to the degree in which they are involved in, and committed to, this quest for the redemption of human ills to which they seek to give rational interpretation and formulation from a theistic point of view. They are philosophers inasmuch as they sincerely attempt to make some kind of objective analysis of philosophical concepts and experiential facts by which they both formulate and criticize their hypotheses.¹ It is with such convergences in mind that divergences brought out by critical comparison may be considered.

ii. Plan of presentation

The critical comparison of theories in this chapter will be structured by three basic philosophical and theological categories of religious thought: theory of knowledge (including theories of reason and revelation), theory of God, and theory of value. Out of these categories in each sys-

1. This is to use definitions of theology and philosophy proposed by such thinkers as Tillich and Ritschl. Cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 22; and Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900), p. 3.

tem of thought presented certain elements relevant to the problem of evil will be lifted out for critical comparison.

It has been the purpose of this dissertation to keep within the supportive context of their original systems all elements examined for their relevance to the problem of natural evil.¹ In this section of critical comparison, elements compared will again be kept in their original contexts as far as possible. Because of this, not all elements or categories of elements may be compared by the same plan of presentation. In fairness to the materials considered, freedom must be used in the structure of presentation lest elements of widely differing systems be forced into inappropriate molds.

As far as possible, criticism will be brought out by way of comparison, allowing strengths in one system to reveal weaknesses in the others, or allowing weaknesses to reveal strengths. However, such comparison may not always be possible in instances in which certain systems have unique elements which admit to no ready comparison with other systems at hand. In such instances, direct, critical exposition will be employed.

iii. Questions to be answered; problems to be understood

Regardless of this freedom in the manner of presentation for the sake of fairness to the materials to be critically compared, adequate philosophical understanding of certain basic problems and meaningful answers to certain basic questions relevant to the problem of natural evil will be sought under the heading of each category considered. Philosoph-

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1. As stated in the introduction to this dissertation, whole systems are not being compared and critically evaluated, but only elements relevant to the problem of natural evil are being considered. Since none of the thinkers presented has written a complete theory of natural evil, whole theories cannot be comparatively evaluated.

ical explanations and answers will be examined for their rational self-consistency as well as for their comprehensive consistency and coherence with factors of human thought and experience relevant to the problem of evil.

1) Under the heading of theory of knowledge (which will be expanded to include reason and revelation) the questions whose formulation and answers will be considered are essentially these. Has the ultimate ground of life's polarities been meaningfully defined as being knowable by man? Have the functions of reason and revelation in such knowledge been meaningfully delineated and correlated? Is the nature of such ultimate knowledge descriptive or symbolic--is God knowable as a specific entity or as that which utterly transcends specificity? Finally, in all of the above, is man's natural experience of negativity held to be more than an illusion? Is it admitted as evidence for a conception of ultimate reality which can truly account for man's experience of negativity?

2) Under the topic of theories of God, the adequacy of answers to the following questions will be considered. Is the ultimate nature of God so conceived as to explain, first, His relation to the ground of evil, second, the priority of meaning and value in experience, and, third, the basic unity of creation in which positive and negative elements are discernible? Is the ultimate ground of evil defined in such a way as to account for evil in human experience? Also, are the transcendent and immanent aspects of God meaningfully defined and related?

3) Under the topic of theories of value, questions to be answered are essentially these. Is there given a meaningful definition and criterion of value in terms of which the nature and redemption of evil can be comprehended? Is there a meaningful conception of how natural evil enters into the creation? Is there adequate understanding and explanation of the complex nature of natural evil, particularly in its relation

with moral and metaphysical evil? Is value meaningfully grounded in or related to ultimate reality? Finally, if God is a God of values, that is, a good God, what is the relation of His goodness and His power?

The order in which these questions of philosophical understanding have just been presented is essentially the order in which they will be considered in the sections of this chapter. However, each question will not be the special heading of a section, since the answers, set within the contexts of their respective systems, do not allow for such artificial arrangement. Rather, these questions will form the underlying emphases in each section as relevant elements of theories are critically compared under the larger headings: theory of knowledge, theory of God, and theory of value.

2. Knowledge of the World and Ultimate Reality

A theory is never more secure than the authority of its author as a knower. All beliefs, speculative or factual, may be called illusions. Theories of evil and its redemption always face this danger. Hence, how man knows his world and ultimate reality becomes a major concern of this study.

Underlying questions which direct the emphases of this section are: Is the ultimate ground of life's polarities knowable? How is it knowable (by natural reason or by revelation or by both), and what kind of knowledge is this ultimate knowledge? And, in all of this, is man's natural experience of negativity (however conceived) to be admitted as offering evidence for a conception of the ultimate reality by which it is to be explained (or is such experience explained away as finite illusion)?

1. The precedence of scientific epistemology in Wieman

In this section of comparison and criticism the theories of knowledge (both natural and revealed knowledge) by Wieman and Tillich will be compared first. This is because these two have written theories of natural and revealed knowledge in greater detail than Lewis and because their theories are of such a nature as to oppose each other directly. Such direct opposition allows for distinct, critical comparison which might be lost by the introduction of a third theory at this point. However, following this comparison of Wieman and Tillich, Lewis' theory of knowledge will be compared critically with the above two.

Epistemology logically precedes ontology in the thought of Henry Nelson Wieman. How a man knows determines what he may know. Knowledge depends ultimately upon objective, scientific empiricism. For Wieman, science is nothing else than the refined knowing process itself. Scientific method is defined by Wieman as a method in which sensory observation, experimental behavior, and rational inference are working together. Man comes to knowledge by sense experience (whether rarefied as aesthetic experience or gross as tactile impressions) interpreted by conceptual, imaginative, and conative reason. God or ultimate reality is known in the same way anything else is known, by perception structured by conception in the subject-object continuum of all human experience. Man becomes aware of a process or pervasive quality of creative, positive value in his world. There is met in nature the creator and sustainer of value.

By scientific method man is helped to clarify and adjust to this God-factor. It is true that science approaches reality as a piecemeal venture of departmental specializations. Thus no one science and, perhaps, not even the totality of sciences can ever fully comprehend the pervasive

God-factor. Nevertheless, more can be known of the God-factor in this way than by any other.

According to the theory of Wieman, the God-process which is studied by scientific reason is the very source or producer of the conditions for such reason, namely, the subject-object, thought-thing series of all human knowledge. God is the guarantor of truth, since God Himself is the process which generates and correlates the subject-object series.

Human reason orders the meaning of experiences met in nature. It may ramble through speculative immensities of the ideal and the supernatural, but it finds existential justification and verification only within the scope of nature, the whole of reality available to the empirical sciences. Speculative reason is worthful truth only as it relates ultimately to empirical facts. The tests of truth are perception, empirical examination, common agreement among subjects, and coherence. This is not coherence in the broad sense stressed by Edgar Sheffield Brightman, but in the specific sense of coherence based on empirical proof.

A verifiable God within such a theory must have the qualities essential to anything which is experimentally verifiable. He must be something actually existent in the universe or in nature and have certain specifiable characteristics by which He can be identified. God must be within the experiential whole of nature. Nor may He be the sole determining force in nature. This would tend to make Him unspecifiable, being a composite of every specification and its opposite. However, Wieman has quite a different reason for declaring God less than total determinant. The existential facts of error, evil, and discreativity bespeak other forces in nature arrayed against the creative God. To explain these

facts God must be a producer of meaning and value within a natural whole which is composed of other factors which are antagonistic or neutral.

ii. The precedence of ontology in Tillich

Paul Tillich holds to a principle which is the direct opposite of Wieman's theory that epistemology "precedes" logically, or sets the limits of, ontology. Tillich believes that ontology determines epistemology, both logically and existentially speaking. Every epistemology presupposes some ontological structure in which it operates. This is something that Wieman does not seem to see. From Tillich's point of view, Wieman's system is shot through with presuppositions such as the exclusive immanence of God, the exclusive virtues of science, and the rational validity of the subject-object epistemological relation based on a prior, underlying God-process. God as the guarantor of human knowledge is a presupposition. Although Tillich, with Wieman, discovers that subject-object dualism is a basic structure of all natural knowledge, he rightly affirms that he nowhere discovers within natural experience a comprehensive ground to bind the two in correlation. This ground is, rather, a hypothesis (regardless of how necessary) which reaches beyond scientific empiricism. Wieman may insist that man is able to be concerned only with the concrete, and Tillich may even agree with this. Yet there are dimensions of the concrete, necessary for knowing it, which transcend the concrete. A coherent philosophy of knowledge demands an explicit consideration of this ground.

For Tillich, ultimate reality or God, the "ground of being," is not revealed in natural objects but in the conditions necessary for knowing objects. "The truth of all ontological concepts is their power

of expressing that which makes subject-object structure possible."¹ Thus one is driven either beyond the realm of the natural or into the "depths" of the natural to comprehend it. Tillich looks into the depths or the ground of nature which is also the ground of natural knowledge.

Empirical knowledge operates by categories which it did not create. Wieman claims that these are abstractions from man's natural experience.² Yet, both Tillich and Lewis might then have good reason to ask, Whence comes the minimal conceptual structure of mind which enables it to do its initial abstracting? At this critical point Wieman is silent. In the thought of Tillich and Lewis, categories are universal, formal fixities of reason which are original in man. However, Tillich has gone beyond Lewis here to notice the dialectical antinomies or polarities visible in the categories as the forms of reality man knows (individualization-participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny). These are irreducible one to the other. Yet, they bespeak a transcendent common ground to comprehend and maintain their common opposition. This common ground of the polarities of existence and the dialectic of categories must also be the common ground of all existence which they describe. This ground is the "depth" to which Tillich looks.

At this point Tillich turns to revelation. He declares that it is by revelation that man receives confirmation of this prior, integrating ground of existential polarity sought by reason. This is a ground which transcends reason; a ground met only by revelation. Tillich holds that

1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 169.

2. In this Wieman does not deny the universality and constitutional stability, i.e. the "givenness" of categories. They are more than man's arbitrary creation, although they are still human formulations.

existence is a kind of Kantian appearance, not totally divorced but estranged from its causal ground of noumenal reality. Appearance here, as for Kant, cannot be pierced by natural reason (which is also of the house and lineage of appearance). Natural reason cannot pierce the veil of appearance to know reality, which is, nonetheless, everywhere implied in appearance.

According to Tillich, reality comes by revelation and moves through appearance to give man "knowledge" of the mysterious ground of all polarities. This includes the polarity of subject and object which heretofore has always kept the knower somewhat at bay in doubtful distance from the known. In this experience of revelation the polarities, discontinuities, and evils of time are comprehensively transcended in an eternal, noumenal ground of reality. This is for man the self-manifestation of the ecstatic depth or ground of creation--transcendent reality.

Tillich further claims that this revelation comes as the experience of man's being "grasped" by the integrating ground of all of life's polarities and dialectic. It is a matter of being grasped by the ground of being under which all of life's negativities are subsumed. This is not a ground of being which is a deist's "prior realm" or a naïve supernaturalist's "second story." It is the transcendent depth of reality in which all existence participates. It is the dimension where subject and object cease to suspect their distance, where "to be" and "not to be" cease fearing each other, and where guilt and innocence find help in redemption. It is the experience of the ultimate affirmation of life in God. This is, for man, the ultimate truth, a truth that is felt, lived, and done. This immediacy of being-itself is according to Tillich the

ultimate truth for man.¹

iii. Critical comparison of Wieman and Tillich

A first question which may well be asked about the above theory from Wieman's point of view is: What kind of knowledge is this revelation which utterly transcends the subject-object structure of knowledge? It comes not of man's rational search, and it bespeaks a world with a depth dimension which utterly transcends the structures of existence for which it is responsible. This is revelation of that, and by means of that, to which man is utterly unaccustomed.

Wieman holds that knowledge which oversteps the dualism of subject and object, to be "grasped" by its object, is not knowledge at all. It is perceptual immediacy which is only a first step to knowledge. Thus, to speak of sheer revelation, which transcends the subject-object relationship of the knower and the known, as truth is nonsense. Whenever existentialism so invades epistemology as to lessen the distance between subject and object by "involvement," or "love," or "being grasped," knowledge loses its self-critical capacity generated only by subject-object opposition. Epistemic dualism, which, for Tillich, breeds doubt between

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1. It will be remembered that in Tillich's theory ultimate reality or being has rational form and structure. However, human reason is vitiated by the fall and cannot attain to the logos or pure reason of ultimate reality. In finite, fallen reason, as seen earlier, internal elements (i.e. subject-object, individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny) move against each other to constitute the structure of man's negative experiences of anxiety, doubt, and guilt. These polar elements are incapable of transcending their antithetical course to find their prior integrating ground of opposition to which they point. The contestant elements of finite reason suggest, but never reveal, the ultimate matchmaker of their struggle.

When, however, this prior ground breaks through the veil to human experience as an ultimate experience of truth it remakes man's confidence and composure. The antithetical and dialectical is transeended and reunified. Thus, finite reason in man meets its depth and is

subject and object because of their distance, is, for Wieman, the only structure which permits a coherent critique of truth. Thus, that which for Tillich is a kind of metaphysical or natural disvalue in the epistemics of finite reason is, for Wieman, the only guarantee of finite knowledge and truth. Tillich calls for "participation." Wieman calls for "observation" where any coherent account of knowledge is presented.

Wieman goes on to declare that theology is, after all, not so much the rational exposition of revelation from above as it is the ejective assertion of teleological structure by man from below. While affirming the irreducible duality of human epistemology, as does Tillich or even Lewis, Wieman does not seek some depth dimension of reality with Tillich to affirm a comprehensive, generic, prior ground to comprehend both subject and object. He rightly perceives that while Tillich's revelation of being, which comprehends man's estrangement, does keep man from the despair of relativity, it does not preserve him from absorption into that absolute in whom all subject and objects, form and dynamics, and other dialectical categories are one. A coherent theory of revelation must preserve the finite categories by which revelation is received.

If the subject-object series, with all of its disvalues, errors, and evils, is worth affirming in the initial exercise of man's knowledge, it is worth affirming as being in some sense ultimate. This cannot be had by a hypothesis of God who "comprehends" both subject and object, but

transformed. It must be understood here that Tillich's definition of reason is a classical one. Reason includes emotional and volitional aspects. Thus, to know or "meet" the truth is to love it and do it, to be "grasped" by it and "participate" in it. This is akin to the Socratic idea that knowledge is virtue since knowledge of the truth enlists all of mind's powers, including will, to follow the truth. This is also akin to the Johannine concept of doing the truth, living in right relation to ultimate, saving reality. (John 8:32; 14:6; 17:3; 18:37.)

by a God who "creates" and "correlates" both.

Wieman further declares that the ontological acknowledgement of a comprehensive ground of being, or a process of creative value, is not a first but a final achievement of reason. Its "revelation" is a natural one formulated out of the rational constitution of a community of rational beings in rapport with each other and their mutual world of data. It is man who at some point makes the ejective hypothesis (to use the term of F. R. Tennant) which affirms and describes a God revealed in natural sources. This is man's rational formulation of that unity of process which he perceives in what Whitehead and Wieman have called an almost aesthetic religious experience. By this experience and its rational formulation Wieman comes to know a process which operates in the world and can be, in some measure, abstracted from experiential events in the world. Tillich, by revelation, is met by a ground of reality which is the basis of the world and its processes as well as the basis of man's capacity to abstract principles from his world of experience.

It must be remembered here that Wieman does not declare that by human reasoning man can actually meet the totality of creative process any more than Tillich says that human reason can reach ontic reality. Yet, for both, God in His self-manifestation must be in some sense comprehensible to man's rational experience.

In this, Wieman and Lewis, as will be shown, make bold to say that this rational relation between man and God-made-manifest is intelligible only if God in His ontic reality be of the same stuff as finite reason's God. This is a very defensible position. At least God must be the co-ordinator of the thought-and-thing series, not just in man's finite department but throughout reality.

Tillich seems to think that he takes this dare but he does not. It is true that he claims that being is rational. According to Tillich's system, God in His self-manifestation may condescend to make contact with, and be molded by, human reason (even in its fallen state). But then Tillich speaks of God of highest heaven as being an abyss transcending all of this. The question arises as to what possible relation can exist between God as being or logos and God as being-itself or abyss. Tillich feels this concept of a transcendent God strengthens the nerve of man's assurance in God's power and being to overcome all existential contradictions, doubts, and evils. This, for Wieman, cuts the nerve of man's status as a knower, since, from Wieman's point of view, anything, good, evil, or indifferent can easily be dubbed illusion if human reason is incapable of comprehending the ultimate nature of reality. This insight of Wieman is decisive.

There are further problems in Tillich's concept of revelation. Traditional theories of religious experience claim to confront an ontological object whose immediacy evokes that rare experience called confrontation-of-God. In Tillich, man is grasped in this experience by God and made to participate more starkly in the underlying ground of life, a ground which overcomes all of life's negativities. Yet, for Tillich as for others, this experience can produce no irreducible "quale" (in the Tennantian sense of the word) unless one speaks of the highly controversial and ethereal qualities of Otto's "holy" or mysterium tremendum. It can bear no concrete statement about itself, nor can it defend its numinous immediacy against the charge that persons of various God-preconceptions come to, and go away from, the experience with highly varied concepts of deity. In that experience which leaves behind

all subject-object duality to confront the ineffable or, here, "participate" more fully in the saving ground of epistemics and life, Wieman would say that one cannot speak of "truth" or knowledge. These are categories of systematic duality, according to Wieman. Tillich's duality becomes posited between human-truth and God-truth instead of between man and fact.

Tillich agrees here with Wieman in the idea that revelation does not offer discursive, existential information to man. Rather, it is a confirming illumination and integration of man's present knowledge with its previous negativity and doubt. It should be noted that Wieman, too, acknowledges such moments of mystical immediacy. This immediacy does, perhaps, give one a feeling that he is on the virgin ground of reality, unsoiled by the contrarities, contradictions, and evils of rational experience. But Wieman seems more explicitly aware of the fact that this is a specious immediacy, for behind the emotive throb of the moment stands the accumulation of many sense-perceptions, concepts, and beliefs-in-the-making which are now integrated and confirmed. And, following the bright moment, there is a need for criticism of the experience by natural reason.

Tillich does seek to meet this criticism, however, by saying that the moment of revelation is always in correlation with man's knowledge-truth venture. But then he speaks of meeting pure, unspecifiable "being" as "truth," and, suddenly, he has altered the typical meaning of truth. Wieman insists that revelation need not bespeak a realm inaccessible to human reason. Lewis, a supporter of the supernatural, as will be seen, declares the same. Now it may be true that Tillich's system does not have "another realm" or supernature, separate from creation. However, his depth of reason or source of revelation so far outstrips man's existence, with which Tillich says it is continuous, that it serves not only

the function of supernature but of "extra supernature," as any coherent examination of his theory of revelation will show.

At this point, however, Tillich devotes great attention to the maintenance of correlation between being and existence, the far and the near of reality. Revelation must always be correlated with, and made intelligible by, man's negative, existential situation, along with its questions and cravings of natural reason. Secondly, natural reason is still united with its ground or depth to the degree that it can discuss it symbolically. This symbolic usage is not arbitrary. Man's natural constitution reaches out of its evils for redemptive divinity in certain ways and forms which are stable within a given culture. This is conducive to dependable symbolism.

Wiemann would see the merit of correlation between the human, problematic predicament and any divine answer. This is especially so if, as in Tillich, "being" created the very conditions for the problematic predicament. However, for Wiemann, to declare that natural reason is so far removed from reality that it can only make symbolic statements of it is the ultimate dissolution of man's faith in reason. One has to admit that Tillich's concept of human reason (which can make only symbolic statements about reality) can serve as the grand opening for all problems (natural evil or otherwise) to be treated as illusions and all answers to be called relativistic daydreams. When man can only know the divine co-ordinator of the subject-object series through a glass very, very darkly, then doubt is cast likewise upon the whole series itself which God co-ordinates. This is the ultimate abdication of meaning in life.

iv. Natural knowledge and revelation of the supernatural in Lewis

Contrary to Wieman and Tillich, Edwin Lewis does not delve into a comprehensive system of epistemology or give an analytical theory of revelation. Thus, the capacity of the human mind rightly to know its natural, evil predicament or its salvation is not called into systematic question. However, the structure of this discussion, thus far, allows certain factors of Lewis' theory to be introduced meaningfully in this present connection.

Lewis agrees with Wieman and Tillich that human experiences of negativity, conflict, error, and evil lead man to look beyond his natural predicament for an answer. It must be remembered here that Lewis approaches this matter as an axiologist more than an ontologist. Thus, his quest is not primarily for the "ground" of the one and the many, consistency and change, being and nothing, and other categories as is Tillich's. His quest is to explain the opposition of good and evil in the world. This will be considered in detail later.

It is interesting to note that Lewis wavers on the borderline of saying whether revelation of this ultimacy offers original knowledge or whether it only illuminates, confirms, and integrates knowledge already held by man, as is the case in Tillich (and in Wieman as will be seen). In either case, Lewis is more explicit than Wieman or Tillich in his affirmation that the transcendent ground revealed in revelation is not far removed from the structures of creativity-discreativity-neutrality known in existence. Lewis believes that by revelation man comes to see his plight in the light of an ontological background which authenticates it. The human experience of polarity, of creativity-discreativity, is no illusion of finitude, but a continuation of the polar relations which

exist on earth as they are in heaven. Ontological structure transcends man, but it is certainly not "abysmally mysterious" as is Tillich's depth of reality.

Although Lewis' theology is highly flavored by mythos and symbol in his portrayal of the drama of creation and ontological struggle, nevertheless, he does not emphasize, as does Tillich, the infinite distance between his symbols and reality. It is true that Tillich does say that symbols participate in the reality they portray. However, Lewis seems to be saying something much more important for subject-object empiricists who desire to know the realities involved in their predicament. Lewis is saying that symbols, rather than "participating" in reality, describe reality. Unless reality can be in some sense described, no human problem, including the problem of evil, can be answered.

When Wieman, Tillich, and Lewis finish their systems, they all have comprehensive God-grounds to comprehend experiential polarities. However, Wieman and Lewis maintain that such polarities are ultimate. Wieman and Lewis always describe their God in the polar terminology of creator, value producer, creative process, and co-ordinator. These terms all bespeak polar structure. Tillich, on the other hand, describes the comprehensive ground of polarity in language which suggests the resolution of polarity: "ground," "abyss of being," "participation," and the like. Thus, one is left with a question as to why polarity must be so utterly transcended to explain its ontological ground and correlation. More praiseworthy is the attempt of Wieman and Lewis to find ultimate correlation for life's polarities without declaring such polarity to be so far below the status of ultimate reality as to be almost "unreal," or almost of the nature of finite illusion.

v. Further critical comparisons

(1) The dialectical structure of transcendent reality.--It has been observed that while Wieman has a single-story universe and Lewis, a double, Tillich tries to maintain the best features of both in a single-story structure with an "abysmal" subcellar of ontic depth. This being the case, whenever Tillich is criticized for setting reality too far beyond the ken of human reason he can reply in the fashion of a good dialectician and say that far is near and near is far. Far reality still participates in the near human reason that has fallen from it. On the other hand, Lewis and Wieman, not unacquainted with dialectic, insist on paying some respects to the more stable pattern of logic in which far is far and near is near. Even here Tillich can rejoin the discussion to call static logic only one pole subsumed in the dialectical polarity of form (logic) and dynamic (dialectic). Nevertheless, at some point one has to insist that the ontological basis of this dialectic in Tillich is inaccessible to man and far more mysterious than the rational basis of dialectic proposed by such thinkers as Hegel.

(2) The revelatory fulfillment of reason.--At any rate, whether ultimate reality be "near" or "far," Tillich and Lewis agree that reason is in some sense fulfilled rather than obliterated by revelation. In Tillich reason calls for revelation to solve its internal polarity and natural conflict, both epistemologically and ontologically. In Lewis, reason calls for revelation to find out whether human conflict is ultimate or just man's unique and orphaned lot and whether it can be overcome. Now it is at this point that special attention must be given to Wieman's conception of revelation, since Wieman has been presented thus far as a kind of full-time antagonist of theories of revelation, being a scientific

empiricist. Special attention is given to Wieman's thought on the question of revelation in this section of critical comparison, since it is largely by critical analysis and comparison rather than by a reading of Wieman's explicit theory that one comes to see the full import of his thought on this issue.

There is a sense in which Wieman seeks revelation. It has been noted¹ that his absolute transcends the structures both of personality and mind, by how much no one knows. The natural reason of the mind of man is incapable of foreseeing the next emergent stage of creation by the creative supermind. The vision of it when it appears is revealed from within man.

According to Wieman, man is self-conscious, purposeful mind, and God is not. Thus revelation is, in a sense, self-induced by man, for he is the only seeker; God does not seem constitutionally capable of seeking him. Yet, it must be remembered that the complexity and scope of Wieman's religious insight, i.e., the whole God-process, far outstrips the narrow attentive capacity of the human searcher. This unsearchable vastness not only outstrips human cognition by reason of its quantitative expanse; but Wieman also suggests strongly that there is a qualitative depth to reality which escapes the probing insight of human science. Beyond this, Wieman goes on to say that man cannot make himself interested in what does not interest him. The interest or faith (psycho-physical propulsion conducive to interest, attention, or action), which is the initiatory fact of knowledge for Wieman, comes from, or is revealed from, above. It is "grace," according to Wieman. All of this strongly suggests

1. Supra, pp. 27-29.

a God who has to reveal Himself to man, search for man, and come to man as in revelation. If man is ever to know anything about this God, whose expansive superpersonal and supermental nature transcends man, and whose grace alone can interest or fix man's attention on Himself, then it seems very necessary for God to reveal Himself to man. This is not the same at all as man's discovery of God.¹

Tillich and Lewis would agree that faith is a God-initiated act of grace. Thus it is "revealed" from above. However, Wieman goes further than this to speak of a confirming immediacy with which worshipful man is confronted. This, added to Wieman's theory of the vast, super-human value-process, presents a God who so outstrips human reason that perhaps only symbols can suggest His true nature. Wieman does not give much attention to the concept of the symbol, although his system inordinately cries out for it. However, he does suggest that symbols must "come from the constitutional, psychic needs of worshipping man. Likewise they must adequately portray the coherently noticeable activity of God. For instance, the symbol "Father-God" stems mutually from a devotional need of man and from the objective fact that some process does produce men and bind them in relation. In this sense, man does not invent but discovers symbols. However, this whole concept is equally conducive to the suggestion that these symbols are revealed, quite originally, and perhaps "inescapably," in man who discovers them in himself, in his relation to his culture.

Wieman speaks of a matrix of quality or value-structure inherent in the universe which is the source and object of all empirical knowl-

1. Wieman begins to move toward acknowledgment of this particularly in his latest book: Man's Ultimate Commitment.

edge. Man becomes interested enough to know only those things which are values to him. But, as Wieman has already said, man cannot choose to be interested. Interest is given. Thus, this value matrix is both source and object of knowledge. This is not wholly unlike Tillich's depth of reason or Lewis' creator of reason in its function.

At times Wieman describes the God-process as a functioning reality among others. But then the religious man in Wieman takes over not only to call this value-process the supremely worthwhile cause but the ultimate cause in man's existence. It is the object of man's supreme commitment. It is beyond all human capacity to fathom. It reveals itself in personality and mind, yet outstrips them utterly in its nature. Ultimately, all Wieman is saying of natural reason, whether he admits it or not, is that human reason is capable of knowing the current manifestation of creative reality and of recognizing that its source dynamically and ontologically transcends this known current stage of itself. By how much and by what nature Wieman cannot say. Tillich and Lewis would agree with this. The three thinkers are much closer here than they would seem to be at first glance. The trouble is that whereas Tillich and Lewis are well aware of the implications of their systems at this point, Wieman is very slow to admit these implications suggested above.

It is most interesting to note at this point that Lewis, the only avowed supernaturalist of the three, is the only one who ever does allow reason to know through exploration and revelation just "what more" than man and human reason God really is. As will be seen below, this is a strength in the thought of Lewis which is lacking in Tillich and Wieman.

(3) The validity of committed knowledge.--All three theologians have a deep respect for empirical knowledge and human reason in its analysis of human problems and divine answers. Wieman holds out strongly for an irreducible subject-object dualism in the maintenance of knowledge and truth. This is a plea for objectivity. No doubt both Tillich and Lewis would agree where what Tillich calls "technical" reason is concerned. However, Lewis and Tillich maintain that commitment, faith, and action are essential in the knowledge of God. One must literally do the truth. One does not find the truth of God's redemption of evil by listening to a Christ who says, "Understand thou me." It is by involvement with a Christ who says, "Follow thou me" that one enters into relationship with redemptive power. This is not clearly a cognitive relationship, yet it is the only relationship by which one may "know" or "meet" the reality which saves.

Yet, in a sense, the empiricist Wieman finally has to come to this too. He declares that the true value of the things man holds dear can be seen only in the light of commitment to the creative. This can hardly be called detached, scientific knowledge. Wieman also says that man's greatest evil is separation from God. With due respect for keeping axiological statements out of epistemological arguments, it must still be noted here that such evil called "separation" does not form a likely opposite for a good which is called by Wieman "detachment."

Tillich has said that it is the reuniting love of God which enables man to know Him. One has knowledge only by some reunion with the known, by loving it, by sensing its mutual ground with oneself. Wieman declares that here one fogs up his epistemic spectacles with the hot breath of involvement in his object. This may be true. But it is de-

creasingly true in man's confrontation with the One whose very nature is love itself. If one is a theologian, he cannot ultimately use detached knowledge with reference to God, for theology is committed. God is the existential correlate to what Tillich has called man's "ultimate concern." In this context, the epistemological concern for objectivity becomes what Tillich has called a "preliminary concern."

(4) Objective knowledge of God.--In man's quest for God, however initiated, Tillich and Wieman hold it to be man's ultimate idolatry that he should identify any stable object as God. This means identifying creation with creator, meaningful existence with its ground. In this, the dogmatic and static are equated with the creative. Thus, for either thinker, God is not an object among objects. (It might be countered that Wieman's God is a process among processes, and an empirically identifiable one too. Yet, as before mentioned, process is a hard entity to snare in the net of objective, substantial specification.) It is this ontological consideration, much more explicit in Tillich than in Wieman, which has much to do with the unwillingness of either man to spell out the ultimate nature of God.¹

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1. Just as the polar terms of existence can never leave the track of their opposition to discover their common meeting ground, just so, no argument for the existence of God can find God because of its inevitable use of such terms. Further, if one were to prove the existence of God, he would have proved in Tillich's view a peculiar thing, namely, a humanely reasoned object named God, hence, an idol. Tillich proposes that even the ontological argument, which has had its prestige, only shows "that an awareness of the infinite is included in man's awareness of finitude." (Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 205.) Wieman insists that God is dynamic, creative, superpersonal, and supermental process. In this theory, too, the rational, specifiable objectification of God seems equally impossible. It is interesting at this point to notice another parallel factor between the systems of Wieman and Tillich. Wieman claims that only God can unite or integrate the disparate factors of nature to bring forth the internal connection of organism. Man can only do the work of "mechanism," i.e., relate externally the disparate or polar factors of existence. Nevertheless, mechanism and

Lewis, on the other hand, does not hold such a concept of the idolatry of the created, except in the traditional sense of concupiscence. His God is a larger object, though dynamic, quite personal, and very rational.¹ For man to see or know God is not the ultimate evil. For man to touch the ark of the covenant is not fatal. The ark need not be hidden where the Philistines cannot get at it. The ultimate evil is for man to serve the Adversary. Hence, Lewis can strive to spell out the nature of Very God Himself without abject fear of idolatry. In this, he need not limit himself to a discussion of only the existential symptoms or twice-removed symbols of a God quite beyond man's personal and mental structure. He can and does speak of God Himself.

This fact which makes Lewis' God more definite and specifiable in epistemology makes Him more available and scrutable in ontology than the God of Tillich or Wieman. These both claim their God to be transcendent over human mind and personality on the one hand, yet so immanent in creation as to be closer than hands and feet, on the other. Nothing is more self-defeating to an epistemologist than the correlation of that which is

organism are still related as factors of one reality, being the external and internal relations of the same factors. This is very much like Tillich's rational analogy of polar reason which is ever disparate in man, united in God, yet of a single fabric in one reality.

1. No one of these thinkers sees God as a person ultimately. The fact that He is best known in personality does not prove Him personal. However, they all see His transcendence over personality as nonetheless inclusive of personality. Where personality is man's only example of an infinite capacity for self-transcendence, and that only limited by human frailty and limitation, one wonders what is accomplished by designating God "transcendent over" personality, which is, itself, infinitely self-transcendent. This train of thought has been well elaborated by Borden Parker Bowne, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and L. Harold DeWolf. However, transcendent or not, of the three theories presented Lewis' God bears, finally, the closest resemblance to the structures or qualities of personality included in His transcendence. This God is most like man.

either beyond all imagination or closer than hands and feet.

(5) The import of natural experiences of negativity.---It is interesting to note that all three thinkers, whether self-styled as supernaturalist, transcendent realist, or naturalist, have a sufficiently high regard for man's natural experience to say that the shocks of doubt, guilt, and anxiety in man's natural experience drive him to God. Paradoxically, the most positive assessment of negativity-ridden nature is to be found in the Christian concepts either of prevenient grace, or what John Wesley called "convicting grace." These concepts have been illuminated by Nels Ferré who suggests that the dark experiences of nature are pedagogical and corrective inasmuch as they cause man to desire and search for a God who can redeem evil experiences or save him from them. Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich all see this, with Tillich saying the most about it. This question will be considered further under the heading of religious significance. However, may it suffice to say here that in a study of the problem of evil the belief that nature's worst as well as nature's best can lead man to God is a most valuable ultimate affirmation of man's capacity to know (not imagine or be deluded by) his problem and to know (receive) meaningful redemption. Evil experience is not explained away as illusion. It is admitted as evidence in the formulation of the concept of ultimate reality. It is admissible evidence whether it be conceived of as an element of natural knowledge which discovers reality or an element of natural knowledge which "calls down" revelation of ultimate reality.

3. The Nature and Work of God and the Ground of Evil

Theories of God and the ground of evil by Tillich, Wieman, and Lewis will now be critically considered for their capacities to define the

ultimate nature of God in His relation to the ground of evil, as well as to explain the priority of meaning and basic unity of the creation. The ultimate grounds of evil presented will be examined for their capacities to explain the kinds of evils man experiences. In all of this, the capabilities of theorists to define and relate the transcendent and immanent aspects of God will also be considered.

1. Tillich's dialectical concept of God

Tillich's God is not in, beside, or over nature. Yet, He is in, and beside, and over nature. God is found in the "ecstatic" or self-transcendent character of this world as its depth and ground. This is the fountal concept of ontology which moves by dialectical reason to correlate the near and far aspects of God. This is the bond between God's creative, "living" immanence and His eternal, mysterious transcendence.

By a dialectical rationale opposites call forth each other and are defined, criticized, and made intelligible by the tension of their mutual opposition. Out of this, man's reason catches symptoms or suggestions of a depth of reason in which the tension is ultimately resolved. This depth reality expresses itself through structures of dynamic dialectic. Yet it transcends and integrates polarities which, for natural reason, remain ever separate with only a hint of their common ground in the sheer fact of their perpetual relationship of opposition.¹

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1. Formal logic does not permit the evocative correspondence of Yes and No. Unlike dialectic, logic never sees the matching of opposites as "paradox" (i.e. the unexpected) but as contradiction. Thus formal logic expresses the static phase or dimension of reality; dialectical reason, the dynamic. However, as mentioned earlier, Tillich can claim that formal logic and dynamic dialectic belong to the same reality. They are, respectively, its form and dynamic. Thus, Tillich elevates dialectic over logic so that the dynamic devours or compre-

Now Tillich declares that "God as Spirit" is a symbol which suggests this integration or life-giving comprehension of all polarities in the Godhead. The reply may be made that "spirit" has traditionally meant "immaterial" more than "integrative." Yet, one must admit that proverbial descriptions of God as Spirit have attributed to Him, at once, the integration of dynamics and form, individualization and participation, freedom and destiny, and an utter transcendence over rational categories of limitation. God has been deemed, at once, as being what He is and what He shall be, here and everywhere, free to exercise that which is His nature, present and eternal, great and small, specific power and all power.

Wieman has suggested that Tillich's "power of being" is a grab bag from which one can derive any ontological power and its opposite to explain anything.¹ It may be added that such a resource is phenomenally practical for winning arguments based on polarity. By maintaining two dialectical concepts throughout every argument and calling them expressions or structures of a single principle, one may say Yes and No to every question and never be held to one or the other. All factors of opposition in human experience seek transcendent integration here to explain the final unity of this life and world. This ultimate unity Tillich seeks to supply through the almost unassailable reason of dialectic.

Beyond factors of rational contradiction and polarity, Tillich is likewise cognizant of factors of disvalue and discreativity in all life and experience. He sees evil as the polarization or "breakdown" of that

hends its formal mate. The timeless movement of dialectic, unlike physical movement, allows the timeless to be full of time, the infinite to be full of finitude, and God to be many things and no thing.

1. Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment, p. 309.

dialectic which is the form or structure of reality for man. Hurricanes appear as dynamic rampant over form. Final death appears as form rampant over dynamic. Or in moral evil, dynamic is fanaticism or revolution. Form is dogmatism and complacency. Thus, whatever factor is responsible for this polarization must be one which is capable of relating to the ontological ground of polarity, there to induce this disjointed dialectic. However, it must be a factor with less than the ultimate status of creativity or being. Otherwise, without some primacy or greater ultimacy in being and creativity, nothing of order and value would tend to continue as meaningful existence. Being-itself transcends the opposition of being and nonbeing, giving priority to being.

Tillich seeks to present evidence for this priority of being. From the existential point of view, he notes an ever-present primacy of being over its antagonist. This is illustrated in the fact that even man's doubt (a symptom of antagonism) exists only from a prior fulcrum position of truth; his guilt, from a standpoint of righteousness still in him; and his anxiety, from a courage great enough to acknowledge fear.

Thus, Tillich posits the source of this negativity within the ground of being as its capacity for limitation, determination, finitude, and, hence, creativity and life. This source Tillich calls nonbeing. It is relative nonbeing, ὄν ὅν, rather than οὐκ ὄν, by the very fact of its relation to being, however that relation may be conceived. However, by the fact that it is disruptive to the absolute, it is, in that sense, absolute. Being, in its eternal "overcoming" of nonbeing within itself, is called "the power of being." This is a term of work as well as of structure. Nonbeing in its relation with being becomes the delimiting factor in the categories, time, space, cause, and others. It is manifest

in whatever being produces or creates.

Thus, nonbeing becomes the divisive or estranging factor vertically between essence and existence. If one may make the system simple again for the sake of clarity, this vertical estrangement shows up in the horizontal scope of creation as the estrangements of polar elements in dialectical existence. By this, Tillich seeks to account for the integral relation of discreativity with creativity in existence while also accounting for the pre-eminence of being in anything existent. The ex-istent (ἐκ ἰσινυ) stands out of being by virtue of its limitation caused by nonbeing. It stands out of nonbeing by its infusion of being. Being is preponderant here by the fact that being-itself ultimately transcends even this split between being and nonbeing. For Tillich this is the ultimate transcendence of God above God, the Name above every Name, the unlimited and unspecifiable.¹

Certain classic criticisms may be made against this type of transcendent affirmation. Most obvious among these is the suggestion that a God who is all-in-all is as incomprehensible and meaningless as nothing-in-nothing. This type of criticism may be better directed, perhaps, against certain mystical pantheisms than against Tillich's system. Tillich is led to his all-in-all by dialectical reason pursuing the trail of pre-eminent positivity which is ultimately grounded in being-itself. This positivity shines through ever loftier reaches of existence--existence which is beset by negativity. Hence, the ultimate God is correlated with that human experience of positivity over negativity which leads man to

1. It is well illustrated here that dialectic is always three-dimensional. Not only do horizontal opposites refer to each other, but height and depth hold commerce. Beyond this, height can evoke the higher, and so on ad infinitum.

belief in Him. He is the existential correlate of man's ultimate concern for being instead of nonbeing, hence, an affirmative (even if incomprehensible) all-in-all. One must ever beware here, as in Wieman, lest one portray God as everything. God is not everything but the transcendent ground of positive meaning in everything which takes negativity into itself.

ii. Wieman's continuity of creation and God

Wieman seeks a God in nature with man. He finds no need for going beyond nature to find or define this God. With Tillich, he desires a God in continuity with creation, not one in another room. This God must, from His near position, comprehend the dialectical facts of natural continuity and change, stability and novelty, constancy and growth. However, at this point, Wieman's quest seems to be, initially, more religious than Tillich's. Whereas Tillich seeks to explain initially the "something" and the "nothing" of existence, Wieman seeks to comprehend the goodness and the badness of existence. The basic feeling of man's composure for Tillich may almost be called "isness." In Wieman it is "goodness."

Although Wieman uses dialectical applications of reason from time to time, more frequently he seeks to explain the stable and dynamic aspects of life and the world in terms of process whose form is constant but whose content changes, as it must in any process. More of an axiologist than an ontologist, Wieman is interested in explaining the facts of creativity and discreativity in terms of value judgments.

Wieman finds natural factors of conflict, inertia, and destruction so rampant and aggressive in man's experience as to conclude that these must come from processes and realities set over against God. The God-

value process must be only one process within nature.¹ God is the process whereby factors of prior nature are caused to interact by an inner, organic propulsion into meaningful, concrete entities. God is the sole process for meaning and value production in nature.

There are moments when Wieman speaks of this process as if it were the sole cause or ultimate cause. At other times he calls it one causal force among many subsumed in nature. Critics have been harsh over this seeming contradiction. However, it must be remembered that where meaning and value are concerned (and here religious man is most concerned), God is the sole, ultimate cause for man. Where metaphysics is concerned, Wieman presents God as a causal process. His difficulty is that he does not clearly delineate his shifts from the language of involved axiology and religion to the language of objective metaphysics and philosophy.

Problems do arise here, nonetheless. It may be asked, Whence the minimal meaning and value (or structured disvalue) necessary for these other forces or factors in nature to exist? Wieman states distinctly that it does not come from God. But in Wieman's system God is the only giver of form and meaning. One may argue, after the fashion of Tillich and

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1. It may be asked how Wieman can prove that the value process is only one instead of many. As explained earlier, Wieman sees both a multi-form and a unitary aspect in value process. However, since good (meaning, value) by definition seems to be an integrating, structuring, relating, and unifying factor in any series of fact-events where it is found, it may be assumed quite readily that the good process, God, is one. The question may also be asked as to how Wieman knows the dis-creative is many rather than one. Actually the answer is just the reverse of the one just given. It may be noted that ever since the introduction of Hegelian dialectic, the unitary and the multiform can be one, hence the question loses its absolute import in twentieth-century thought. It becomes a matter of emphasis more than logical distinction. Thus, the "principalities and powers" of negativity may be called by many names or by one. Man has shifted back and forth in this choice since the beginning of thought.

Lewis, that negative factors derive their form from the creative factors on which they are somewhat parasitic. Wieman notes this too. But he then goes on to say that discreative forces have independent status apart from the creative. They have some minimal form as energy qua energy. But this givenness of form still calls for explanation.

Secondly, whence the basic integrating power behind, or in, or among the several processes of nature holding them in such continuity of meaning and existence that they can even conflict with the God-process? Wieman names this "over-allness" nature, but denomination is not explanation. What binds together the stage of conflict? What holds nature together as a single whole if it be constituted by independent powers of opposition? Tillich has said much more than Wieman about the unifying ground of reality, although there is much mystery admitted here in Tillich. Lewis, as will be seen, is as vague as Wieman at this point.

A third question is similar to the second, yet a bit deeper. On what common basis can creativity and obtuse forces and factors of nature relate to each other? Tillich has the transcendent pervasiveness of the ground of being holding all antithetical facts in correlation. Lewis has his "residual" nexus. When in the Timaeus Plato's Demiurge meets with the receptacle, the receptacle is found to be more capable of rational form than it seemed to be at first--so amenable to rational form that Plato's God can "persuade" it to do His will. The question here is, What is the common basis for rational persuasion or even compulsion by the creative God on other forces and factors in Wieman's theory? Wieman's common modicum in which opposites exist is "nature," to which he fails to give comprehensive, prior structure (as did Whitehead with his theory of a primordial God) to comprehend and sustain the "dialectic" of independent

good and evil.

Again, one must ask, Whence comes sufficient priority of meaning and value in Wieman's system to account for the fact that anything structural inheres in the world? Tillich has gone to great, perhaps too great lengths to account for this. Wieman makes an elaborate case for the indestructibility (if not the "inobstructibility") of that which is creative. The creative is never self-contained within any creation, hence, it is incapable of total rout by that which destroys creation. Yet this theory, valuable as it is, does not offer the priority or even the predominance of creativity, meaning, and value necessary for the maintenance of the orderly world which man does in fact find. In Wieman's system the divine seems incapable of the predominant meaning in man's world. This above all, perhaps--the priority of meaning and value--was the value of Whitehead's primordial God, and, in a retroactive sense, of his consequent deity also.

iii. Lewis' God of dualistic struggle

Edwin Lewis has sought to avoid certain ones of these problems (just noted in Wieman) in the formulation of his theory. This is true even though Lewis has said very little about these problems in any explicit way. Lewis, with Wieman, has seen the forces of discreativity as quite alien to God, independent, and powerful. Thus Lewis feels that only a dualistic hypothesis can meet the facts. However, he has realized the need for a common meeting ground for ontological ultimates. In a rather incomplete way he has sought to offer this in his theory. The Creator and Adversary are self-differentiations, along with the residue, from a single source. It is regrettable that Lewis never explains this principle of self-differentiation. This would require a "second-mile" kind of ontology

beyond his metaphysical analysis of creation. However, many things seem implicit in Lewis' system. Lewis sees the residue or residual constant as a meeting ground for the efforts of Creator and Adversary. The Adversary can attack only what the Creator forms from the residue. It is very interesting that in one passing phrase Lewis says that the residue is called by this name because it is what is left over from the original, ontic stuff from whose self-differentiation came Creator and Adversary. The residue is that aspect of the primordial reality which did not enter into the differentiation either of Creator or Adversary.¹ This seems highly suggestive of the fact that the residue is the one common (even ancestral) tie which Creator and Adversary still have with their original togetherness. Thus it is a kind of retroactive as well as present nexus for their opposition. This is never explicit, but quite readily implicit in Lewis.

In the present sense of positive-negative opposition, Lewis stands with Tillich to say that negative power (though somehow possessing independent initiative) derives actualized discreative form and meaning parasitically from the positive good it destroys or limits. This not only offers a meeting ground for the Yes and the No of life, but also gives some priority to the Yes in life. Thus, it may be said that Lewis has more priority for meaning than Wieman, though less than Tillich. As was described earlier at some length, only the Creator can create from the residue. This residue is from a common source with the Creator, hence, malleable or "impressionable" by it. Now the Adversary's attack is always logically subsequent to creation, since the Adversary is only self-

1. Lewis, The Creator and the Adversary, p. 143.

actualized by its evil work on creation. Lewis seems to see here what Wieman ignores. The discreative cannot create or characterize anything that the creative did not first make, since any negative creation is an absurd monstrosity in which discreativity and divisiveness are supposed to characterize some existent reality. Such a self-divided creation could never congeal. Since, in Lewis, the negative is only actualized by its attack on the positive creation, its life, as well as all life, is dependent on some predominance of the meaningful stuff it attacks.

However, one thing that Lewis does not seem to realize is that he gives no explanation for the ontological unity of the Adversary. Just as no totally negative creation can survive, serious doubt is cast on the capacity of a totally discreative agency to survive if that agency does not derive its unity from the Creator--which it certainly does not in Lewis. Lewis posits an Adversary and meaningfully describes his functions. However, Lewis fails to explain, or give any coherent account of, such unity of negative function. This is a problem that Wieman sees very clearly as he refuses to attribute to a single agency factors of discreativity in existence.

Wieman, Tillich and Lewis seek to present grounds for the priority of good in the world. Whenever they use the language of devotion and redemption, they unite to say that the stabbing pains of evil are the promising cry of a prior good under attack. However, it must be said that Wieman's ontology (in which forces responsible for evil have independent status) does not comprehensively support this at all. Again, it must be said that Lewis does not go as far as Tillich to comprehend the preponderant positive power in the universe (particularly at the point of explaining that structural unity in which the ground of evil exists), but he

does go a good deal farther than Wieman. On the relative scale of consistency with facts, Lewis' ratio of good to evil, Yes to No, does, nonetheless, appear to be realistic.

iv. Further critical comparisons

(1) The problematic nature of God in Wieman and Tillich.---At this point critical comparison of the nature of God in the thought of Wieman and Tillich will be made before further consideration is given to Lewis' theory of God. This is because of certain similarities to be found in the concepts of Wieman and Tillich.

Wieman calls his God "process," "growth," "interaction," "concretion," and the like. These are all dynamic, operational, or behavioristic terms. Although he is within the circle of naturalism, Wieman moves in the direction of Hegelian terminology to suggest that the absolute is progress, the absolute is what He does, He is his manifestation. God is not behind but is process. Now it is hard to conceive of process, growth, or interaction as substantives. This is the problem of the dynamic vocabulary of Mead, Dewey, Whitehead, and, perhaps, Watson. Wieman claims, for instance, that one does not love a person. Rather, he loves the interaction he has with the person. Hence, man loves interactions.¹ There seem to be as many affirmers as rejectors of such a theory. The question in this instance is whether it is personality, the stable agency, which causes interaction, or vice versa.

To call God a process is to state His species and genera, yet species and genera apply to abiding entities. God is an event or a system of point-moment events, but not a continuing entity. To say that God

1. Wieman, Is There a God?, pp. 17-18.

is what He does is, as Dubs once put it, to say "light is what makes the light shine."¹ It illustrates but does not reveal the power. It does seem that interaction demands fairly stable objects to interact. At the other end, it does seem that a permanent causal object or agency is needed to produce, explain, and comprehensively to integrate the systematic nature of the interaction. For instance, Wieman calls God "the possibility of the Greatest Value." This is a futuristic concept of God. Now what stable entity insures this futurity against inconsistency or dissipation?

Now this fact, that it is questionable whether Wieman's God is an identifiable entity, might serve to recommend Wieman's theory to Tillich. Tillich vehemently demands that God not be construed as an identifiable object, but as the stable ground of all objects and subjects. Wieman, to the contrary, has suggested here that God is an identifiable, specifiable object (a process). However, at this point Wieman, with Tillich, starts calling his God the generative ground of subject and object, vastly beyond man's capacity to comprehend, fathom, or anticipate. By this, Wieman makes his so-called specifiable God as unobjectifiable as Tillich's being. Actually Wieman and Tillich are close here. Wieman has a scaled-down version of Tillich's non-objectifiable deity. However, criticism holds better with Wieman than with Tillich, since Tillich always claims that his God is abysmally removed from epistemic discovery. Opposed to this, Wieman after calling his God scientifically identifiable, has reduced or elevated Him to the status of the unobjectifiable. It is highly questionable whether science can deal with, or identify, the unobjectifiable ground of subject and object.

1. Homer H. Dubs, "Religious Naturalism--An Evaluation," The Journal of Religion, XXIII (Oct., 1943), 259.

Wieman moves with Tillich to call God superpersonal and super-mental, beyond all human capacity to predict or fully to comprehend, since men are personal and mental. It is questionable at this point just how superhuman Wieman's God can get without becoming supernatural. Nature surely transcends its traditional definition when it includes a superhuman God whose process is by definition beyond all human comprehension and anticipation. When Wieman says that God is above mind and personality, yet in the inclusive sense of being revealed in them, he sounds very much like Tillich, who states that God transcends existence but is revealed in it. Yet, Wieman, as a theistic naturalist, should not sound this way. Again, at times, Wieman seems to have a scale-model version of Tillich's system, including a depth of reason; a non-objectifiable ground of meaning, subject and object; a God above-yet-in persons and mind; a rational quest answerable by revelation; and, as will be seen, an abhorrence for the idolatry of the created.

The unexpected stature of Wieman's God becomes even more obvious when one deals with the purposiveness and directionality of God. Tillich's God has a dimension of purpose. So has Lewis' God, as will be shown. For these thinkers, purposiveness (initiatory and consistent self-conscious directionality) is a prime aspect of transcendence (self-and-nature-transcendence) in God just as it is in human beings. In a sense, purpose stands over the process it directs. Thus purpose in a naturalistic process is enough of a factor on which to base arguments for supernature. One may choose to argue, instead, for Tillichian transcendence. This, however, is not too different from supernature in this connection, unless one should have a very naive, compartmental or layer-cake concept of the supernatural. Only by such naïveté may one sever the connective lines

between being and existence, which Tillich seeks to preserve.

Interestingly enough at this point, Wieman denies to God the capacity for conscious, self-transcendent purposiveness. To allow this would be to let the camel's nose of transcendence into the tent of naturalism. This denial of divine purpose in Wieman has been harshly criticized. God becomes a flowing river without directive or a hurtling locomotive without an engineer. Charles Clayton Morrison has put it this way: "Does God know what He is doing? If He does, He transcends all His works."¹ Wieman's God does not. He not only lacks purpose as a factor standing out of process, but he lacks self-consciousness per se. One may argue for internal, Aristotelian, entelechy-like purpose, or an internal telos in process, but self-consciousness, once denied, can hardly find a substitute. Up to this point God has been given a behavioristic definition, as was man in the middle nineteen-thirties. This may easily be interpreted as Wieman's decapitation of the Godhead whereby conscious, purposive agency is lost and only the truncated behavior of the divine survives.

However, it must be remembered that Wieman seeks not to call God devoid of purpose, mind, or personality, but to call Him a process which transcends or inclusively outstrips all of these. It may seem at first glance that Whitehead's Process and Reality has lost meaning in the fact that Wieman has lopped off reality and kept process alone. Yet Wieman has sought to incorporate in process all that reality had and more. It is one thing to hypothesize that God is in nature; it is another to confine Him there. If sheer personality, mentality, purposiveness, or self-transcendence on the part of God puts Him in danger of being supernatural,

1. Charles Clayton Morrison, Review of The Source of Human Good, H. N. Wieman, The Christian Century, LXIII (Nov. 13, 1946), 1375.

what must Wieman's "process" do to God's natural status when Wieman claims that process inclusively transcends all of these? Surely God begins to achieve dimensions of Tillich's abyss and mystery. When process outstrips mind, and is so complex that the totality of sciences cannot comprehend it, and is so qualitatively deep that only worshipful mysticism begins to sense it, who is Wieman to say that God is no more than nature--that the whole of the divine is, in a sense, not more than the sum of its naturalistic ingredients? Wieman cannot coherently prove his naturalistic presupposition of the exclusive immanence of God.

(2) Critical comparison with Lewis' specifiable, working God.--

Lewis also uses dynamic, behavioral language. And it must be said that his emphasis is more on what God does than on what God is. However, by giving God the capacity of conscious purpose, hope, and suffering he does imply strongly what God is. God is very much like His creature, like man who is made in God's image. Apart from any consideration yet of the need for a stable, conscious God for the sake of availability in worship, it may be said, on the basis of consistent metaphysics alone, that if man is a stable entity and he is in God's image, God must be a stable entity too. The Creator can hardly create what is utterly unlike Himself. Wherever God is characterized as being only what He does, and it is said, as by Wieman, that the creation of personality is the highest work He ever does, then it is only consistent to say that God is in man's image. What He does cannot, for Wieman, be the image of what God is. Rather, what God does and is are one, with all emphasis given to the former. Hence God is in the image of His doing, His creation, man.

If the ad hominem suggestion be admissible, the God of Wieman has turned out to be very transcendent over the natural realm of the

empirical sciences (sciences which operate by personality through structures which are mental and not supra-mental). Thus He seems to be, truly, a God molded more by Wieman's hypothesis than by scientific evidence. In this, too, God is somewhat in the image of His man, Wieman.

Tillich, on the other hand, never ceases to stress the dimension of the consistent nature of God which is in correlation to His works. However, it is in Lewis that the nature of God becomes really specifiable, since Lewis feels it to be no sin to make God an identifiable object, in the supernatural-natural context. Though Lewis writes no extended epistemology, his system logically presupposes God to be the coordinator of the subject-object series. Hence, God is a fact more basic than either subject or object in the human context. Nevertheless, Lewis will not go so far as Tillich to say that God can in no sense be objectified. It seems to be presupposed in Lewis' thought that if man be a creation of God, set free and given some independence from his source (as a free center of will, thought, and feeling), and if the stick-and-stone world be set over against its Creator to a degree sufficient to escape pantheism, then God is an object. God is, in some sense, beside, as well as behind, over, and in His creation. Even if He be a Thou-subject to man, He is an object. Without going too far afield into God's availability, it must be admitted that the sheer psychology of worship--humble approach, adoration, confession, thanksgiving, communion--does objectify God in a real sense. This is true even though man backs up from that greater Object to realize that the Object is the very ground of the I-Thou encounter itself. Nothing short of this much objectification can coherently save man from mystical absorption and union in God as opposed to confrontation and communion with God.

God, in Lewis' thought, has a dimension of mind with consistent purposiveness. Ultimate stability of any other sort than rational purposiveness is of a lesser type than that belonging to man. It is only determinate fixity and inanimate rigidity. One senses that Tillich feels this keenly too in his persistent symbol of a personal God. Symbols, for Tillich, participate in the reality to which they refer. And Wieman does feel this to the extent of allowing personal symbols of God for worship, as will be seen in the study of religious significance, but he has no theory of the symbol which moves it into reality as do the theories of Lewis and Tillich.

Wieman has made a valiant effort to show that the functions given God in ontology outstrip mind and personality. (He may have failed to note that they may outstrip nature too.) In naturalism, where higher is based on lower, that which "transcends" or "outstrips" personality, mind, and specificity is not necessarily above man but may be below man. Even in Tillich, who would substitute "depth" for supernature, causal reality is more like a groundswell from below than a pull from above. This is, perhaps, why some have called him a naturalist. Tillich and Wieman both remain open to the charge that reality from below may transcend man in terms of power while falling short of man in terms of quality and value. This would offer an excellent metaphysics for comprehending natural evil in which man suffered the effects of blind powers loose in his world. But it would fail to comprehend man's religious experience of value and his quest for redemption. Nevertheless, one must beware of a God of nature or "depth." The overtones of value in this conception put it at a certain disadvantage in the presence of a God of heaven or valuational "height." This is to say that if God is above man His transcendence must

be in terms which man considers "above" himself, in terms of personal values, not just in terms of power and mystery. Lewis seems to meet this demand most explicitly.

4. The Nature of Value and the Conception of Evil

Aspects of the theories of value by the three thinkers of this dissertation will now be critically compared. Theories will be considered for their capacities to define value in such a way as to make intelligible man's experiences of negativity and redemption. The way in which theories presented explain the entrance of evil into the creation and the complex nature of man's experience of evil will also be examined. Finally, consideration will be given to the capacities of theories to define the ultimate ground and status of value and to suggest the ultimate relationship of the value and power, or goodness and power, of God.

1. The nature of value in the life of man

For all three thinkers, values are both subjective and objective. That is, values must be values for man--desired by man. Likewise, values are objective, being more than relativistic constructs from human whim. For all three thinkers, the criterion of true value is the self-fulfillment of the individual in terms of the integrated growth of his creative personality. For human values to be realized, first, man must be brought to desire them (and this is seen by all three as a function of the grace of God), and, second, the conditions for their realization must exist.

All three thinkers see man as a creation of God. God seeks to bring forth in man free personality capable of reverencing its creator. The implications of such reverence run all the way from mystical worship to ethical human fellowship (these being products of the divine work or

purpose). Man has broad areas of freedom in his response to the creator.

He may choose to give greater attention to the exclusive and disproportionate satisfaction of certain departmentalized urges or appetites within himself than to the satisfaction of his total self (which requires the harmonious and integrated fulfillment of lesser appetites). Man's total self-fulfillment can be satisfied only out of a right relation with God. Departmental urges can be satisfied by much less than God--by all kinds of idolatries. When these lesser desires in their quest for satisfaction are allowed to override the welfare of the total self--when they are allowed to conflict with one another--then personality disintegrates.

This is not to say that departmental appetites are evil. The three thinkers of this dissertation are saying, rather, that the true value of their satisfaction comes in their being satisfied in such a proportionate way as not to conflict with, override, or tear down other aspects of personality. In other words, only when the health, wholeness, and growth of the total personality is consistently achieved in the fulfillment of man's desires is he achieving the true values which the creator seeks to bring forth through him.

Man does not create his own, original value-constitution or that of his world. He is, according to Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich, created in a world in which values can be realized. In spite of the uniqueness of human personalities, certain values will have universal validity among men, for all men bear a constitutional likeness.

(1) Value and the creative personality, according to Wieman.--

According to Wieman, the ultimate value is that process responsible for the possibility of values in human experience. This is the creative process which inspires human interest in creative growth and value-realiza-

tion through the right adjustment of man to itself. This creative process working in man expands man's range of appreciation, understanding, and creative control in his relation with nature and persons. Whatever subserves this "creative interaction," as Wieman calls it, is somehow redeemed by its function in this larger achievement. For instance, man, whose personality is so often divided against itself in its present value-desires, affections, and idolatries, may be quite incapable of seeing his own "illness." Only grace can open the eyes of man. However, it is often the case that suffering, frustration, the death of a loved one, or one's own threatened death (for which man may or may not be responsible) creates a breach in man's disintegrated self-sufficiency. Through this breach grace may come. That is, man may then be led to question, and, perhaps, even confess and repent of his divided self which has been nourished on idolatries. In such instances, the deity is able to move into the self (which was formerly disintegrated and static by its idolatrous love of created goods) and bring forth in that life the ultimate value. This is the value of reverence and love for the creative process which unites creation in meaningful interrelation and organic growth. Man comes to participate in those activities of creative process which bring forth mutual growth, support, and meaning among elements of the self and world.

(2) Value and man's relation to being, according to Tillich.--

Tillich's thought is not utterly unlike Wieman's. The breach in man's self-satisfaction through which grace may come is man's experience of dissatisfaction with the idols of finite creation over which "departments" of his disunified personality have fought for possession. Man's total personality finds its ultimate value in the experience of the depth of

reality which seeks to reunite with itself the affections of man which have become estranged. Rooted in reality is man's essential self--a self grounded in being. Thus, the ultimate value for man is concern for being which transcends those liabilities of pain, death, doubt, and dissatisfaction associated with finite creations. In this view of life, again, man's experiences of suffering and death--his experiences of frustrating limitation and separation from his essential self--are recognized as evils. They are evils rooted in nonbeing. However, this is nonbeing which not only exists in being-itself or God, but which is overcome to become the limiting function in meaningful creation. The New Being in Jesus Christ is an expression of human life so involved in being or God as to bear and overcome evil or nonbeing. It is an expression in finitude of the ultimate relation of being over nonbeing.

The more nonbeing creation can take into itself, the greater its value. That is to say, on the one hand, the more nonbeing present in creation in terms of the limitations and potentialities involved in its complexity of structure and life, the greater its value. On the other hand, the more nonbeing (expressed as anxiety, guilt, and doubt) which a creature can take into himself and still not despair but "contain" it as an internal critique on his pre-eminent confidence in God (life, righteousness, and truth based on God), the more value is forthcoming from the creature. Jesus Christ as the New Being is the personified criterion of such value possible in man.

(3) Value and the imitation of Christ, according to Lewis.--Lewis holds that Jesus Christ is God's revelation to man of those values which God seeks to perfect in His creatures. These are values of self-giving love toward God and man. This is the self-giving love of God by which He

creates, sustains, and redeems the world. These values were seen in the life of Jesus Christ insofar as a human person can realize them. They are not ready-tailored for all men and situations. They must be interpreted within the context of Christ's life and world and reinterpreted to suit man's continuing circumstances. Man finds these values in a kind of imitatio Christi which is also an imitatio Dei. Lewis holds that this self-giving love of God seen in Jesus Christ by which human personality moves toward fulfillment is nothing which can be commanded in man. Rather, as is the case in the thought of Tillich and Wieman, it is the grace of God which moves through creation (a creation meant to find culmination in the creature's love of God but contaminated by the Adversary) and seeks to bring man to the realization of his potential self. Man becomes most receptive to this grace when dissatisfied with the passions and possessions which have possessed him, frustrated his growth, and threatened his destruction.

(4) Comparative considerations.--In all of this comparative discussion it must be noted that disvalues in human experience are not considered here to be "values at last" because of the grace of God which they may occasion. Death and doubt, suffering and dissatisfactions are not always redeemed. Man may be destroyed by them or permanently disabled by them. Then they are clearly evils. Sometimes they are redeemed, but even then they are still evils, else they would not require redemption. The key insight in all three thinkers seems to be given equal support and emphasis by them. This is the insight that only the grace of God can explain man's and the world's value-constitution as well as man's awakening from idolatrous blindness (where true value is concerned) to an awareness and craving for true value in God.

All three thinkers define values as ideal states, conditions, possessions, or aspects of personality. Values are personal. Likewise, the grace of God which motivates man's concern for values is a grace which is in a sense personal. It is grace which operates in and through personality to find fulfillment in the fulfillment of personality.

It would seem that the creator and sustainer of such values, as well as the motivator of man toward value, would have to be described as being somehow personal. Tillich has moved in this direction to speak of God as symbolically personal. Wieman has moved in this direction to call God inclusively more than personal. However, Lewis has come the closest to describing God and speaking of God as personal. Man is in some sense made in God's image. Thus, he has given the most explicitly coherent structure of deity for the creation and support of value (for personality) as well as for the motivation of personalities toward value by grace. Although Lewis is never able to explain the ontological unity of the Adversary, as noted above, Lewis defines the Adversary, too, as a negatively personal being since only by this, he feels, can the Adversary oppose in God or man values which are personal. All of this leads into metaphysical considerations to be made below.

ii. The complexity of evil in human experience

It is difficult to find an experience destructive of human personality in which some elements of human responsibility and some elements of natural necessity are not present. That is, it is difficult to find in the experience of man an instance of moral evil in which natural or constitutional circumstances of limitation or compulsion do not play some "culpable" role. It is also hard to find an incident characterized in the main as natural evil in which human responsibility is not a factor of neglect, thoughtlessness, or, perhaps, conscious desire. Metaphysical evil also enters the discussion. Man searches the heavens to comprehend

his ills, whether by Shakespeare's "excellent foppery" of astrology or insightful speculation. Man seeks to comprehend those agencies and powers over him which are responsible for evil--metaphysical evils.

(1) Tillich's comprehension of the existential complexity of evil.--Tillich's concept of the fall, as an admixture of man's freedom and destiny with subsequent questions which call down revelation, does recognize the admixture of evils which man experiences. Destiny in Tillich is determinateness, not determinedness. It is the determinate nature necessary for any free creature ("finite freedom"). Man is set as a finitely free creature in a natural world of things visible and invisible. Whenever man allows this natural dimension to become his ultimate concern and prime mover he commits idolatry. He separates himself intentionally from the ground of being to which he is still bound by the connection which keeps him a living spirit. Now there is much in man's self-centered natural constitution which may lead him to this idolatry. Again, for Tillich, there are physical evil, pain and death which are the natural implications of creaturely finitude. Tillich sees even the meaninglessness and futility of early death, insanity, etc. as mysterious, yet, somehow, expressions of the natural negativity of finite existence.¹ The factor ultimately responsible for this is nonbeing. This is the element of limitation in God's creativity. This nonbeing takes on positive or "demonic" status and impetus when man focuses his concern and worship on the creation it infects. Included in this is man's overconcern with himself, for he, too, as a creature, is infected with nonbeing. Without man's initiative, nonbeing is an element of inertia. With man's initiative and freedom added to it, nonbeing becomes demonic. In this, man invests himself in his own destruction, commits himself to the natural body of sin and death, moral and natural evil.

1. Ibid., pp. 269-270.

(2) Convergences of natural and moral evil in Wieman's theory.---

Wieman, in his metaphors of the creative and created, seeks to say what Tillich has said with the metaphor of being and existence. Wieman sees with Tillich man's idolatry of the created as an ultimate mingling of moral and natural evil. Man's natural constitution best equips him for the static, dogmatic love of present self and things rather than the creative process. Man who is a creation gives the natural creation his responsible vote, makes it his first love, and creation becomes demonic. Wieman operates on the linear metaphor of creativity versus the created. Tillich operates on the depth-dimension of being versus existence. In both, the lesser comes from the higher but is in some sense separated from it. Lewis uses the analogy of creator-created to the same end in more personal terms. Not much functional difference exists at this point between the superhuman of Wieman, the supernatural of Lewis, and the "depth" of Tillich.

Besides a theological structure of lower "created" entities based on higher "creative" process, Wieman also has a naturalistic theory of higher creation based on lower. Thus Wieman can construct an elaborate theory of inertia and protective hierarchy from below. Spiritual creation has feet of clay. Likewise, he gives independent status to brutish powers in nature which are realized in all forms of natural catastrophes, both in and around man. Evil is active and dynamic as well as limiting and inertial. This does seem like a comprehensive recognition of the fact of evil which is, at times, limitation, and, at other times, dynamic destruction (quite apart from any human will which makes evil demonic). Evil which is outside of God comes as adversary and limitation both for man and God. The plights of man and God are not dissimilar here, except

for the fact that only with man can evil creep inside to transform his positive will into the demonic.

(3) Lewis' structure of cosmic struggle to comprehend the felt content of natural evil.--On the basis of similar considerations, Lewis has conceived of evil as an independent aggressor on God and man. As in the other two theologians, evil becomes manifest in creation. In other words, it is not capable of infecting or diluting the positive nature of the creator. Its capability is to destroy creation or, at best, delay the creator. In Lewis' system one is especially impressed with a sense of cosmic struggle. Against such a background man seems like a rather inconsequential agent for either good or evil, considering the gigantic battle of the Titans in the background. As in the thought of Tillich and Wieman, Lewis sees man as an incomplete creation seeking completion, as a free creature much more molded than molding. Man is a creature of the good (God cannot create what is contrary to His own nature), but he is attacked and infected by evil. He is like Phillips Brooks' child of God on whom the devil has laid his hands. Man's power to resist the titanic force(s) of evil must come from God. Man cannot rise against adversaries which tower infinitely over him except by the grace of an infinite God.

Lewis' drama of creation and fall (cosmic conflict and infected creation) predates man logically and temporally. This is not unlike certain orthodox theories which account for natural evil not by the fall of Adam but by the fall of Lucifer prior to man.¹ For those who would not see the experience of existent man as the standard of judgment for

1. Cf. Dom Bruno Webb, Why Does God Permit Evil? (New York: P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1941).

good and evil, this helps to explain the fact that natural evils like tidal waves and animal diseases do, in a sense, predate man. This is not totally unlike Berdyaev's pre-existent fall of man the spirit.¹

One gets in Lewis something lacking in the theories of Tillich and Wieman for the comprehension of natural evil, namely, the existential flavor of Titanic forces wrestling over man. This is descriptive of an authentic feeling man does have in instances of natural evil. Systems bordering on pure voluntarism, which claim that all evil is sin or consequence of sin, do not meet this felt experience of man. In the instances of evil in which natural evil predominates, man feels that greater powers than his are lashing out against what is good and holy. This is the experience underlying man's ageless conceptions of devils, demons, and demon possession. These are powers which he has not voluntarily joined in every instance of his existential self-fulfillment, as Tillich claims. These are not mere forces of blind brutishness, as Wieman suggests. They are powers which undercut or pervert the most intricate biological, mental, spiritual, and social structures of personality. The aggressor here seems

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1. The problem of human freedom--man's responsible capacity either to sin or respond to the grace of God--is not explicitly solved by any of the three thinkers. In Tillich, freedom is a kind of "emanated" or delegated initiative in a "centered being"--man. Yet, man is so involved in that structure of creation which necessitates the fall and so "grasped" by grace which engulfs him when he despairs of his condition that necessity appears to be predominant here. Man is not an independent creation of God. He is produced out of being and nonbeing in God, and ever exists in God, in such a fashion that God is never to be objectively referred to by man.

In Wieman, although God has not such status as in Tillich, man more or less emanates from God. Freedom is creative process passing through a self-transcendent being. Yet, this self-transcendent being cannot transcend the process passing through him, nor can he escape his static affinity to created good which he, himself, happens to be. Freedom is grace, and sin is occasioned by the sheer fact that the product of creative good is created good.

In Lewis, too, the fall predates man and the battle of the Titans is beyond human responsibility. However, in Lewis, man is a being

to be a kind of adverse, personal being or power. Man feels predominantly (though perhaps not totally) not responsible for this power over or in his life. Man's sober interpretation of such powers seems authenticated by the kind of suffering he bears. Neither the suffering nor the interpretation seems capable of being explained away as illusion or delusion.

It is Lewis' concept of the Adversary which provides a more meaningful ground for this kind of natural evil suggested above than do the theories of Wieman or Tillich. (This is true in spite of Lewis' inadequate explanation of the ontological unity of the Adversary.) Likewise, it is most clearly capable of underlying that Christian theory of redemption noted earlier (and to be noted again in the next chapter) in which God through Jesus Christ is conceived of as a victor over adverse agencies or the adverse agent in the universe.

iii. The ultimate nature and status of value

All three thinkers have made some attempt to call the creation basically good but existentially fallen and ambiguous. It is well to consider now the source of this positive priority they seek by a further consideration of the ultimate nature and status of value.

(1) Tillich's ontological basis and nature of value.--Tillich is an ontologist more than an axiologist. Thus, for him the primary category of reality is being, not value. Structure or meaning is derived from being-itself, and, in turn, value is somehow derived from structure. Thus value is twice removed from reality. Beyond this, Tillich goes on to sug-

somewhat independent from God (God being conceived of as person instead of as ground of being or creative process). Man is in God's image in Lewis, thus, his rejection or acceptance of God is more conceivable than in Tillich or Wieman. In Wieman and Tillich, one cannot finally assert that all evil is not a kind of natural or necessitated evil (even these terms being hard to explain where all existence is just what it must be) and all grace, irresistible.

gest that value concepts presuppose a split between essence and existence (a measuring of the created against its ideal source), hence values really apply only to the creaturely, finite world.¹ Now value is somehow thrice removed from reality. To use value designations for God is to speak in highly symbolic terms, according to Tillich. This seems like a polite way of saying that God's values are not man's values except by far-fetched analogy. Tillich calls the God of being "holy," but he uses the term to mean sacred or untouchable rather than morally good.² The main terms applied to God are holiness (non-moral), mystery, majesty, glory, mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, and abyss. These are terms of awful power and being, terms almost suggestive of the worship of power or the immensity of being for its own sake more than the worship of value.

In his theory of Love, Power, and Justice Tillich seeks to implant value in the heart of ontic structure. Love is the internal movement of being toward reunion with that which is "estranged" (not utterly cut off) from it. Yet, this love is very much like Empedocles' love which was but a name for the physical force of congestion among elements in creation. It is, for Tillich, the same force found controlling celestial galaxies and sunspots. It is related to the life of God only by analogy. It is related to the life of man as a force which is as efficacious, inexorable, and unresponsive to his love as the law of gravity. One may, but as a rule does not, love such forces, or call them love.

In a sense, Tillich is saying, on the existential plane, that sheer life itself is good or valuable. Perhaps so, but it is not God's

1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 202-204.

2. Ibid., pp. 216-217.

kind of value. Again, life supports the worst in existence as well as the best. As Wieman has put it, life is not good just because it is life. The greatest evil can be experienced only in life.¹ Reverence for life, in the Tillichian sense, is no guide to value, for life can be good or bad.

It seems fair to say that the religious quest of man has always been a quest for the ultimacy of value. Tillich sees philosophy as man's objective consideration of ultimate reality for its own sake. Theology is man's systematic thought about his concern for reality, in order to discern its soteriological value for himself. Although Tillich has done much work to delineate convergences between these two, it may be asked whether he has noted one convergent which is essential to the history of Christian thought. Christianity has believed that value dominates existence. Christian philosophy (in the sense acceptable to Tillichian terminology²) and theology have claimed again and again that value is as basic as being.

Value of itself seems impotent; the power of being of itself seems morally indifferent. Value and being must be co-ordinates in the idea of the absolute. To say that God is being is as tautologous as saying that existence exists. The tautology is broken only by the investment of specifiable value in God and existence. The great question, then, is whether God is good, bad, or indifferent, in terms which men can appreciate. Sheer immensity for its own sake, apart from value, is not good. It is only an ontological power politic. The Christian idea of God has usually been a blend of value and being. God has an infinite concern

1. Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment, pp. 104-105.

2. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 27-28.

for the good which He Himself is, hence He has an infinite capacity for actualizing it.

(2) The ultimacy of value in the theory of Lewis.--Edwin Lewis has sought to make value essential to the Godhead. Thus, the creation is by definition good, and this is man's kind of good. The dramatic metaphor of Creator and Adversary is as axiological as it is ontological. In fact, with the residue as the neutral and potential stuff of creation and the Adversary as potential discreativity, God is needed precisely to add the creative touch of actuality and, in doing so, to bring meaning and value into the world. Some may find the weak point in all of this to be the distance which Lewis allows between being as such (residue) and value (creator). This is the distance which gives the Adversary his chance to infect and corrupt whatever is created of residual being while yet staying a safe distance from the value-source, God. However, it may only be a loose use of words which is at fault here.

Two criticisms are usually brought against ultimate dualism. One is the inability of a believer in ultimate dualism to support the ontological unity of any ground of discreativity or negativity if that ground is totally characterized as being discreative. As noted previously, Lewis' system is weak at this point. The second criticism is against the inability of an ultimate dualist to explain the priority of value, order, and unity of coherent meaning in the universe. As noted above,¹ Lewis' theory seems strong at this point by reason of the fact that the power of the Adversary can be actualized only by attack on that which is first created and yet sustained by God's power. Also, the Adversary can neither bring forth any creation of itself nor ever totally undercut the work of the Creator.

1. Supra, pp. 85-90, 106-107, 206-209.

(3) The centrality of value in the theory of Wieman.--Wieman is very explicit. In his theory value is as basic as being. God is the supplier of meaning and value to existence. God's values are man's values; value and ultimate cause (of meaning) are one. As noted earlier, Wieman may have some difficulty presenting his God as ultimate cause. Nevertheless, he does seek to hold value basic both for epistemology and ontology.

The question may now be asked again: If God gives all meaning, insofar as the foul, ugly, and devilish have meaning, must not this come from God? Wieman strives for a No answer insofar as he allows some minimal, prior structure for all energy or force qua energy or force. But his system leans heavily in the direction of a Yes, after the pattern of Lewis and of Tillich particularly. For no matter how independent the agencies of evil may be in Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich, all three agree that they derive much of their immediate meaning and structure from the good they attack. The battle line of evil must conform to the shape of the citadel of good. Thus, in an almost parasitic sense, the form of evil can be influenced by or derived from good. This is particularly obvious when Wieman posits two kinds of evil, obstructive and destructive, to meet the two kinds of good, creative and created.

Although one must note the liabilities of words, there does appear in Wieman a strain of suggestion quite contrary to his insistence on the primacy of value. After the concept of Whitehead, Wieman says that concrete existence, or created structure, or concretion, is the basic stuff of value. Now this does tend to put existence somehow prior to, or responsible for, value.¹ Whitehead seemed very conscious of this in his

1. This moves in the direction of Tillich, who would set being prior to value. Since Wieman has no category equivalent to Tillichian being in his system, existence serves for him a very similar purpose.

version of the system when he said that the interactive constellation of concretion in this world offers more in the way of aesthetic, orderly continuity than of moral value. Whatever the case, Wieman's intention, at least, is that of traditional religion, to find value-reality. His problem is to prove that sheer organic connectedness is always value. In a sense, his problem is that of Tillich--to show why life qua life (organic interrelation) is good or value when actually it can be bearer of either good or evil quality. However, Wieman goes beyond Tillich who would agree with him that created beings given to a kind of self-idolatry can be bearers of evil quality whereas this is not the case with created beings given to the creative life of God. Wieman goes beyond Tillich by saying that the creative life of God is itself value, thus explaining why commitment to it is value.

iv. The goodness and power of God

Lewis and Wieman have met the problem of calculating the relative power and goodness of God by limiting His power of being in deference to His goodness or value. Tillich, on the other hand, has sought to maintain both God's power and his goodness entire.¹ Lewis has been very explicit in the limitation of God's being. However, his God has infinite potential power to see Him through his campaigns for value. Wieman, too, has sought to compensate for God's finite power-status by his definition of creativity. This definition of creativity offers God what William James might have called an open-ended possibility of power. Paul Tillich has limited his God from within by nonbeing. But, as with Brightman,

1. The problem arises again as to whether the kinds of values Tillich finds in God (majesty, mystery, holiness) are far enough removed from categories of power to be values at all.

this is limitation within an infinite, transcendent continuum of power and goodness.

It might be said that while Wieman and Lewis preserve God's goodness at the price of His power, Tillich, trying to preserve both His goodness and power, actually maintains neither. Tillich's categories of God-values belong more to ontology than to axiology. Somehow, God's ultimate values are indifferent to human value-perception. It is interesting to note how Wieman and Lewis, working for a value-definition of God, are willing to admit that a value-Absolute is in some sense limited by, or involved in, the values He supports. Tillich, in the search for an unlimited God above God, seeks an ontological rather than a value-definition. He apparently feels that being-itself is the category which can best underlie existence without being finally limited or sullied by it. On the other hand, a value-producing God cannot produce value without being somehow intent on, or involved in, and limited by, such values.

Yet, one may speculate on what Tillich's category of nonbeing as related to the living God really accomplishes. Nonbeing is quite obviously a dimension of limitation on the power of being, no matter how "eternally" God "overcomes" it. Thus, God is limited somehow by his involvement with the career of overcoming negativity. Secondly, as spelled out by Tillich, nonbeing is the root of all disvalue seen in creation. Thus, whether God's values ultimately be man's or not, He is somehow involved in His creation to the extent that nonbeing for Him is negativity for man. In this manner, God's goodness is limited, whether symbolically, by analogia entis, or actuality. Thus it may just be that Tillich, who seeks the God who is all-powerful and all-good, creates a hypothesis in which God is limited both in power and in goodness. In this, Tillich's God above God

is not coherently supported in Tillich's system. Thus, He is not, in any intelligible sense, as much of a God as the Gods of Wieman and Lewis who are all-good and very powerful.

5. Summary and Conclusions

1) Edwin Lewis, the only avowed supernaturalist among the thinkers considered, has succeeded in offering what is, perhaps, the most explicit description of God of the theories considered. He has done this by a kind of "descriptive" (rather than evocative or "participatory") symbolism. God, who is in some sense objectifiable by human reason, is described in terms which, for the most part, are not "supra-mental" or "superpersonal." It is true that the exact relation of Creator, residue, and Adversary is never fully spelled out, yet it is described in what might be called highly anthropic terms. Lewis consistently supports his claim that ultimate reality is intelligible to human reason, therefore, an ultimate solution to the problem of evil is possible.

On the other hand, Wieman's God, at first held to be available to empirical sciences, finally turns out to be a God who transcends them as the very process which produces and correlates subjects and objects. Thus God must stand in as well as beyond subject-object relations, while being neither one nor the other. This is not utterly unlike Tillich's concept that the ground of being which underlies and correlates the knower and the known must transcend the categories of knower and known. In a very real sense, such a God becomes unknowable, hence, the ultimate solution to the problem of evil is a mystery.

2) Wieman, the theistic naturalist and champion of scientific reason, does, after all, have concepts in his theory of knowledge best

characterized as concepts of "revelation." The God whom Wieman claims to know by empirical sciences finally turns out to transcend structures of personality and mind, being their very basis. The basic drive for knowledge in the subject is called "faith" which is here a kind of propulsive interest in values. This faith is induced in man by "grace" according to Wieman. This can only mean that God transcends the sum of scientific knowledge as the very condition for the existence of scientific knowledge. It is He who prompts human interest (faith) in what man is able to know. In this sense, knowledge "comes to" man from a source which is ultimately supra-mental and superpersonal, and whose creativity, according to Wieman, cannot be anticipated. Knowledge of such a God seems to be "given" or "revealed" much more than discovered. Thus, Wieman finally comes to join Tillich and Lewis who hold that human reason is in some sense fulfilled, or found to relate to God, by revelation.

3) All three men agree that the negative experiences of finite man are not illusions. Indeed, they are somehow pedagogical in the sense that they cause man to look beyond his experience to explain it, find redemption for it, or be saved from it. Now it is revelation which in some sense fulfills reason in this quest. It is doubtful whether revelation offers original information in any of the thinkers considered. Revelation does give illumination or confirmation to the belief that the polarities, contrarities, and negativities of life, whether purely existential as in Tillich or quite ultimate as in Wieman or Lewis, are meaningfully related in the larger being and work of God in which they can be overcome or redeemed.

4) There is the problem of the ultimate relation of God and the force(s) of evil in all three thinkers, since all three hold that the

negativities and contrarities of human experience are real (not finite illusion) and suggest a factor of opposition or limitation on God. Tillich seeks to preserve the priority of good (or positive being) in his concept of the universe by giving God abysmal transcendence over every limitation or power of contradiction. Yet, this is an assertion the meaning of which is never spelled out, nor can it be by the principles of Tillich's epistemology.

Lewis gives priority to the Creator by reason of His creative priority in the struggle with the Adversary. God creates, somehow knowing His creation will face attack, thus He has the first word as to the shape of creation. The Adversary cannot create or be actualized on its own. Also, God has great potential power to redeem what He creates. Indeed, creation which gets past the first onslaught of discreativity to develop or grow at all suggests some priority of the Creator's power which must redeem as well as create if creation under attack is to survive or continue. Of course, the priority of creative power here is not so great that the creative struggle does not contain in it elements of risk. Such elements of risk can only be courageously faced by man by faith in the Christological victory to be considered in the next chapter.

A serious question has been noted as to whether Wieman's God, as a process in nature, can stand as ground for the priority of meaningful existence and value in the world. It is strongly doubted that He can.

The question of the relation of God to forces which oppose Him is also the question of what binds reality into one meaningful whole in which forces of opposition can be related at all. Tillich has sought to relate being and nonbeing, but, by the terms of fallen human reason in his theory, this can only be done symbolically. However, he at least

posits the name of an ultimate, unifying ground of reality underlying all contrarities--being-itself.

Wieman suggests that the negative forces of nature must have some minimal, rational form (if only as energy qua energy), though he never says from whence it comes or how it relates rationally to the God-process which is supra-mental. He also sees, as does Tillich and Lewis, that evil derives actualized form parasitically from the good it attacks. But for Wieman this is a secondary consideration, since discreative forces are said to have independent status. Thus, in Wieman's thought, their relation to God is even more difficult to comprehend. One almost expects Wieman to break into the language of Tillichian dialectic to claim that the ground of negativity is related to creativity by its transcendent relation to their common ground. Though this might explain nothing, it would at least express some mysterious relation in a bravely positive way. With Tillich and Wieman one cannot see how the "living," creative God and other agencies of opposition (be they natural forces or nonbeing) relate to a larger whole which contains and binds them into relation (be this nature or being-itself). This is basically so because one is not told what "nature" and "being-itself" really are, as will be further suggested in the next summary section below.

Lewis seeks to relate the Creator and the Adversary in personalistic terms which, although held to be symbolic, are also held to be highly descriptive of what is symbolized. However, Lewis, too, fails to suggest what it is which binds Creator, Adversary, and residue into a whole in which they can be related. He suggests a kind of retroactive relation in the fact that Creator, Adversary, and residue are self-differentiations from a single source. However, no clear definition of such

a source is presented.

5) All three thinkers hold that God must be immanent in man's experience to be available and relevant to man's circumstance and need. God must also be transcendent over the human predicament of evil to transform it and not become its total victim. It is in the matter of divine transcendence that Wieman (who has defined God as scientifically discoverable in nature) rather inconsistently presents God as having unexpected stature. God transcends mind, personality, and purpose in Wieman, and transcends them in an inclusive sense. If God be raised this far above human personality structure and mentality, He becomes utterly undiscoverable by man. Again, if God transcends man by this much, then "nature" which contains this God and more must be transcendent almost to the degree of Tillich's being-itself.

In the case of Tillich and Wieman, God cannot be objectified, since He is the very ground or process for the creation, support, and correlation of subjects and objects, and He transcends personality and human mental structures by which objectification can occur. In this sense, God is ultimately indescribable and incomprehensible except by symbols which "participate" in, or evoke, this ground or process of meaningful creation which is, itself, beyond comprehension. However, all of this is far more intelligibly explicit in Tillich than in Wieman.

Lewis holds that God transcends creation and human experience, but not in the mysterious sense found in Tillich and Wieman. Man made in the image of God can rightly conceive of God and interpret ultimate reality (whether suggested by natural reason or revealed) by structures of personality and human mentality. God can be objectified and "talked about" as well as "lived in." It is interesting that although Tillich,

(the transcendent realist) has sought to hold the transcendent aspect of God in inseparable relation with His "in-the-world" aspect of immanence, and Wieman (the scientific naturalist) has sought to make this latter aspect of immanence final though somewhat unsuccessfully as seen above, it is Lewis (the admitted supernaturalist) whose God is the most comprehensible of the three theories, even in His most transcendent dimension.

6) All three thinkers have defined true value as having both subjective and objective dimensions. The criterion of value for all three is the integration and creative fulfillment of personality by right relation to God. God is the sustainer of beings and conditions which make the realization of values possible. He is also the giver of grace (not irresistible grace) to man by which man becomes interested in, or desires, true values. All three thinkers note that it is in man's experiences of disvalue that he often becomes most receptive to the grace of God which causes him to question his idolatries of false values (idolatries in the double sense that something less than man's total self is being disproportionately or exclusively satisfied by values which are not the true values ordained by God in a life which is reverent toward Him). Thus, when man repudiates his questionable idolatries he may be redeemed. In this, man becomes obedient to the grace of God which illuminates and prompts his desire for true, self-fulfilling, God-reverencing values. This is not to say that the disvalue or evil experience which occasions this change is explained away. It is still evil and must be redeemed.

Value, for all three thinkers, is a kind of personal fulfillment. Yet, there remains the problem of how values are related to the God who creates the conditions for, and prompts man's interest in, value. Tillich's God so utterly transcends personal value-structure that it is in-

conceivable how human values can be rooted in, or man's interest in value be prompted by, God. At least it must be noted that Tillich consistently asserts, in the first place, that man's values are not ultimately God's values. However, Wieman has started out by saying that man's values are God's values, but he has failed to show how this can be in the case of a superpersonal God.

Lewis comes the closest to defining God as ultimately personal. Thus, he is the most consistent in the support of his claim that God's values are of the same nature as values which fulfill personality. It is God's desire for the creation or realization of such personal values in Himself and in His children which causes Him to prompt man by grace to desire and realize true values in the world.

7) All three thinkers have some concept which might be characterized as "the Fall." Creation and conflict are correlates. Yet, although metaphysical concepts (i.e. creation) and axiological concepts (i.e. the Fall) are related, this relation varies among the theories presented. Wieman holds that concretion or the meaningful, organic relation of natural entities in the creative process is value. There is a hint here of concrete existence logically proceeding value. However, Wieman insists that God, the ultimate cause of meaningful existence, is also the ultimate cause of value.

Lewis has sought to equate creation with value by reason of the fact that God who is good (in terms of the kind of goodness found in integrated human growth and the realization of human potentialities) creates by love. All that He makes (insofar as it can be distinguished from factors of contamination caused by the Adversary) is good. In the case of Tillich, being stands logically prior to value. Value is a

category of existence, but not of being. Tillich tries to write axiological factors of love into ontology, yet these sound more like categories of power, mystery, and immensity of being. It is a question whether ontological concepts can generate axiological concepts meaningful to man, if being is conceived of as more basic than value. That which transcends man in terms of being and power, but not in terms of humanly relevant values, may only transcend him in the sense that a typhoon or a tidal wave transcends him. This cannot lead to man's devotion or reverence or comfort. Likewise, man's moral standards and endeavors lose their absolute import. Wieman and Lewis have insisted that man's values and God's values are of one fabric. Tillich cannot say this. Wieman has difficulties maintaining this. Lewis' system most explicitly supports this ultimacy of value.

8) Tillich has sought to comprehend the existential complexity of evil (i.e. the mingling of natural, moral, and metaphysical factors of evil) in human experience by his theory of "the Fall." It is difficult to see how, if creation and fall be correlates, man's moral responsibility is crucial. Yet, Tillich does present insights of an almost psychological nature to describe man's experience of self-realization (particularly in its negative aspects) in which man does in fact feel both morally responsible and "destined." Wieman has sought to show a relation of moral and natural or metaphysical evil in his concept of the idolatry of the created--a concept very much like that of Tillich by the same name. Lewis sees moral evil as a kind of less-than-total perversion of man's will by the dynamic agency of the Adversary. In this experience of moral evil with its sense of personal responsibility, there is admixed an element from the experience of natural evil. This element is the sense that man

has of great forces battling over him and in him. Lewis' highly personalistic description of the struggle of ultimate forces over and in man is meaningful. Further, it is meaningful to man who feels in this struggle of titanic forces over and in him that any redemption or salvation must be of the nature of a victory of positive power over negative power. Theoretical grounds for confidence in such a victory according to Lewis have been presented above. Grounds for this confidence on the basis of Christian faith according to Lewis will be considered in the next chapter.

9) It has been noted above that Wieman's God takes on unexpected stature when his system is carried out to its full implications. Conversely, it may be that Tillich's God loses stature. Wieman and Lewis have seen God as limited in power (although having great potential power) but not in goodness. The factor of limitation on His power exists outside God. His goodness cannot be questioned.

Tillich has sought to present a God of both infinite power and goodness. Yet, he has implanted the ground of disvalue and limitation within God. It may be that man's experience and values are different from God's, and God's experience of nonbeing very different from man's experience of negativity and limitation. Nevertheless, inasmuch as human disvalue and limitation are the existential correlates of nonbeing, then man must characterize nonbeing (if only symbolically--and Tillich claims man should never say "only a symbol" in the spirit of deprecation) as a factor which in the life of God operates as a limitation on both the goodness and power of God as man knows Him. This Tillich would never say, but this man can hardly help saying within the terms of Tillich's system insofar as it is comprehensible. It is conceivable that nonbeing could be construed within God as something which does not detract from

His goodness. Edgar Sheffield Brightman has sought to show this. But this requires careful and elaborate description which Tillich's symbolism does not permit. Thus, the vagueness of symbolism leaves Tillich open to the charge that God, insofar as He is comprehensible to man, is limited as to power and goodness.

Lewis and Wieman both define God as all-good and very powerful. However, it must be said at this point that Lewis' theory has these advantages over Wieman's. His concept of the Adversary (though admittedly problematic insofar as the ontological unity of a discreative being is concerned) allows for a clearer affirmation of truly perverse power in the universe to explain certain evil experiences of man than does Wieman's structure of inertias, protective hierarchies, and brute forces. At the same time, Lewis' God (over nature as well as in it) is a more powerful God than Wieman's God (exclusively in nature) when it comes to the explanation of the priority of meaning and value in the universe or the belief in the eventual redemption of the universe. Finally, Lewis' concept of the goodness of God in terms of divine personality-structure is much more intelligible than Wieman's concept of the goodness belonging to a superpersonal, supra-mental deity. In the thought of Lewis, God truly is, in spite of evil, all-good and very powerful. Faith in the redemption of evil or the victory over evil by the good power of God will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL COMPARISON FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE

1. Standards of Religious Significance

A coherent interpretation of the religious experience of the historical, western, Christian community (which is the community out of which the thinkers considered in this dissertation have spoken) seems to point to certain requirements for any theory of evil, and of natural evil in particular, which would serve to illuminate or interpret meaningfully the experience of religious man. Perhaps unanimous agreement could not be found among religious thinkers for any one of these requirements as presented here, and perhaps the list of requirements presented below is distinguished more by its brevity than by anything else. However, only a few requirements for a standard of the religious significance of systems are presented here. These are chosen because of their crucial relation to the problem of evil at hand rather than their central importance in the experience of the Christian community considered at large. In most cases, the elements in the standard of religious significance listed somewhat briefly below will be explained in greater length as they appear in the text of this chapter.

Religious man who faces experiences of evil in his world desires to know why as readily as nonreligious man. However, religious

man in the tradition of western, Christian theism, which is the tradition considered in this study, seeks to find a theological structure in which he can comprehend that ultimate shape of reality by which his experiences of evil may be explained. This is a theological structure by which man would comprehend reality in philosophical terms in the light of certain theistic commitments of faith generated by the religious experience of the historical Christian community.

1) The first test of religious significance or meaning in the present context is whether theological concepts for the interpretation of evil are consistent with, and serve to illuminate, those experiences destructive of man's personality and life which man calls evil. Are the evils interpreted the kinds of evils man meets? In this, it is true that ultimate structures and powers responsible for experiences which man calls good or evil must be so related as to explain whatever relationship such experiences seem to have in human experience. Further, they must be so related as to render intelligible the relationship of the overcoming of evil with good in experiences of redemption. This was considered under the heading of philosophical understanding. However, agencies and structures of good and evil must also be kept distinct from each other, lest the dualistic standard of values (good and evil) so undeniable in human experience be lost, and man's experience of values be rendered unintelligible. Thus, another aspect of this question is: Can evil in its aggressive and vicious form as met in human experience be explained in such a way as to account for (and not explain away) this aggressiveness and utter opposition to good?

2) Religious man in the tradition of western Christianity has tended to believe that his values are rooted in the ultimate nature of things. This does not mean that man can know all values as they are to

God, but that God's values are not ultimately different from, or contradictory to, man's values. Thus, can value be shown to be relevant to man (so that he may speak of it intelligently) and also relevant to God (so that man may believe that his axiological experience and quest for redemption are more than finite illusions)?

3) Religious man has traditionally held, and the Christian tradition has been founded on, the belief that God can and does save men from evil. For such salvation or redemption to be relevant to man's finite circumstance, there must be an aspect of God which might be called "near concern." On the other hand, there must be in God an aspect of transcendent power by which He is able to overcome the evils of finite existence. Thus, the question is: Can Christian thought understand a God of immanence and of transcendence and relate the two dimensions in terms which are consistent with religious experience?

4) In prayer and worship religious man seeks to be related with a God who is not a lesser being than himself--a God who is somehow responsive to man's approach. The religious experience of prayer in particular has called forth belief in a God with whom communion or communication is possible--a God who responds to the human spirit and, in the experience of evil, to human need. Thus, can a concept of God be formulated which offers available meaning to religious man by "describing" or "symbolizing" God in terms which interpret such response and communication?

5) The redemption of man from evil by God must be rendered intelligible if it is to be preached (communicated) and rendered effective in the rational life of man. The Christian community has put its trust in a God whose consistent, loving purpose has been shown to man by the dependable nature of a world in which man's needs are supplied, his growth can occur, and in which man's personality can be somehow redemptively trans-

formed by a right relationship with God. Can concepts of ultimate reality be found by which God's creative, supportive, and redemptive relation to nature and man can be comprehended?

6) Finally, religious man not only seeks to believe that true values are somehow rooted in God who made and sustains him, but that they are conserved and not lost by such a God. Religious man, who seeks to find the greatest fulfillment of the potentialities for value which God has put in him and his world, finds it hard to believe that God allows these values and potentialities of values to be cancelled out finally by death. This would be to say that God is more wasteful ultimately of human values than the best men He has created would be. Religious men of this Christian tradition have held to a variety of beliefs in eternal life and immortality, and, indeed, any theory of the ultimate redemption of evil by God must take into account the question of eternal life and immortality. This is the consideration of whether God's redemption can be fulfilled within man's present life alone. Do the seeming injustices of this life or the quality of the redemptive experience met in this life ultimately point beyond this life?

The theories of Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich will now be examined in the light of the considerations above. This examination will be in the same order as these standards of religious significance. It will be noted that most of the areas of thought considered in this chapter have been given some critical consideration in the more comprehensive discussion of theories in the chapter on philosophical understanding. These previous considerations will not be repeated here. However, they will serve as something of a broad foundation and reference and allow for a somewhat briefer and more pointed examination of elements in the present chapter from the standpoint of religious significance.

2. Explanation for the Kind of Evil Man Experiences

An examination has already been made of the capacities of systems presented to interpret the relationship of value and disvalue implied in human experience. The relation of good and evil powers and structures has been considered in the study of philosophical meaning.¹ Some consideration was given at that time to the capacities of theories presented to explain the aspects of "aggressiveness," viciousness, and almost "calculated" cunning found in experiential evils for which man is not responsible.² More may be said of this now.

Lewis sees God and the ground of evil as both ultimate and immanent. They exist within a structure which seemingly gives some priority to God's good power. Evil is aggressive for Lewis, as it is for Wieman or Tillich. Indeed, any theory which makes evil out to be only inertial or indeterminate contingency does not confront the forces of aggressive, vicious, calculating destruction which have driven man since time immemorial to characterize them variously as demons, devils, and dark legions. It is a question here, of course, whether Tillich can ever account for the initiatory aggressiveness of evil which, as he claims, derives its parasitic form and dynamic from positive being. Evil, quite unlike an ultimate parasite on good, is also met by man as a constant, radical downward defect in all of life. Man maintains good only by the constant tension of effort. If he relaxes but for a moment, disvalue begins to accelerate. Tillich tries to suit his ontological terminology to this pervasive aggressiveness of evil by saying that being constantly has to "overcome" nonbeing. Yet, this being still seems too basic and

1. Supra, pp. 202-208, 235-237.

2. Supra, pp. 224-226, 240-241.

transcendently powerful in Tillich's system to account for the gravitational, downward run of all life.

It is likewise questionable whether Wieman's system can move beyond factors of sheer inertia, contingency, and blind brutishness in nature to explain factors of insidious and even calculating discretion in the world. This is something which moral and metaphysical dualism does best. Wieman's evil may seem to be the most radical, for it does not come from a single root with good (unless he spells out nature in such a way, which he does not), and there is no assurance of its redemption. Wieman claims that this evil cannot destroy the creative process, but only obstruct it. However, in the short and very final life span which Wieman allows the individual, the obstruction of the creative can have essentially the same effect on man as its destruction. Nevertheless, in spite of its radical nature and scope, Wieman's evil lacks the initiatory cunning and calculation of the Adversary in Lewis' terms. Lewis offers evil with a vengeance, and this, in the raging disasters of man's catastrophes, is what man feels evil to be.

One must admit that Tillich has made an extreme systematic effort to relate positive and negative factors of existence by a kind of dialectical rationale. Yet, Tillich is not safely away from the problems innate in all dialectical idealisms. Just as in absolute idealism, even with its "antithesis," one senses existential and brute factors extraneous to this neat, positive system (hence the rise of existentialism), with Tillich's system one senses brute facts of evil and separation from meaning and God which refuse to be subsumed in any meaningful, dialectical correlation of positive-negative being. One is

made sympathetic to Karl Barth who refuses to explain this nihilistic aspect of life from the Godward side of things. Ultimately, perhaps, (in Tillich) this has to be done by the philosopher who must seek for the oneness of the many. But there is a moral and religious consciousness in man which finds greater recognition in Wieman and Lewis, who set God and evil utterly against each other. It is true that in the former consideration of systematic coherence in this study, highest praise was given to whatever system provided the most obvious connective meeting ground for structures of good and evil. Perhaps, in the study of religious significance, such connective structure is again praiseworthy, since it provides a redemptive structure for the coming of good to evil in order to overcome it. Yet, the belief that evil comes from God may well contradict religious man's turning to God for comfort, unless, of course, one abdicates the problem of evil to assert a mysterious monism, as has been done so very often. No matter how creatively God "employs" or "overcomes" the "shocks of evil," in a monistic theology of natural evil which does not resort to divine mystery at the point of this problem God may become too easily a kind of Judas who betrays man just to enhance the welcome contrast of His kiss. It is true that the inrush of redemptive experience may well lead one to generalize on the power of God as being behind all things and sovereign Lord over all. Yet, religious man before redemption feels that much is opposing and thwarting God. And even redeemed man, in realistic retrospect, has to admit, "Whereas I can see, yet I was blind"; there was that which seemed capable of thwarting God. In the consideration of man's experience of evil, that system seems most meaningful which separates agencies of good and evil most clearly. Wieman and Lewis have sought to do just this.

Although Tillich would derive all manner of negativity from non-being, yet his nonbeing seems best suited to the role of its initial presentation. It is the element of ontic limitation which makes being capable of specifiable creation. But then it is as difficult to transform sheer limitation into disvalue as it is to transform convincingly Wieman's contingency or accidental movement of brute factors into evil. As noted by Lewis, evil has about it an aspect of calculating, negative initiative which is more than sheer ontological limitation or contingency. In fact, a case can even be made for the positive worthfulness of limitation as the basis of creation, and for the worthfulness of contingency, as the "looseness" of creation which allows for freedom. The evil which man feels is more than these. Lewis' source of evil, as seen throughout this study, is also more than these. It is an independent, calculating aggressor.

3. The Ultimate Status of Humanly Relevant Values

It was noted above that an adequate theory of natural evil must be cognizant of the fact that one of the deep beliefs of religious man in the western Christian tradition is that values are somehow rooted in the nature of things. In this, a God who has relevance for man must be a God of values relevant to man. Conversely, it might be said that if values be rooted in ultimate reality or God, then man must somehow be able to know ultimate reality or God to know values which are more than finite illusions. In other words, it seems that only a position which sees value as ultimate and man's knowledge (whether aided by revelation or not) as capable of knowing some aspects of ultimate reality can squarely meet the problem of evil. Even absolute idealisms which seem

at first glance to meet these qualifications finally tend to reduce axiology to epistemology, as one's ultimate questions of values are so often returned to him as epistemic blind spots in himself. Were man able to view the "whole of reality," say these systems, his problem would not exist. Like poor Boethius, man is told that his highest knowledge is that he cannot know.

1. The questionable transcendence of ontology over axiology in Tillich

It is interesting to note that Tillich makes very similar Boethian statements as he defends the exclusive validity of symbolism when speaking of ultimate reality. Here, too, the highest reach of knowledge is an admission of ignorance. However, Tillich uses the language of ontology which is always logically prior to epistemology for him. By ontological assertions which transcend man's axiological questions, Tillich returns such questions to the inquirer as matters of ontic "estrangement," or "separation," or "fall." Yet, one cannot transcend the problem of values, of good and evil, without likewise leaving behind and losing the viewpoint of morals and value. Tillich sees that one needs some depth dimension in all the polarities of value with disvalue to provide a common ground between polarities. He seeks a line of relationship between contrarities and the source of their opposition. In this, his ultimate affirmation of what "is" finally smothered out any ultimate affirmation of what "is good" or what "ought to be."

However, Tillich does not even wait until he gets to the second-mile realm of transcendent correlation (of structures of being responsible for good and evil) to move "above" the realm of value-structure. Long before he reaches this he transfers his consideration from axiology to ontology.¹ By doing this he transcends, even prematurely, religious

1. Supra, pp. 226-229.

man's conviction of the ultimacy of values. Religious man fears distance between ultimate being and value by which Tillich is able to say that value "has roots" in being. Religious man holds that ultimate being is value. Until Tillich agrees to this, without maintaining clever dialectical devices for saying that the statements, "Value is rooted in being" and "Value is being" mean the same, Tillich will not be able to prove his claim that the God of philosophy and the God of theology are one God. All things adjudged to be good or evil by man are just what they must be to a God of being. Tillich's ultimate terms like "estrangement," "fall," "separation" and "reunion" (all terms suggestive of ultimate value structure as he uses them) are axiologically meaningless, unless they are related in a true value-reality which they certainly imply. The ultimacy of being or "isness" cannot, by itself, generate ultimate "goodness."

ii. Axiology transcended in Wieman

An aspect of this whole problem of being over value can be found in Wieman's system of thought, too. Wieman holds that the ultimate cause of meaningful existence is also the ultimate cause of value. He claims that this is value which is meaningful to man. Yet, when Wieman begins to speak of this causal process as being supra-mental and superpersonal, one cannot see how this structure can generate or conserve values realizable in human personality (in accordance with the criteria considered in the last chapter). Logical priority is given to the ground of the sheer existence of things (interaction, concretion). This cannot be spoken of in terms of values which are meaningful to men.

iii. Human values and the personal aspect of God in Lewis

Lewis seems to feel that when dealing with the goodness of God and the evils of existence, if religious man operates by religious conviction as much as by philosophical calculation, he will put his vote

with that structure which supports moral potency rather than metaphysical consistency. Thus, to move the ontic ground of God's consistent value out of the ken of rational comprehension as does Tillich and, at times, Wieman, is to render impossible the philosophical comprehension of an ultimate tenet of religion--the ultimacy of value.

Perhaps it is only by attributing to God systematic and devotional structures held by personality (created in God's image) that one can affirm the claim of Wieman and Lewis--that God's values are very much related to man's values. Tillich's ultimacy of the power of being far outstrips the ultimacy of value. Wieman would equate ultimate cause of meaning and ultimate cause of value, yet his God-above-personality, above mind, hence above comprehension, seems like a rather farfetched repository or ground for anything like mundane, human values. Once again, as noted in the study of philosophical coherence,¹ the similarity of divine and human values seems best supported in Lewis' system, precisely because his symbols of ultimate personality structure are not just evocative, participatory, or devotional, but come very close to describing the nature of God. For the values of human personality to be ultimate, man must be made in the image of God.

This line of thought leads to a consideration of the nature of God. In the present context of religious man's experience of natural evil, this becomes a consideration of the soteriological nature of God.

4. The Soteriological Nature of God

Man cannot approach God from the throes of disvalue unless he be convinced that God understands his suffering more intimately than "from

1. Supra, pp. 231, 239.

afar." If God is to be the "physician" of man's suffering soul and body, God the physician must be more intimately acquainted with man's experience and structure than is man the patient. On the other hand, God must also transcend man's experience to transform it. It is hard to see how man's religious trust in the absolute as redeemer or healer can be generated from any other relationship.

i. Jesus Christ, the revelation of God's sympathetic, redemptive power

All three thinkers see Jesus Christ as the normative (not exclusive) revelation of God's concerned conflict with evils such as man experiences. Christ is also the revelation of God's victorious capacity and power to redeem man.

(1) Tillich's victory of courage in the self through Jesus

Christ.--Although Tillich seeks to balance the importance of the life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, his emphasis seems to be on the negative aspects of the cross and the resurrection faith of believers. Jesus as the Christ revealed God's concern, participation, and even suffering in the finite world. He revealed God's purpose and effort to reintegrate the world with its positive ground of being. That which is undeserving of acceptance is accepted by God's grace. The estranged is reintegrated with God under the conditions of finitude (i.e. not absorbed into the absolute but harmoniously related to the absolute) by virtue of God's love. Christ's resurrection symbolizes man's reunion with the victorious ground and power of being. Man, thus reunited with God by faith in Christ, is cleansed of the sting of sin and given courage to face evil. Tillich calls such courage an "in-spite-of" quality in man's outlook. Well he might, for suffering and death linger on as facts. Man's redemption is a matter of attitude and faith. It is a victory in

himself. In spite of Tillich's heavy ontological language concerning God's objective "rearrangement" of the universe in Christ, man is given only the assurance that he may be able to face his own crosses in the spirit of Christ, but man is not given the objective assurance that he too will in some sense "rise again" as did Christ.

(2) Lewis' objective victory of God revealed in Jesus Christ.--

Lewis sees the revelation of Christ as a revelation of God's persistently victorious struggle with evil. After the manner of Tillich's man, Lewis' man appropriates the victory by faith, and faith is ultimately an act of grace. Lewis' theory, besides speaking of man's subjective victory over guilt and fear, also speaks of God's objective victory over the enemy's ultimate curse upon creation--death. Death is overcome in fact as well as in attitude, as will be further discussed below. By this, man is truly a New Being.

(3) Wieman's redemptive community founded in Jesus Christ.--

Wieman has been charged with using the whole Christian structure of thought as a kind of mythological supplement or poetic expression of what can be explained otherwise. Perhaps such charges are generated by a superficial reading of Wieman's system. It is true that Wieman speaks of Jesus as being a kind of "best man yet on the scene." Creative power was dominant in the life of this man, according to Wieman. In this, Jesus "makes a crucial experiment" in living in committed relation to such power. The results of the experiment are not yet all in. Yet, one must press Wieman to the ultimate run of his argument to see certain presuppositions which have an authentic relation to traditional Christian belief. As seen earlier, to be a "best man" in Wieman's system can happen only by grace. Likewise, "experiment" calls upon grace-given faith,

intent, and insight. Thus Wieman's definition of Jesus as the Christ is more from God manward than from man Godward.

Wieman moves further into a distinct emphasis of the traditional Christian community, namely, the community itself committed to Christ.

Wieman moves in the direction of Royce to emphasize the victorious community rather than the individual in Christ.¹ This is the mystical body of the church, an organism in which creative power is dominant. It is a community of commitment to the creative process in which the painful losses of the created become bearable. It is an ethical community in which the creative alleviation of suffering and sin is everywhere promoted. The suffering sinner is healed and redeemed by the people of God. It is said that misery loves company. Wieman is saying that redemption cannot exist without it. This community is the condition for Wieman's interpersonal, creative interchange, the condition for a new social creation out of a world of lost sufferers. The goal entire of Wieman's creative evolution is this fellowship established on the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

(4) God's immanent concern, suffering, and victory revealed in Jesus Christ.--In spite of their differences, all three thinkers see Christ as the normative revelation of God for man's redemption from sin and evil. These all move in the direction of a Barthian emphasis on the crucifixion as a revelation of the inescapable ultimacy and viciousness of the power of evil. The crucifixion reveals the fact that God does suffer with man, for the evil which caused Christ to suffer is the same kind of disvalue by which man suffers. By this aspect of the Christian

1. It was Royce who believed that the divine life is expressed in the form of a community. Cf. Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913).

revelation, the question of Job changes from "Why do I suffer so?" to "Why does God suffer so?" This question, coupled with faith in Christ's resurrection, brings the "good news" of ultimate comfort. It is news that a God of concerned acquaintance with man's ways has power over evil in its most vicious form. The most vicious expression of evil is the death of God's most precious son--the one who was utterly given to God's "way" for man. The highest victory of good is Jesus Christ's resurrection.

It is at this point, perhaps, that Wieman's system suffers from an omission which gravely weakens this confidence for suffering humanity. Wieman denies any confidence in the ultimate victory of God over evil. Lewis admits that there is risk involved here, that ultimate victory is not easy, but that the ultimate victory, though it must be persistently maintained, is won in Jesus Christ. Tillich, on the other hand, is so victory-conscious that his system does not even seem to have an element of divine risk. This may breed confidence in man that victory is sure, but such victory may sadly lack realism if it does not follow after divine struggle and risk which are real elements prior to any victory which has meaning for man. In any case, in Lewis and Tillich there is presented an aspect of God which suffers, but ultimate victory is held to be sure in the infinite hands of God.

ii. The comfort of divine immanence and the liability of the utter transcendence of God

Men of the Christian faith have believed in a God who is able to give divine comfort to sufferers. This is the God in whom the con and the fortis of comfort are comprehended. There is an immanent aspect of God by which He understands and even participates in human experience.

In fact, the greatest confidence man has that God can understand his suffering from within is contained in the belief that God suffers with man. A God who suffers can understand a sufferer's prayer. A God who loves man is sure to listen to his prayer. However, the element of fortis in divine comfort suggests a God who transcends man's predicament to be able to redeem it. This aspect of God must be meaningfully related to His immanence.

Tillich uses the language of therapeutic depth psychology to speak of God as accepting the unacceptable, suffering in man, making the estranged at one with Himself from the inside, listening to man's confession and plea not in terms of their outward expression but in terms of man's inner feeling, intent, and motive. All of this has meaning for religious man who seems to be so created that he seeks to whisper his need to a near God rather than shout his plea to a great, transcendent absolute.

Yet, there is over all of Tillich's discussion of the warm, personal, immanent aspect of God the pall of preoccupation with impersonal, ontological structures, cosmic immensities, and that ultimate reference for all discussion--God above God. This aspect of divine transcendence seems to be beyond any conceivable relation to God's immanence. Although man may use worshipful symbols of divine immanence and concern for man, ontological considerations always seem more ultimate in Tillich. God's concern for man is not far removed from His concern for seasons, and comets, and star dust. It is the routine work (or "concern") of being for cosmological maintenance. Above all that Tillich may say of the immanent aspects of God, there stands the God who seems to be ultimately impassible, the abyss of aseity. Not even by the terms of

ontology may one describe this God--certainly not by the terms of religion. In the final analysis, this is the God of ontology, for "being-itself" is an ontological concept. Religion is silent here. The fact that God, no matter how related to religious man (in symbolic terms of personal concern), has dimensions of utter retreat from man's problems almost prompts man to confess to another, perhaps idolatrously to a God who is held to be ultimately Christ-like.

Wieman starts out with the lowest possible Christology and the most immanent God this side of sheer humanism. But his system, too, moves into the superpersonal, supermental reaches of a process which is as unconscious in its moving of planets as in its development of new species of men. Elements of both con and fortis seem lacking here. One wonders whether man in his commitment to such a God does any better than to love evolution and hold to the fact that his present pains are but the growing pains of greater creative species of men to be.

Lewis has as high a Christology as dualism permits. In Christ man does see God in His near concern and victorious power. Lewis does not emphasize the whatever-more-than-this God may be. The whatever-more-than-this God may be is not ultimately unlike this revelation in Christ. Christ does not participate in God (Tillich) or experimentally illustrate God (Wieman). He reveals the very nature of God--a God of conscious purpose and concern for creation, a God who inclusively transcends but is never utterly beyond the reach of description in terms of personality structures.

At this point, a consideration of religious man's primary approach to God by worship may be in order. In this area, too, theories presented seek to relate the immanent and transcendent aspects of God in terms of religiously meaningful symbols.

5. Man's Approach to God in Worship

1. Dimensions of the experience of worship

Worship in the Christian tradition seems to oscillate between "high and lifted up" moments of sheer awe and mystery and "thus saith the Lord" moments of intelligent prayer, prophecy, and ethics. Tillich seems best acquainted with the former. God as mystery and abyss is utterly holy, majestic, and unapproachable. On the other hand, Tillich does acknowledge the need for symbolism to refer to God's responsive communion with His creatures. Somewhere between the experience of the unapproachable and the responsive God, Tillich moves into an area of almost oriental mysticism or pantheism. This is found in his discussion of man's being grasped by the depth of being in which all subject-object distinctions of finite polarity fade away. This bespeaks almost "unification" with God.

Wieman also has these three dimensions of utter awe before the transcendent God, communion with the immanent and responsive God, and some kind of mystical "unification" in God. First, Wieman speaks of the "purple hills of divine mystery" which transcend the foothills of empirical science.¹ Although his system may seem better geared for calling these distant slopes mirages rather than provable reality, they are quite real in Wieman's sense of the verifiable efficacy (i.e. pragmatic value in the creative life of man) of worshipful beliefs in a transcendent God (at least transcendent over humanity, personality, and mentality). In this, man may worship in awe and mystery the "high and lifted up." Secondly, Wieman speaks of man's being a constitutional

1. Supra, p. 35.

19
261

factor in the ultimate cause of value. This does not exactly yield a concept of a responsive, personal God for the experiences of prayer and worship. Yet, it supports the belief that by prayer and worship man has some effect on the shape of the ultimate agency of meaningful creation, and that man may put himself in an attitude which is responsive to the promptings of that agency toward himself. Thirdly, after the fashion of Whitehead, Wieman speaks of moments of almost aesthetic mysticism in which man feels integrally united with the whole, dynamic, humming process which produces meaning and value. This comes close to Tillich's absorptive unification of man the worshipper into the worshipped, into the very process responsible for his being.

Although Christian mysticism has often narrowly skirted the brink of such unification, it has, for the most part, spoken of confrontation, communion, adoration, or prayer which are terms of duality, of independent I and Thou. It seems fair to say that Tillich and Wieman have at least left the door open for interpretations of worship in terms of absorption and unification.

Lewis, on the other hand, remains closest to the dualistic structure of traditional Christian mysticism. For him, the life of speechless awe and adoration is correlated with intelligent communion and prayer. Unification with one's ground or process of reality seems unlikely where man is always quite distinct from his creator. Likewise, his creator is quite specifiably distinct from the totality of powers that be, as must be the case in a metaphysical dualism. These two distinctions (which Wieman would also seek to maintain) seem to be more systematically maintained in the theory of worship by Lewis, than in the theories of worship by Tillich or Wieman.

ii. Meaningful symbols for worship

Tillich realizes that "being-itself" is no fit object for intelligent worship. Wieman acknowledges the fact that "interaction" suits no high altar. Thus, both of these men approve of the intelligent usage of worshipful symbols. As noted earlier, the symbols used must, first, reflect the authentic constitutional needs of the worshipper and, secondly, participate in the reality they evoke. Since in both thinkers, the constitutional needs of the worshipper can be traced ultimately to the promptings in man from his creative source, a symbol which reflects one reflects the other.

Lewis uses terms of personal structure to describe the deity. He does this within the language of both systematic thought and devotion. He agrees with Tillich and Wieman that personalistic representations of God may be more descriptive of the psychology of the symbolizer than of the symbolized. Yet, he also seeks to say (as do Tillich and Wieman, whether successfully or not) that man is somehow in the image of God. God cannot create what is utterly unlike Himself.

On the other hand, since personality, by definition, includes the capacity for infinite self-transcendence without a prior limitation, one wonders how many metamorphoses of self-transcendence God would have to undergo to be "more than personal." As noted previously in the study of philosophical coherence,¹ the only things "more than personal" that men know usually turn out to be forces "less than personal." It has been noted earlier that the naturalism and depth-naturalism of Wieman and Tillich often suggest just this, i.e., an absolute which outstrips personality in terms of power and being but not in terms of meaning and value. Such an entity transcends personality in the way a tidal wave or

1. Supra, pp. 215-216, 227, 240.

an atom bomb transcends personality.

Strangely, these same criticisms do not seem to pertain to Lewis' thought. Basically this seems to be because Lewis, who claims his God to be superpersonal, never quite does anything to support his claim in an explicit or forceful way. His God is described as functioning in ways ideally personal. Lewis' God of systematic theology can be brought right into the devotional chamber of worship without a change of vestments. Some may say that this is the over-paid-for value of mythological theology. Others will recognize in the so-called mythological language of Lewis well thought-out personality structures to comprehend the ultimate realities of life.

Perhaps it is only by attributing to God systematic and devotional structures held by personality (created in God's image) that one can make the claim which Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich seek to make, namely, that man's values are ultimately rooted in the absolute. And perhaps it is only in terms of personality structure, whether it is held to be descriptive or symbolic of the nature of God, that God's relationship of immanence and transcendence can be rendered intelligible for man, for whom self-transcendence can only be found or illustrated in terms of his own personality. A man beset by experiences of evil who can find in worship confirmation for the belief that his highest values are supported by God and that God has power over his plight but is immanently concerned with, and available to, him in his plight is a man in whom redemption is begun.

6. The Nature of Redemption

The religious significance of the theories presented will now be examined in terms of their capacities to comprehend and interpret the experience of redemption from evil in the lives of religious men of the tradition under consideration.

1. The experience of evil and the redeeming grace of God

It has been noted by all three thinkers that the shock of evil is quite often the most effective of all ways to recall man to God. The negativities of nature are a consistent reminder to man that he is not self-sufficient. This same consideration has been eloquently expressed by Nels Ferré.

Nature is the right medium with its consistency, with its predictability and unpredictability, to foster in us at the same time initiative, responsibility, and creative insight, and also common dependence on something beyond us all, the need to co-operate with each other, and a feeling of constant insecurity on the plane of human power, goodness, and wisdom.¹

This is reminiscent of Berdyaev's concept of "creative unrest." The shocks of evil subserve God's good to the degree that they spur man's desire for it. But it is at this point that a sobering reminder is in order which has been eloquently presented by Berdyaev.

The experience of evil can bring us to the good only on condition that we know and reveal its untruth and its non-being; it can enrich us only as we denounce it and deny it in the most absolute fashion as a vehicle for the enrichment of our spirits.²

Negativity is valuable only as it is opposed. Orthodox thinkers have sometimes said that the fall of man subserved the good by the fact that it called forth Christ on earth. The danger here is this. If one lauds the evil over-much, one never develops that opposition toward evil which drives man to God for help to transform it or to bear it.

Man in the depths of the experience of evil may ask the question

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1. Nels F. S. Ferré, Evil and the Christian Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 56-57.
 2. Nicolas Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit, trans. Oliver Fielding Clarke (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), pp. 185-186.

"Why?" in a speculative or a recriminatory way. More helpful while the evil experience is fresh would be the answer to the question, "How?"

"How shall I bear this evil? . . . How shall I be saved? . . . How can this evil be redeemed?" These two questions, Why and How, mingle and blend and lead one in search of God. However, it is the How which leads one to search for redemptive power by which he may courageously oppose, transform, overcome, or escape the evil at hand.

Wiemann, Lewis, and Tillich all agree that faith which searches for, and trusts in, the redemptive power of God in such a circumstance is motivated by the grace of God. This is not the grace of God which purposely sends the evil to get man's attention, but which uses the occasion of man's opposition to this evil to express in him God's own opposition to evil. Thus, for once, grace seems to find man in a frame of mind which is responsive to God's will. For all three thinkers, this redemptive power of God which enters man beset by evil is one which seeks to reunite man with the ground of good. Man in this relationship of "reunion" comes to look upon evil as being whatever separates man from God. Good is whatever re-establishes his right relationship with God.

(1) Redemption as reunion of the estranged, according to Tillich.--

According to Tillich, this reunion of man with God is reunion "in spite of" continuing negativities in man's finite existence, so far as natural evils are concerned. In other words, man is not saved from infirmity, affliction, and sensitivities to suffering. He is saved in them by God's power to transform limitation, contingency, and adversity into the raw materials of a courageous new creation in man. For one thus reunited with the redeeming and transforming love of God, suffering becomes the

raw material of sainthood. The grace of God which empowers this is not irresistible. Man must yield himself to it.¹ In so doing, man's will is reintegrated with the divine will which creates him (i.e., has created and now sustains). His resistance to evil is no longer a prime concern, that being too negative a preoccupation for the positive will of God. Man's will becomes more like that of the positive, creative God. It is a will to salvage, transform, or overcome evil by good. Now any evil which drives man to this new commitment, or by opposition forces him to exercise this new commitment, or any evil which warns man of harm by the sting of pain automatically subserves the good. In this, evil finds itself imprisoned or "contained" both in heaven and on earth--in heaven contained in being; on earth, contained in the New Being.

(2) Wieman's concept of redemption as commitment to creative power.--Wieman's creative power is also a power of union or reunion. It brings into interaction (organic unity) the disparate elements of life which man can only unite externally as "mechanism," never as organism. Wieman's God reactivates man to allegiance with, or commitment to, that which is ever emerging rather than that which is dying or passing away. This is commitment to a power which brings into the unity of ever larger systems of meaning elements which operated as disvalues in smaller systems. But besides Wieman's redemption through organic union (or reunion

1. It is a question whether Tillich's system offers sufficient grounds for this independent status of human will. True, Tillich gives it independence sufficient to bring on the fall. Yet, in a system in which all is grounded in inescapable being, one wonders whether it is not the case that where human initiative abounds "there does grace more abound." This is a similar problem to that faced in Roycean idealism. Where creation is emanated more than created from the absolute, is not all grace irresistible and all human action deterministic? Interestingly enough, Wieman who has no all-consuming absolute also finds it hard to distinguish between human free will and irresistible grace, since he too lacks any thoroughgoing concept of creation. (Supra, pp. 47-49, 130-136.)

in the case of one who has willfully "fallen away" from creative process), there is another aspect to his system. Although, in Wieman's system, created good serves the creative as a present rung of the ladder of progress, nevertheless, it is not somehow reactivated or redeemed itself by the creative power. Instead, creative power "supersedes" and replaces it. Thus, creative power redeems the created only in the retroactive sense of giving it descendants worthy of having lived for. It must be noted that, unlike the redemption by reunion described above, this is almost a kind of redemption through succession.

(3) Lewis' concept of redemption as commitment to God, the creative and victorious artisan.---The Creator in Lewis' theory is a victor in His struggles. This structure is at first more suggestive, perhaps, of the destruction rather than the redemption of what is or has been made evil. This seems especially true in Lewis' ontology in which the Creator molds and creates out of the residue somewhat in advance of the Adversary's attack, since the attack is on creation, not residue. Thus the suggestion is that God's work is on fresh materials (residue) not yet tainted by the onslaught of evil. Thus His work does not seem to be the salvaging, transformation or redemption of old infected creations. However, if one carefully considers Lewis' structure of ontology it will be noted that his view of creation is far from naïve. God creates processively and sustains His creation processively. The infection of evil in the product of creation is something which occurs in the very first stage of creation. It is a factor which God must work against, fight, and overcome during the entire, long stages in the support and completion of His creation--that is, if His creation is to survive or one day be fulfilled at all. Thus there is structure here for the continuing work

of good which overcomes evil through the redemption of infected creations. Man the creature "gives himself" to this good God still working redemptively in him for his self-fulfillment. In this, what Tillich has called sustaining and directing creation comes to be seen in Lewis (as in Tillich) as a work of redemption as well.

ii. The consistency of divine purpose throughout redemption

In the case of all three thinkers, the redemptive intervention of God in the life of man does not alter or upset the basic structure of man and his world. God's "plan and purpose" for creation is consistent before and after man's redemption. Man is not snatched out of the world of suffering by some supernatural intervention. He is saved in the world of suffering. Man's freedoms and sensitivities (hence his capacities for sin and suffering) are kept intact throughout this redemption. Otherwise he would not still be man. This is why there is such a heavy content of courage, of "in-spite-of" confidence, in the redeemed attitude of man as presented by all three thinkers. Man is saved in, not out of, the world. God's plan for the creation of free, sensitive, conscious men does not change.

This same divine consistency is a liability through the fact that it permits man to be susceptible to old ills even after new faith. But it is also an ultimate asset for man's faith. Faith must be grounded in a trustworthy, dependable God who sustains all of man's redemptive gains.

(1) Implications of God's consistent purpose as evidenced in natural stabilities.--According to the three thinkers presented, one dimension of divine trustworthiness and consistency is found in the stable, natural laws of creation. These are the stabilities necessary to provide a stage on which free creatures can act and by which their actions can be

secured. Yet, such stabilities of natural law are great liabilities to the free creature, or, in a sense, it is the free creature who is the liability. Nevertheless, man does not break natural law by his misdirected act. It is he who is broken on it. The consistent law of gravity which secures earthlings to earth also destroys men who defy it and walk off cliffs.

Now man has an infinite capacity for animistic projection by which he all too readily attributes insidious, conscious intent to the stabilities by which he is injured. It may be said that man readily misuses Tillich's symbol of "culpable nature." However, if the teleological design and aim of God in creation is finally to produce men, and all of His preliminary (sub-personal) creation is to support such highest creation, then the hurts man bears from known natural stabilities must ultimately be man's own "fault," since all stabilities of nature stand to support his existence except as misused. This is something on which Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich readily agree.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that in the experience of evil caused by man's misuse or miscalculation of natural order, he does cry aloud to God to alter, suspend, or rearrange the laws of the universe to suit his emergency. In this, he seems to think of the alteration of constitutional order as being as practicable as an alteration of elements in some humanly fabricated system. Man fails to see that such an arbitrary alteration of constitutional order would be a change in both the purpose of God and the identity of man so that neither would be as he was to enjoy the change. God is self-consistent in His nature and purpose, according to all three thinkers. According to them, this is not to be misconstrued as divine weakness or obstinacy. God's incapacity for self-contradiction is a

symptom of His strength. And it offers grounds for man's trust in him.

(2) The redemptive increase of human knowledge in a world of stable structure.--Out of this consideration of the consistent purpose of God in natural stabilities (by which man can be injured through misinterpretation and misuse) certain questions arise. One question is: Who is responsible for man's misuse of natural order when the misuse is due to ignorance for which man cannot be held reasonably responsible? Another question is: How is this ignorance overcome? To put it another way, for centuries men have called certain natural phenomena the works of vagrant or satanic powers. These phenomena were later found to be quite orderly, following the enlargement of man's natural knowledge. Likewise, for centuries man has misused natural stabilities to his own detriment through ignorance. Yet, one cannot escape the fact that prior to man's enlarged knowledge these orders did operate as stark negativities, as if awaiting an addition of positive power to the balance of creation, creative power which might finally enable the long-suffering creature, man, to comprehend, obey, or control orderly structures of his world. This suggests a struggling God gradually overcoming negativities at least in the mind of man. Lewis' theory implicitly allows for such an interpretation, and Wieman's theory supports this quite explicitly.¹

✓ If one does not see this enlargement of human knowledge and control of natural stabilities as a struggle in which both God and man participate, and it is declared that God has ever been in a position to enlighten man but has not done so (because of man's prolonged recalcitrance to apply himself to wisdom or for some other reason), then one

1. Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment, pp. 91, 149.

has to account for the pre-scientific (and, indeed, even post-scientific) generations who went down to dusty death as being expendable content in a long, orderly evolution in which all is positive order.

Tillich's God struggles against or "overcomes" limitation in the mind of man, just as He works everywhere else in creation. Yet, there are dimensions of God which so transcend this struggle that the process of being "overcoming" nonbeing in this instance seems strangely drawn out. True, it must take time if it is to be accomplished partially through man, in fairness or "justice" to his limited freedom which slows the process down. Yet, where God transcends all and is ground of all, this laborious clearing away of human ignorance seems tedious and long in coming. In the theories of Wieman and Lewis this aspect of the redemption of natural evils, namely, the development of human knowledge for the prediction and control of nature where possible, suggests a struggle in which God participates to bring to pass the creative conditions for human knowledge and control. In this, of course, man can be responsible for the struggle taking much longer by his often prolonged refusal freely to use his mind to search for redeeming knowledge made available to him by God. However, the length of time and struggle necessary for such "redemption," as it were, of human ignorance about natural stabilities, becomes more comprehensible and, perhaps, religiously meaningful against the background of a struggling God working with man, not just on man.

(3) The concept of divine wrath and the consistent, redemptive purpose of God.--A consideration has been made above of God's dependable, consistent purpose as exemplified in natural stabilities. These He cannot change to suit the whim of man who misuses or misreads them. But God

does in some sense seek to enlighten man's mind in reference to the proper understanding and use of natural stabilities. This, too, has been characterized as a work of redemption in and through man.

In the Christian concept of divine wrath, as expressed in the idea that certain natural catastrophes are visited upon man by a God who is angered by human sin, one may have a God whose consistent, loving, and creative purpose is suddenly interrupted. A naïve presentation of this in anthropic terms may tend to suggest a "loss of temper" on God's part. In any case, the temper of God has also been conceived of as being correlated with His consistent purpose. In this connection, the wrath of God has been held to be pedagogical, teaching man harshly the rules of right living in God's sight. This, then, could be considered an aspect of redemption.

All three thinkers have dealt insightfully with this concept of wrath. Tillich speaks of the strange work of love which, if it cannot convert its adversary, must destroy him. Wieman speaks of the creative God who must finally crack and shatter all dogmatic obstacles which are "created good." Lewis, too, provides for the "fire from heaven" which must, at times, strike at the works of the Adversary.

However, in this matter of divine wrath, religious man is always at a loss to say exactly where divine grace leaves off and human freedom begins. This is to say that one of religious bent finds it hard to say whether God punishes by wrath or man punishes himself against God's standards for him and then projects on God the harsh feelings in himself, calling this divine wrath. Thus it is understandable why all three thinkers are able to speak of a God of consistent love while maintaining that such love may be harsh on the one who stands against it. They agree that this harsh work of God may be a very benevolent function of deity who seeks by consistent love to redeem creation, and who

may have to destroy, or allow for the self-destruction of, whatever finally holds out against such redemption.

iii. Man's courageous opposition to evil and his redemptive co-operation with God

One other aspect of redemption which has already been touched on is man's own work to alleviate suffering and dehumanizing circumstances in his society and world. This calls for a kind of courageous ethic for the opposition of evil.

At this point it might be said that Tillich offers much in the way of courage but little in the way of ethics. He speaks of the essential attitude of courage against life's evils. Yet, this seems to be more of a believer's than a doer's courage, if such a distinction may be made. The primacy of courage in the redemption of evil is established also by Wieman and Lewis, but theirs is a courage which takes matters somewhat into its own hands. Thus ethics enters the picture of redemption. They too have a believer's courage or committed confidence in a God who is good and powerful, as does Tillich. Yet, when Tillich's man speaks with courageous faith like that of Job, "Though He slay me yet will I trust Him," he does it mainly from Job's position, i.e., seated in a kind of rapt immobility on the dung hill of adversity. When Wieman's or Lewis' man speaks so, he does it while getting down off the dung hill, fighting evil, and comforting the afflicted by ethical, community action. This is not to spurn the values of man's ontological confirmation and devotional courage as described in Tillich. It is to say that such courage must be correlated with the life of Godly action. Tillich agrees with this, but does little to spell out this second step of ethical action as do Wieman and Lewis. Perhaps this is all suggestive

of the fact that the God of Lewis and Wieman, and particularly of Lewis, whom man emulates by courage, is a kind of ethical worker or struggler. Tillich's God, the ultimately self-fulfilled being, is more likely to inspire mystical confidence than activistic ethics.

iv. The implications of a suffering God and the continuing cross of redeemed man

Perhaps this redemptive work of man with God to overcome evils of human existence can be further comprehended apropos of the concept presented above, the concept of a God who suffers with and in His creation. All three thinkers have seen this to be an ultimate meaning of the symbol of the cross in the Christian tradition. Now the implication of this concept for the later life of redeemed man seems to be this. Man by redemption is linked with a God who suffers. Perhaps this God no longer suffers as much on behalf of the one who is now reunited with Him, but for the rest of the world He continues the creative struggle of suffering for estranged humanity. Thus, the suggestion by Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich seems fair, namely, that redeemed man, out of his communion with a God who suffers for His creation, will also bear vicariously the sufferings of the world himself. Man becomes a suffering servant, now on the offensive rather than the defensive. Man begins to stand in the courageous image of Jesus Christ. This is the deepest root of the "in spite of" quality of the redeemed man's courage. It is courage "in spite of" suffering. Thus, in all three systems of thought presented, one can find foundations for the spiritual strategy of sufferers in which one calls his suffering "the bearing of his cross" or his share in the suffering of God for the world.

The cross as seen by Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich is the symbol of something both final and continuous in the life of believers. In the Protestant tradition of faith, men like John Bunyan, it is true, have looked at the cross as an objective miracle which, if trusted or accepted by faith, offers redemption within the individual. This is redemption by the same divine grace which operated at the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This belief is akin to the central belief of the Reformers. The three thinkers considered here would stand in this tradition. However, the tradition which speaks of the continuing cross in the life of redeemed believers must also be considered. Roman Catholics like Saint Theresa have looked at the cross as being, besides the above, a rallying call to the suffering struggle of God in which all Christians should participate to further the redemption of the world. Saint Paul, the great progenitor of Luther's "justification by faith," also speaks of completing in his flesh "what is lacking in Christ's afflictions" for the sake of the church.¹ This is not calling Christ's sacrifice incomplete, except in the sense that it is incomplete until such time as all men participate in it. This is to say that there is for the pious Christian a continuous work of a suffering God in which man participates, if he will. This is the tradition of faith in the light of which the elements of realistic courage in the theories considered have much meaning.

Here again, however, an earlier reminder must be made. The thinkers presented do not seem to be saying that the sufferings borne by the redeemed man are to be glorified for their own sake. Martyr complexes are all too frequent where this strategy is followed. Nor must one suffer like the Hindu fakir for the sake of becoming insensitive to

1. I Col. 1:24.

suffering. The glory of suffering lies in the good which is opposing evil through suffering. This alone is the glory of tribulation.

v. Grounds for the present experience of transcendent courage and confidence in God

Man who joins God in the immanent aspects of God's work against evil comes to know by faith that "underneath are the everlasting arms." For religious man, this is the transcendent priority of good power on which he stakes his life. Problems in the priority of good for the three thinkers of this study have been considered. However, it is quite clear in all three that concepts of disvalue, negativity, and discreativity all presuppose a prior and positive "other." Beyond all the implications of the theoretical priority of the Creator's work before the Adversary's attack, in Lewis' system of thought, Lewis has affirmed the priority of God's good power in terms of God's victory over evil made manifest in Christ. Wieman and Tillich have been a bit more explicitly analytical at this point. Wieman has noted how the sting of suffering is always a reminder of a prior value under attack--that the cessation of suffering can be as suggestive of the fall of good as of its victory. Tillich has reaffirmed the inescapable, positive fact of life; namely, that man can doubt only from a prior conviction of truth, feel guilty only from a prior conviction of righteousness, and feel anxious about disvalue, destruction and death only from a viewpoint grounded in value, creativity, and life. All of this is nothing man earns or concocts. This transcendent courage and confidence is given and inescapable. It is the work and power of God's grace which is capable of dominating the entire experience of one who accepts it by faith.

vi. Futuristic dimensions of redemption

Consideration has been given to the experience of redemption in its dimension of present confidence rather than future hope. Both dimensions seem genuinely present in Christian experience. The sufferings of the present are borne not only by present courage, but by futuristic confidence that the sufferings of the present are nothing compared to the eternal glory set before man.¹ The redemption of present evils, like the kingdom of God, both *is* and *is to be*.

Wieman who calls for present commitment to redemptive process demands that such commitment be not dogmatic but open to the eventualities of creative process in the future. Lewis and Tillich, although placing great emphasis on the fact that the present moment in the temporal world has been and can be the bearer of the eternally significant revelation of God in Jesus Christ, both hold that the redemption of man by God both is and is to be. It is this futuristic dimension of redemption which now must be considered.

7. Immortality and Eternal Life

The future dimension of redemption in the theories of thinkers presented in this dissertation will now be considered apropos of their concepts of immortality and eternal life. A word seems to be in order here on the matter of religious man's quest for immortality, for one final aspect of the religious significance of the systems presented may be measured in terms of the way in which they comprehend, interpret, and fulfill this quest.

1. Rom. 8:18; II Cor. 14:17.

1. Religious man's quest for immortality and eternal life

Man's capacity for self-transcendence, his moral consciousness, and his religious conviction of God's goodness all tend to lead him toward a desire for immortality. His creative imagination easily outstrips his three score and ten years which are sometimes exceeded, but more often not reached. His moral sensitivity demands time for the fulfillment of his potentialities and time for life's redemptive processes to run their full course over evil. Man's belief in the goodness of God, a goodness at least consistent with that which God has enabled His creatures to attain, makes it hard to believe that God will finally annihilate His highest creation, a deed no proper human would undertake to do.

Man's motives for desiring immortality may be very negative. Thus, one may crave an afterlife because the evils and injustices of this life seem too great to bear without positing some further realm for rectification. The problem is that on such a basis as the inscrutable or absent justice of God seen by such a person thus far, this believer in immortality has little reason to hope that his extended lot in the hereafter will be any better than his lot in the here and now. The "extended harvest" may only be an extended famine.

It is true that the shock of this world's evil drives man to God, as the thinkers of this study have emphasized, but it must be re-emphasized that it is man's dissatisfaction with, or opposition to, evil which does the positive driving. There has to be a prior, felt goodness at stake—a positive, creative drive seeking to survive "in spite of" negativity. Just so, the afterlife of man demands positive presentation, not as an escape from the inconsistencies of this life, but as a further

dimension of redemptive experience already felt by man in a present life made too godly to expire. This is life grounded in a God who does not pass away, hence, a life which may not pass away.

(1) Tillich's rejection of immortality and affirmation of eternal life.--Tillich escapes the danger of negatively inspired faith in immortality by denying personal immortality altogether. For existent man who is the personification of the split between essence and existence to have immortal life would be to make the split eternal, allowing the limiting factor of nonbeing to have final say in the life of God.¹

Eternal life which man finds in the New Being is a qualitative and vertical dimension of reunification with the source of one's life and value. It is not a matter involving temporal continuation except (if one may so interpret Tillich) in the sense that redeemed man can console himself in the assurance that though he passes away, his God will not. "Eternal time-continuation" for man is a contradiction in terms for Tillich.

Now this seems like a strange departure from Tillich's usual dialectical adeptness. If time and eternity can be dimensions of man's "now," by what power is the dialectic ended? The fact that in one moment of cosmic time God has been in some sense limited by time makes the import of that moment infinite. The "negativity" of limitation in Tillich is not somehow done away with by denying its eternal extension in the survival of creation. Again, even if temporal man be given that religious assurance which says, "Though I pass on, God, my ultimate commitment endures," then, from a religious point of view, one soon has the

1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 188; II, 78, 167.

God of a dead man's ultimate commitment--a God of the dead.

According to Tillich, the divine power enters finite creation as its very life. Creation or existence, however, is somehow devaluated or lower than essence. Thus, according to Tillich, it is as if pure being can operate uniquely and specifiably in a person for a time and then withdraw itself, lose its individuality, and re-enter an abysmal sea of pure being to regain, in a sense, its former, unspecifiable anonymity. This is very unlike the Christian belief in which creation, once created, has an independent and memorable shape. This concept of Tillich is not far removed from Hinduism. The eternal significance and worth of the individual seems hopelessly lost for religious man. The values of human personality are finally lost in a God who is ultimately "indifferent" to values or individuals. God is a reservoir of sheer being qua being.

(2) Wieman's rejection of personal immortality and affirmation of social immortality.--Henry Nelson Wieman has said that although the creative good must be the object of man's ultimate commitment, nevertheless, man must appreciate to the fullest all present, created good. However, the reservations in that appreciation become very great indeed when Wieman calls the craving for immortality of created being the ultimate idolatry. This is not very different from Tillich's rejection of immortality. Of course, Wieman's most obvious argument against immortality is that it is scientifically unprovable. However, one wonders whether this argument holds as much weight at the end of Wieman's theory as it did at the beginning. In many ways, Wieman has dealt with a reality whose comprehensiveness, depth of quality, superpersonality, and supermentality outstrip the scope of any or all sciences anyway.

Wieman sees God as a great value-producer. Yet, Wieman offers little in the way of a cumulative repository for value outside of the forgetful memory and traditions of given cultures and societies. Except for something like the survival of vague Jungian archetypes, this puts cumulative value totally at the mercy of cultural revolutions, and the vagrancies, spontaneities, and inertias of societies and nature. In this sense, one loses the longitudinal connectiveness of growth or process in Wieman.

Wieman, like Tillich, speaks highly of the values realizable in human personality. In fact, personality is presented as God's most precious creation. It is also the self-conscious locus of God's most significant, continuing creativity. Now Wieman is deeply rooted in that tradition of thought which sees that value demands content or existent being to exist. Value without existence is the smile on the Cheshire cat without the cat. Potential value, for Wieman, is not value outstripping existential fact. Potential value is only the axiological side of potential concretion. At several points in this study it was shown that as Tillich gives priority to being over value,¹ so, too, Wieman suggests (perhaps unconsciously) a priority of concretion over value.² If this be the pattern of his thought, then one is led to wonder how the value of personality can be preserved without its concrete, factual receptacle, personality. Wieman seeks to give personal value foster parents of concrete content in the form of society which preserves individual values. Whitehead saw this possibility, too, but as an accurate observer, he noted the factor of leakage or distortion in

1. Supra, pp. 226-229, 238-239, 251.

2. Supra, pp. 230-231, 252.

the transference of unique values from one unique personality to surviving, unique personalities in societies. Then, too, he saw how impermanent societies and cultures are. It was his contention that the accumulation of value, its eternal significance and survival, demands a consequent nature of God to "remember," preserve, and conserve personal values. Wieman, who stands in the tradition of seeing value as integral (not prior or subsequent) to concrete existence, can hardly prove, in terms of this view, the survival of unique personal values in society without the survival of the personalities in which they are generated and in which they exist.

However, Wieman stands in another tradition also. It is the tradition of behaviorism which allows for the behavior of an entity (i. e. God) to exist without the entity. Just as Wieman has called God "His behavior," so, too, traditional behaviorists have called man the behavior of a personal soul while denying the existence of the soul. This tradition might well influence Wieman's idea of the survival in society of personal values without the persons.

The goal of religion, for Wieman, is the fellowship of the holy community in which God's work of creative interaction may occur. In this, he seems to follow a collectivist strategy to the point of seeing such a society as the chief value whose survival somehow makes up for the loss of individuals.

To this it must be replied that the social immortality proposed by Wieman neither conserves the unique values of personalities nor presents opportunity for the self-fulfillment of individuals. In fact, since the potentialities for the growth of values within any individual seem infinite, no matter how great is the self-fulfillment to which

society leads the individual during his life-time, the possibilities yet in him are still infinite at his death. Social immortality does not preserve the unique experiences of grace known only to individuals, nor does it give time for fulfillment to the potentialities of such grace within the individual.

(3) Lewis' integration of personal existence and value, immortality and eternal life.--It has been noted earlier that Lewis' system most consistently seeks to integrate existence (being) and value. Thus the existent being (i.e., person) is not so far separated from value as to say that man "has value." Rather, man is his value. Therefore existence and value are so integrated systematically for Lewis that eternal life (qualitative) and immortality (quantitative) exist as one meaningful whole. Just as men in existential suffering (qualitative) cry out, "How long?" (quantitative), so, too, men in the experience of redemptive fellowship with God and man (qualitative) affirm "How long! How incapable of ending!" (quantitative).

In Lewis' thought man is not driven to immortality by total dissatisfaction with this life. Total dissatisfaction, like total despair, never desires continuance, but death and release. Rather, creative dissatisfaction is here subsumed in positive hope for self-fulfillment. Hope which is not given time is not hope. Again, this is not the selfish attitude of man conserving static values--an attitude spurned by Wieman. At its best, it is the creative attitude of the worker who passionately would continue or complete his service, and thus needs time in which to do it. It is the desire of man to render a fuller account of the possibilities within him. Man, who at best seeks to waste neither his moments nor his powers in this life, finds it difficult and debasing to serve a

God who is conceived of as finally more wasteful of man's potentialities (in death) than ever man was at his best. This would apply not only to death, but also to the gradual dissolutions of man so often witnessed before death, if they be final.

The religious and creative person, if he be realistic, may well desire more than a salvation which delivers him from the fear of death, as described by Tillich and Wieman. Such a person may well desire that the reality of death be overcome. Salvation which overcomes feelings but not facts only shadowboxes with reality where the ultimate self-fulfillment of man is concerned.

ii. Implications of the concepts of crucifixion and resurrection

Perhaps all of this may be set within thought-patterns of the Christian tradition in terms of crucifixion and resurrection. According to Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is a stark, undeniable exhibit of the objective, cosmological reality of evil in the world. So, too, is the suffering and death of every man. This evil is more than a matter of man's psycho-spiritual attitude, although it includes this. It is an objective fact. However, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, in so far as men participate in it, is not so, according to Wieman and Tillich. The resurrection, in so far as the believer participates in it, is little more than a matter of the believer's psychology so far as the believer's own personal immortality stemming from it is concerned. The believer's share in the resurrection becomes only a matter of revitalized confidence, courage, and faith. By this the believer's life is cleared of immobilizing fear, guilt, and doubt about his finite status. This is a great deal, but, somehow, this is little more than a matter of internal feelings. There is no objective

43
285

reality to the continuing power of the resurrection for every believer-- that is, man does not "rise again" because Christ rose again. Yet, without this, one does not have in the resurrection an adequate match for the continuing, objective realities of crucifixion and death. Death is not "led captive" in fact. God here fails to reintegrate and rearrange the universe after seeing it disintegrated and disarranged by the power of negativity and death both in Christ and man.

Eternal life as qualitative confidence in God is precious. But without objective, personal immortality for man in some dimension of his being, eternal life cannot transcend the status of spiritual pulse-taking on the part of sufferers for whom evil objectively transcends and finally stops the pulse.

iii. The nature of life eternal and immortal

Since it is only Lewis whose theory answers the above need for objectively real, personal immortality, only his theory may be considered finally in terms of the nature of such immortality. The creative person does not look on immortality as a blissful escape from life's creative struggles. Such an existence would be more of the nature of suspended animation, life without growth. No, as noted earlier, a praiseworthy aspect of all three positions presented lies in the fact that they see redemption as genuinely relevant to this life--that is, man is not saved out of struggle or work but saved in it. So it must be with the nature of eternal and immortal life if it is consistent with God's scheme of redemption in the present life. If immortality (or eternal life--here given a quantitative dimension) is to conserve, enhance, and further human values, it must be true to the nature of such values. Man's greatest values are realized in a life which is creative, dynamic, up-

ward climbing, as are the values of the Creator Himself. Hence, any after-life must preserve this creativity and work. It can be seen here why Tillich, seeking to maintain the all-consuming priority and finality of positive being, fears the eternity thus given to factors of limitation necessary for a life of work, struggle, creativity and growth. On the other hand, insofar as the values of a creative life can be understood only apropos of elements of opposition in the highest creative life of man (as is the case with God), Lewis' dualism in which the Adversary is an "eternal principle" is seen in a new light.¹ Such dualism is not ultimately pessimistic. In fact, it becomes the ground for the continuing limitation, opposition, and struggle which are essential to the definition of man as he is known in this world, and, for that matter, the definition of God, the continuously victorious creator and redeemer as He is known in this world. Somehow, the life of man in a next world cannot be said to be radically different, if man is to survive as man. In this, the power and effect of the Adversary is ultimately made to subserve the good in this world and the next. The good which is thus subserved can never be the good of a relaxed life, but of a dynamic, creative, growing life both by reason of the dynamic love and concern for creativity which God has put in man, and by reason of the continued victory which must be maintained over the powers of the Adversary. Whether Lewis adequately grounds his belief that the powers of good in God and man have sufficient prior, pervasive, and fundamental status to achieve and maintain such a victory for God and man will, no doubt, be subject for debate among thinkers long after this dissertation. The verdict of this study is that Lewis does support his belief in this pervasive priority of good over evil.

1. Lewis, The Creator and the Adversary, p. 142.

8. Summary and Conclusions

1) Since time immemorial religious men have characterized as demons, devils, and dark legions the agencies behind natural catastrophes, diseases of mind and body, and, in general, all evils seemingly beyond human responsibility. By this, man has sought to offer a realistic explanation for powers of evil which are in some sense aggressive, vicious, and almost calculating in their capacities to undercut and destroy man's values. The powers or agencies of evil in man's world seem to be something more than parasitic on powers and structures of good. They seem to possess initiative and influence great enough of themselves to account for the downward, "gravitational" run of all life.

Tillich, well aware of the dynamic aggressiveness of discreative powers in all of life has sought to account for them as based in non-being, a factor within being-itself. Being constantly "overcomes" (works on or even "against") nonbeing. Tillich uses a vocabulary of work and struggle in his description of this relation of being to non-being. He seeks to write a metaphysic which is relevant to the sense of struggle between forces of good and evil, creativity and discreativity, which man senses in experience. Tillich, having posited the ground of this ultimate struggle within being-itself (a positive concept, although transcending the dialectic of positive and negative terminology), and having sought to relate being and nonbeing by a kind of dialectical reason, is not safely away from the problem found in dialectical idealism. The problem is one of realistically explaining brute, irrational aspects of life which seem extraneous to neat, positive, monistic systems of reason. Man knows experiences of separation from meaning and God which refuse to be subsumed in any meaningful, dialectical correlation of

positive-negative being within a monistic ground of being-itself.

Wieman seeks to account for irrational, discreative powers at work in the world in terms of natural forces of inertia, contingency, or blind brutishness which have power and existence independently from the creative process. Although this does seem realistically to account for certain experiences man has, it does not yet explain the insidious, calculating power of evil which destroys creation and obstructs creativity with such precision. Wieman's evil is radical evil in that it comes from no common root with good, nor is there any assurance of the final victory of good over it. Yet, it lacks the capacity for the initiatory cunning and calculation which Lewis, for example, has sought to interpret in his concept of the Adversary.

Lewis, with Wieman, holds that the ultimate source of evil must be in some sense independent from the source of good. Lewis proceeds to describe this source of evil, the Adversary, as having characteristics ideally "personal," in a negative sense. The Adversary is the "evil man" against the "good man." Although Lewis admits his inability to define totally this evil power, his description of the work of this power in terms of irrational and discreative experiences known to (and known in) the human person is highly meaningful and, in a sense, very realistic to man. The philosophical shortcomings of Lewis' concept of the Adversary have been noted in the previous chapter. The religious significance and meaningfulness of his concept is emphasized here.

2) Wieman and Lewis hold that human values are in some sense rooted in ultimate reality. A God who has relevance for man must be a God of values relevant to man. Tillich, on the other hand, holds that ontology transcends axiology; the ultimate ground of value is a God of

being who greatly transcends the values of finite man. Value is in some sense less ultimate than being. If this be so, then man's axiological problems and religious convictions of the ultimacy of value lose their absolute import. Terms like "estrangement," "fall," or "demonic," as Tillich employs them, all suggest an ultimate value-reality, yet ultimate reality for Tillich transcends value.

Wieman claims that the ultimate cause of meaningful creation is also the ultimate ground of values which are relevant to man. But when he calls this ultimate causal process for "concretion" and "interaction" supermental, superpersonal, and transcendent over conscious purpose, one finds it impossible to assert that man's values are not utterly transcended in such a reality.

Lewis describes God as the ground of human values by attributing to God a structure basically akin to personality. If man is created in the image of God, and his values are rooted in God, then the ultimate nature of God cannot be said to transcend utterly personality. Lewis, it is true, does claim that God is more than personality, yet he never makes much of a case for "what more" than personality God is. In the present context, it seems fair to say that the belief that the values of human personality are rooted in, and supported by, God is most meaningfully declared by Lewis who holds that God, although transcending the structure of personality, transcends it in a way which is inclusive of, and not far removed from, personality.

3) All three thinkers presented see Jesus Christ as a revelation of God's immanent, sympathetic concern for man's plight and also as a revelation of God's transcendent capacity for victory over evil. Tillich places his emphasis on man's new inward attitude of courageous faith in

God through Jesus Christ. Lewis' emphasis seems to be on the objective victory of God revealed in Jesus Christ--a victory over the ultimate resources and strategies of the Adversary which were directed against Jesus Christ. Wieman's emphasis is placed insightfully on the creative, redeeming community of faith founded in Jesus Christ. In all three, the redemptive power of God which is continuously victorious over evil (for as long as meaningful creation endures) is made available to man in Jesus Christ by God's grace.

Wieman refuses to say whether God will finally triumph over the forces of opposition. Lewis holds that the normative victory of God has been won in Jesus Christ, but it is a victory which was not won, nor can it be maintained, without an element of divine risk. Victory which is realistic for man must follow, or be maintained by, a struggle in which there are realistic risks of defeat borne both by God and man. Tillich speaks of God's victory won in Christ and of the ultimate victory of God over evil expressed in the symbol of the eschaton. Yet, where the transcendent priority of positive being is never in doubt as in Tillich's system, somehow the victory seems to be not only inevitable but, perhaps, a kind of foregone conclusion which is devastating to faith. It is paradoxical (i.e. contrary to expectation) that God should struggle with evil under the terms of finite, human existence, according to Tillich. But, given God's willingness to do so, victory seems certain. For man, whose victories are won by struggle, risk, and daring faith, and whose savior, Jesus Christ, seemed to win his victory this same way, Tillich's ontology may be somewhat self-defeating in so far as it is supposed to serve as a ground for man's courageous faith in God's victorious power. It is in danger of offering man grounds for an over-secure, "take-it-

for-granted" assurance of victory.

4) In the consideration of the relationship of divine immanence to divine transcendence, Tillich presents deep psychological insights into the nature of divine, soteriological immanence as it pertains to man's experience of redemption. On the other hand, although Tillich has made a significant attempt (from the standpoint of philosophy) to correlate the "near" and "far" aspects of God, from the Christian religious point of view the question may be raised as to the value of his utterly transcendent God above God. This is the God of ontology, the God of being-itself, the philosophical absolute. But the high God of religion must still be a God who creates, a God of mankind, a God of values who is a good God, and a God of worship who is an approachable God.

One senses the liability of divine transcendence for religious man in Wieman, too. It seems strange to speak of a transcendent God in naturalism, yet, a God who is supermental, superpersonal, without conscious purpose, and whose ultimate nature is only evoked or implied (in a distant way) by religious symbols is a God whose transcendent nature does not seem capable of meaningful correlation with His dimension of immanence.

For Lewis, Jesus Christ did not just "participate" in God (Tillich) nor "experimentally illustrate" God (Wieman). He revealed the very nature of God--a God of conscious purpose and concern for creation. This is a God who may inclusively transcend personal structure, but who is never utterly beyond the reach of description in terms of personality structure. Here, and again under the heading of worship, the suggestion has been made that God's relationship of immanence and transcendence can be rendered intelligible for man only in terms of divine personality

structure. This is because man finds that self-transcendence (or the correlation of immanence and transcendence within a single reality) can be illustrated only in terms of his own personality.

5) Man's approach to God by worship oscillates between moments of awe before the transcendent God and communion with the immanent God. Wieman, Tillich, and Lewis all seek to account for this fact. However, in Tillich and Wieman there is a dimension of worship suggested which verges upon mystical "unification" or "absorption." The suggestion has been made that where God is defined as a process or being who cannot be objectified, and as the ground or process of one's own existence rather than as a creator distinct from His creation, then one is hard pressed to maintain symbols in worship which attribute to God so much that is either denied or held to be utterly mysterious in ontology (i.e., personality, objective distance from the worshipper).

The vocabulary and concepts used by Lewis in his theory of worship are very much like those he uses in theoretical discussion. This is made possible by his use of carefully thought out personalistic concepts of God. These are the concepts of personality structure in terms of which man meets all experienceable reality. Thus, personalistic symbols which, according to Tillich and Wieman, may "participate in" or "evoke" reality, according to Lewis describe the reality by which they are created and supported.

In all of this, Lewis maintains that God is more than man in terms of knowledge, power, or goodness. Yet, God is more than man in ways which are not inconsistent with the ways in which He is like man, or, as it should be said, the ways in which man is like (in the image of) God. The question has been raised here as to what can be meant by

Tillich and Wieman who claim that God transcends personality, but that in His transcendence He can be spoken of only in terms of symbols relevant to personality. If personality has an infinite capacity for self-transcendence without ceasing to be personality, then, so far as man's experience is concerned, all things said to be more than personal may as likely be construed simply as other than personality, or, in a sense, even less than personality. That is, what transcends personality may be "more" than personality in terms of sheer power or being, but less than personality in terms of conscious purpose and love. For religious man of the tradition considered here, that to which he bows must not transcend personality but be a greater person than himself. Of the thinkers presented, Lewis comes the closest to saying and supporting just this.

6) In the experience of redemption, according to all three thinkers, man comes to see evil as whatever separates him from God (i.e., renders him incapable of a redemptive and life-giving relation with God) and good as whatever re-establishes a right relation with God. According to Wieman, Lewis, and Tillich, God's way, or purpose, or will for the nature of creation is consistent throughout this redemption. That is, man, though redeemed (and brought to right relation with God) is still man, and nature is still nature. Man is saved in the world of suffering and strife, not out of it. He is given an outlook of faith, courage, and confidence in God, and he undertakes to work with God to transform his lot in the world by overcoming, redeeming, and protecting himself against, evil.

In Tillich, redeemed man finds confidence in the priority of being over nonbeing both in the universe and in himself. This is his ground of courage. In Wieman, man is committed to the creative process

which relates elements of disvalue from smaller systems of meaning to make them values in larger systems of meaning. This is a process which also overcomes or "succeeds" whatever obstructs and "refuses" such relation. Wieman presents meaningful insight here into man's experience of the redemption of evil. Lewis calls for committed faith in the continuing work of the Creator for the support and fulfillment of creation. This is a work of redemption in which man, in the image of God, can participate. In the case of all three thinkers, however, redeemed man is seen to exist in a world which God does not somehow alter after man's redemption. Hence, redeemed man resides in the same world in which he was formerly unredeemed. God's will or plan for His natural creation seems to be quite stable and consistent throughout redemption.

According to the three thinkers, an aspect of the consistent nature and purpose of God is implied in the stabilities of nature. The fact that God does not disrupt such natural stabilities to save individuals from harm in instances when man misuses or misinterprets natural stabilities is not considered to be a symptom of divine unconcern or indifference. It is held to be evidence of God's self-consistent purpose for the maintenance of free creatures in a stable world. However, according to all three, one aspect of God's redemption is the gradual enlightenment of man's mind, his increase of natural knowledge, leading to his prediction and control of natural stabilities by which he was formerly hurt through ignorance. It is noted by all three that if God works with man to bring about this enlightenment, but does so with consistent respect for man's own freedom (by which man may give himself to this venture or obstruct this venture), such enlightenment must be a slow process. This is tragic when one considers the long plight of pre-

enlightened (or presently unenlightened) men who have suffered and died often by reason of the "unscientific" century and culture in which they were born.

Wieman and Lewis have offered meaningful concepts of a struggling God working with man (against obstacles), not just on man, to bring about the conditions for the gradual enlightenment of man's mind. In the case of Tillich, the only obstacle which God faces in His work for man's enlightenment (in terms of "technical knowledge" or the enlargement of natural knowledge) is man's limited mental capacity and human "obstinacy." Man does not readily use his mind for God's purposes. Yet, where God transcends and is ground of all, the tedious clearing away of human ignorance for the obtainment of relief from physical pain, which even "obstinate" humans desire, seems very long in coming. Lewis and Wieman believe that this aspect of redemption, namely, the development of human knowledge for the prediction and control of nature where possible, suggests a struggle against metaphysical factors in which God as well as man participates to bring to pass the creative conditions for human knowledge and control. In this, of course, man may be responsible for the increased length of the struggle by refusing to use freely his mind to search for redeeming knowledge. But this refusal is not the sole reason for the tragic length of time taken by this redemptive process.

7) Another aspect of redemption has been considered. This is man's co-operation with the work of God through ethical action to redeem, overcome, or defend himself against, evils in human experience. Such ethical opposition to evil requires courage based on confidence in the good power of God in the world—power with which man can be allied. Although Tillich speaks much about the nature of the believer's courage

and "in-spite-of" attitude toward evil (and in this Tillich's work is most insightful), he is strangely silent on the matter of ethics stemming from such courage for the opposition of evil. Lewis and Wieman, on the other hand, have much to say on the matter of ethics. This is suggestive of the fact that the God in whom man not only has faith, but the God whom he in some sense emulates courageously, is, according to Lewis and Wieman, a kind of ethical worker or struggler (literally in Lewis, and symbollically in Wieman). Tillich's God, the transcendent abyss, the self-fulfilled God of aseity, is more likely to inspire mystical confidence than activistic ethics.

All three thinkers realize that the symbol of a suffering God in Christianity not only suggests that God is intimately acquainted with man's troubles, but also that redeemed man is likely to become more intimately acquainted with God's experience of suffering. Man redeemed by a suffering God takes up his cross and suffers for the world with God. Man bears vicariously the sufferings of the world in the belief that through him God may redeem the world in small part. All three thinkers have sought to analyze the confidence and courage of redeemed man who enters this trustful service of God. It is here that Tillich's system of thought presents deep insights into man's confidence in positive being in the face of negative experiences based on nonbeing. Tillich notes in man a prior confidence in knowledge where doubt is possible, a prior assurance of righteousness where guilt is sensed, and a prior confidence in life in the face of anxiety over death. It is God who is the ultimate guarantor of these undeniable priorities in man's experience.

8) Religious man's desire for the survival of his values (values which can only survive within the unique personality which bears them)

and his desire for the fulfillment of the potentialities within him cause him to look beyond this life. Of the thinkers presented, only Lewis answers this quest. Tillich holds that eternal continuance of existence or eternal time-continuation are contradictions in terms inasmuch as they make eternal the influence of nonbeing as limitation on being under the conditions of existence. Thus, for Tillich, eternal life can only mean a life made qualitatively rich in the knowledge that it is presently grounded in and obedient to God. Wieman believes that personal immortality is unscientific, hence, to be discounted. However, his theory does seek to account for the survival of personal values in society. This raises a serious question as to whether society can either receive or long maintain the values of unique personalities. Likewise, this offers no opportunity for the fulfillment of potentialities of value still in every man at his death. It is difficult for religious man who has known something of the goodness of God to believe that God is finally more wasteful of his values and potentialities than ever he was at his best.

Lewis, who made earlier the most explicit defense for the belief that ontology does not precede axiology but that the God of ultimate reality is a God of humanly relevant values, now pursues a consistent strategy on the human plane to say that personality does not have value (which may or may not survive its receptacle, personality) but that personality is value. Thus, the survival of personal values demands the survival of the persons in some form. Lewis' man is not driven to belief in immortality by dissatisfaction with this world's unredeemed evils and inscrutable justice. Rather, it is precisely the quality of redeemed living in this world which points beyond itself to greater fulfillment.

According to Lewis, redeemed life hereafter must be consistent with redeemed life in this world. That is, it must be creative and growing. Creativity and growth suggest obstacles to be surmounted, work to be done, struggles to be won, and victory to be secured. In this vision of life hereafter, by the terms of Lewis' system, it would seem that the power of evil is finally brought to subserve the good. Evil is "led captive." The victory of the Creator over the Adversary is won, but the victory must be creatively maintained. Thus, God's creative love in His creatures whom He has redeemed from evil reaches out through them toward infinite possibilities of self-fulfillment for both God and man here and hereafter.

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ABSTRACT

Writings by Henry Nelson Wieman, Edwin Lewis, and Paul Tillich are explored for elements constituting theories of natural evil. These elements are presented within the contexts of their respective systems of thought, and the resulting positions on natural evil are critically compared from the standpoints of philosophical understanding and religious significance.

Although all three thinkers hold that the ultimate ground of life's polarities is in some sense knowable, the God of Lewis, the supernaturalistic dualist, is much more objectifiable and specifiable than the naturalistic, superpersonal God of Wieman or Tillich's ground of being.

All three hold that human experiences of limitation, contradiction, and negativity bespeak a ground of negative experience. For Wieman, it is brute forces in nature; for Tillich, nonbeing; and for Lewis, the Adversary. Divine transcendence over the ground of evil to account for the priority of meaning and value in the world is less intelligible in Wieman and Tillich than in Lewis. The common ground of opposition between positive and negative powers is unexplained in all three. Lewis never explains the surviving unity of the totally discreative Adversary. Although Tillich's insights into the nature of God's redemptive immanence are profound, both he and Wieman, unlike Lewis, fail to make plain the relation of the ultimate and immanent aspects of

God.

For all three, the fulfillment of human personality through a right relation to God is the criterion of values. Yet, only in Lewis do such personal values have any specifiable rooting in a God described in personal terms. The relation of values to God is unintelligible in terms of Wieman's superpersonal process or Tillich's being-itself.

Tillich has sought to explain the mingling of natural and moral evil in experience by his concept of the Fall. This is not utterly unlike Wieman's concept of the idolatry of the created. Lewis' concept of titanic forces battling over and in man, however, best illuminates experiences of natural evil.

Lewis and Wieman have defined God as all-good and very powerful. Tillich has sought to define God as all-good and all-powerful.

It is questionable whether the neat, dialectical ontology in Tillich or the concept of brute forces of nature in Wieman can account for aspects of irrational viciousness and calculating aggressiveness in experiences of natural evil (described as works of demons, devils, and demon possession). The work of Lewis' Adversary is meaningful at this point.

God's victory over evil in Jesus Christ and His final victory over evil in the eschaton seems uncertain in Wieman, too certain in Tillich, and quite realistic and risk-filled in Lewis.

Lewis' language of devotion is often similar to his language of theoretical discussion. In Tillich and Wieman, too much that is asserted in the symbolism of worship is denied or doubted in theoretical exposition.

According to all three thinkers, man is redeemed in the world of suffering and tragedy. A consistent God cannot disrupt natural stabil-

ities or structures of human freedom. However, the enlargement of man's natural knowledge by which man may predict and control nature is an aspect of redemption from natural evils.

Tillich presents deep insights into the nature of the mystical, courageous confidence of redeemed man in God in spite of continuing doubt, guilt, and anxiety. Strangely missing in his thought is any ethical view which sees man as an active co-worker with a vicariously suffering God for the redemption of the world.

Tillich presents a concept of presently qualitative "eternal life," and Wieman, a concept of accumulative, social immortality. Both theories fail to account for the survival or fulfillment of the unique values which are in, or are, human personalities. Only Lewis presents meaningful concepts of eternal life and immortality.

'AUTOBIOGRAPHY'



George E. LaMore, Jr.

George Edward LaMore, Jr. was born June 17, 1930 in North Adams, Massachusetts, the only child of George and Victoria LaMore. His father was an electrician, his mother, a nurse. It was his maternal grandfather, John Bird, a lay preacher in a variety of denominations, who caused his

interest to focus early on the Christian ministry. Raised in North Adams, he became very active in the youth program of the local Methodist Church in which he received further encouragement for his interest in the ministry.

In 1949 he graduated with highest honors from Drury High School where he had been editor-in-chief of both the school newspaper and the literary magazine, had acted in a number of dramatic productions, played violin and drum in the orchestra and band respectively, and participated in a number of sports. He received a General Scholarship to Williams College where he majored in philosophy. Graduating in 1953 with the B. A. degree, he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

While a student at Williams College, George LaMore was student pastor of Federated parishes in Lanesboro and Berkshire, Massachusetts from 1949 to 1950, and the Methodist Churches at North Hoosick and Eagle Bridge, New York from 1950 to 1951. In 1951 he was appointed pastor of the Methodist Churches in Adams, Massachusetts and Stamford, Vermont, near his home town. He remained in this parish during the remainder of his college career and throughout the six years of his study in Boston University School of Theology, which he entered in 1953. That year he married Jane Esther Blackburn of Lanesboro, Massachusetts, who had been the organist of his first parish.

Practical parish experience served to enrich George LaMore's formal, academic preparation for the ministry. Experiences in the parish prompted pertinent questions in seminary study, and insights gained in seminary received ready application and practical testing in the parish. George LaMore graduated from Boston University School of Theology in 1956, receiving the degree of S. T. B. magna cum laude. He

was also elected Roswell R. Robinson Fellow and began studies at Boston University School of Theology for the degree of Doctor of Theology in the department of systematic theology.

Throughout his pastoral experience he has found people deeply interested in doctrinal preaching. Youths and adults have shown profound interest in philosophy of religion and modern interpretations of basic Christian beliefs. Mr. LaMore has sought to meet the needs thus indicated through speaking, preaching, seminar leadership, and pastoral counseling. He has found that one of the most crucial problems on which laymen persistently desire insights is the problem of natural evil--evil for which man cannot be held reasonably responsible. If a good and powerful God is creator, sustainer, and ruler of the universe, then how can man understand, bear, and overcome such natural evils as earthquakes, volcanoes, cancer, children born idiots, certain causative factors of mental illness, and the reality of death and dissolution? In the face of this persistent and crucial question from laymen, pastoral concern and intellectual curiosity have combined to lead the author to write this present dissertation.